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The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall receive, within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, the most constant protection and security for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect the full protection and security required by international law.
This chapter tests the hypotheses developed in Chapter One, first using a series of multilevel models and a dataset of over one million Russian firms. It finds empirical support that the presence of economic competition from rivals and weak political parties drive the decision to enter politics by affecting the benefits to be derived from holding office, while only those firms with sufficient resources and in poorer regions can cover the substantial costs of running. Businesspeople run for office when the commitment problem of transacting with politicians through other means is exacerbated. I then show the findings also come through using analysis of a survey of 654 Russian firms conducted in 2016. Finally, I draw on qualitative evidence from 70 interviews in three Russian regions (Tomsk, Ryazan, and Perm) to illuminate just how competition and weak parties incentivize businessperson candidacy.
This chapter looks at three types of decisions businesspeople must make once they decide to run for office. First, I take advantage of Russia’s mixed-member electoral system to develop and test hypotheses about when businesspeople run in single-member districts rather than on party lists. Using the same dataset presented in Chapter Two, I find evidence that the autonomy offered by an SMD seat is more highly valued since it provides for uninhibited and open lobbying of firm interests. Next, I investigate how businesspeople approach the issue of party alignment, showing how firm characteristics such as ownership and asset specificity (which require different types of benefits from the state) increase the appeal of aligning with the ruling party. I also show that rivals join opposing political parties in order to push for their own individual interests. At least with regard to businessperson candidates, politics is just another arena for direct competitors to protect their interests against one another. Finally, I investigate why some firms send employees other than their firm directors into public office. A final set of analysis tests this set of hypotheses linking the decision to delegate candidacy to the degree of politician shirking experienced.
It is well known that regime types affect international conflicts. This article explores political parties as a mechanism through which they do so. Political parties operate in fundamentally different ways in democracies vs. non-democracies, which has consequences for foreign policy. Core supporters of a party in a democracy, if they are hawkish, may be more successful at demanding hawkish behavior from their party representatives than would be their counterparts in an autocracy. The study draws on evidence from paired experiments in democratic Japan and non-democratic China to show that supporters of the ruling party in Japan punish their leaders for discouraging nationalist protests, while ruling party insiders in China are less likely to do so. Under some circumstances, then, non-democratic regimes may be better able to rein in peace-threatening displays of nationalism.
The International Criminal Court is a distinct international organization headquartered in The Hague. It works in close cooperation with the United Nations but is independent of it. The Court is composed of four ‘organs’: the Presidency, the Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry. The Presidency consists of the President and the two Vice-Presidents, who are elected by the Plenary of judges. Judges are elected by the Assembly of States Parties to terms of nine years; they must be nationals of a State Party. The judges are constituted into Divisions, for Appeals, Trials and Pre-Trial proceedings. Within each division may be one or more Chambers. The Appeals Chamber is generally composed of five judges while the other Chambers are generally made up of three judges, although a Single Judge may issue rulings in some cases. The head of the Office of the Prosecutor is the Prosecutor, who is elected to a nine-year term by the Assembly of States Parties. The Registrar is nominated by the judges but elected by the Assembly of States Parties and serves a term of five years. The Registrar is the principal administrative officer. The Court’s annual budget is proposed by its organs but must be confirmed by the Assembly of States Parties.
Chapter 2 dwells upon the operationalization of the reparative dimension of international criminal justice at the international level, with a focus on the historical evolution of reparations by international criminal courts and tribunals prior to the ICC, and the reparative justice model devised by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). The goal of this chapter is to retrace the diverse models in place in international criminal tribunals in regards to reparations, from a model that excludes reparations from criminal proceedings to one that has a role for victims and encompasses reparative dimensions of justice. Concerning the latter, this chapter analyzes in-depth the reparation regime developed at the ECCC, including the role of parties civiles, and the rich developing case law of the court regarding reparations. This chapter provides a careful analysis of all decisions on reparations and submissions of the parties, it engages with critical scholarship on the system developed at the ECCC, the impact of reparation orders for victims and discusses practical and policy considerations of the types of reparation that can be ordered (collective and moral reparations). It also analyses the partie civile system under which the ECCC operates and discusses the contribution of the evolving case law to the development of reparative justice for international crimes.
The rise in support for anti-political-establishment parties (APEp), especially since the beginning of the 2008 Great Recession, has put democracy in peril. Some scholars have warned us about the negative implications the recent rise of APEp might have for the development of democracy in Western Europe. For that reason, it is important we begin to understand what generates APEp’s electoral success. Drawing on a new comparative dataset that examines all Western European democracies from 1849 until 2017, the current article attempts to provide an explanation. In particular, our analyses examine three alternative explanations put forward by the literature: economic, institutional, and sociological. Our results show that it is not economic performance but both institutional and sociological change which together can help to understand the current wave of support for APEp.
Chapter 5 on amendment, modification, and revision is organically linked with the former chapter on interpretation. It deals with the possibility of a temporal motion of a treaty through amendment, modification or revision. This may lead to either increase (auxesis), diminution (meiosis), or even alteration (alloiosis) of a treaty. The chapter goes through the development of the rules of amendment and modification in the VCLT, and also examines the contemporary development of the law of treaties through conferences of parties established by multilateral environmental agreements. This practice has led to new approaches to treaty modification, which did not exist in classical international law. It may be said that such modifications are effected through secondary legislation, which in turn may lead to the questions of legitimacy. This chapter concludes with an examination of the patterns of amendment and modification that emerge from the multilateral treaties that have been registered in the League of Nations and United Nations Treaty Series.
In this article, we examine how labour market policy interventions, notably short-time work (STW), affect voting behaviour in times of electoral downturn. We use the 2009 German general elections as an example. This is a particularly interesting case because the grand coalition of Christian democrats (CDU/CSU) and social democrats (SPD) was up for re-election against the backdrop of a major recession following the 2007/08 financial crisis and extensively used STW policies to counteract rising unemployment. Interestingly, STW policy and unemployment vary considerably between regions. We exploit this variance to create a unique dataset that combines regional information on STW policy and unemployment in 299 German electoral constituencies with individual data from the post-election survey. Our results show that especially the SPD profited from high STW rates at constituency level on election day, but this policy was insufficient to preclude the major losses social democrats suffered during the election. More generally, our results indicate that classic labour market policy can generate electoral support for social democratic parties, even as a “junior partner” in a grand coalition. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether such support is sufficient for electoral victories.
Chapter 7 discusses the relation between scale and various forms of political participation. Why do some political communities elicit higher levels of participation than others? In this chapter, we argue, following a long tradition, that community size has important, and markedly negative, effects on political participation. We begin with a discussion of relevant theory, in which we build on the assumption that political participation is motivated, to some degree, by instrumental rationality. This rationality is affected by a variety of factors, among which are individual power, citizens’ access to relevant policymakers, coordination problems, and social norms, which in turn are affected by the scale of a community. We explore the relationship between scale and participation by looking at work on citizen assemblies, political parties, voting, efficacy, and the results of a recent meta-analysis. Subsequently, we provide our own analyses of voter turnout based on the Multilevel Elections Archive (MLEA) dataset. Virtually all studies corroborate the consensus that participation – including subjective feelings of efficacy – is lower in larger communities, all other things being equal.
This article examines the 2019 European Parliament election in the UK. The main beneficiaries were the newly formed Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats, both of which ran on clear Brexit platforms, while the Conservatives and Labour struggled to attract support. But the Brexit focus of the campaign – and the victory of parties with clear positions on these issues – belied the extent to which the election conformed to the expectations of second-order contest theory, with low turnout, declining support for the governing (Conservative) party, a surge in support for new and small parties, and scant discussion of European Union-level issues. While the vote shows realignment in the UK continues and can tell us much about the shifting politics of Brexit, we should be cautious inferring much from the victory of the Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats given the second-order nature of the contest.
Scholars, the media, and ordinary people alike express alarm at the apparent loathing between Democrats and Republicans in the mass public. However, the evidence of such loathing typically comes from survey items that measure attitudes toward the Democratic and Republican Parties, rather than attitudes toward ordinary partisans. Using a nationally representative survey, I find that Democrats and Republicans have substantially more positive feelings toward ordinary people belonging to the opposing party than they do toward politicians in the opposing party and the opposing party itself. These results indicate that research relying on measures of feelings toward the opposing “Party” vastly overstates levels of partisan animosity in the American public and demonstrate the need to distinguish between attitudes toward party elites and ordinary partisans in future research.
The Philippines stands out as the first and longest democracy in Southeast Asia. However, except for elections, democracy in the Philippines is a low quality or ‘defective democracy’. In this chapter, we first empirically document the low quality of Philippine democracy. We then advance an argument that explains the pathological condition of Philippine democracy in terms of the fecklessness of its core institutional structures. This institutional weakness can be explained by two significant historical-structural factors: the sequencing of the advent of electoral democracy vis-a-vis the building of the state and the absence of social cleavages in the Philippines. The advent of electoral democracy in the Philippines prior to any effort to build a functioning, autonomous and rationalized bureaucratic state has effectively created favorable conditions for traditional oligarchs to dominate state structures since the American colonial days. The fact that social cleavages never became articulated into the party system has further led to the creation of political parties as clientelistic shells, devoid of any substantive, programmatic agenda that would serve the public good.
South Korea is a success story in terms of institutional development. Not only did the country build a high-capacity ‘developmental state’ in the early second half of the 20th century but, towards the end of the 20th century, Koreans also witnessed the replacement of autocratic rule by a liberal democratic regime. The sequencing of these development stages seems to support ‘stateness first’ arguments, which claim that succesful democratization requires certain degrees of infrastructural capacity and citizen agreement. And, in fact, the ‘developmental state’ significantly facilitated the survival and rooting of South Korea’s democracy. However, as this chapter show, the process of state-building under autocratic rule left behind institutional legacies that continue to hinder democratic consolidation – in particular an under-institutionalized party system and a weak civil society. More generally, the chapter shows that the state-democracy nexus can be subject to path-dependent effects.
This article contests the view that the strong positive correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and far right party success necessarily constitutes evidence in support of the cultural grievance thesis. We argue that the success of far right parties depends on their ability to mobilize a coalition of interests between their core supporters, that is voters with cultural grievances over immigration and the often larger group of voters with economic grievances over immigration. Using individual level data from eight rounds of the European Social Survey, our empirical analysis shows that while cultural concerns over immigration are a stronger predictor of far right party support, those who are concerned with the impact of immigration on the economy are important to the far right in numerical terms. Taken together, our findings suggest that economic grievances over immigration remain pivotal within the context of the transnational cleavage.
Why are populist radical right parties (PRRPs) more successful in some countries than in others? This question is analysed here by focusing on Belgium. While Flanders (the northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) was home to one of the strongest far-right movements in Europe, Wallonia (the southern, francophone part) has remained ‘immune’ to such tendencies. The article argues that different historical experiences have given rise to a hostile political environment for PRRPs in Wallonia, where mainstream parties and the media have created a successful cordon sanitaire. In Flanders, mainstream parties and the media have gradually become more accommodative towards PRRPs. By emphasizing the sociopolitical context in which parties operate, the findings suggest that the reactions of mainstream parties and the media are crucial to understanding the success of PRRPs. The conclusion reflects on potential lessons to be drawn from the Belgian case for mainstream parties and media practitioners elsewhere.
This article examines the conditions under which interest groups interact with political parties. Existing research finds that interest group–political party interactions in most western democracies have become more open and contingent over time. The close ideological and formal organisational ties that once characterised these relations have gradually been replaced by alternative, more pragmatic forms of cooperation. However, most of this research stresses the importance of the structural factors underpinning these links over time and across countries, but sheds little light on the factors driving short-term interest group–party interactions. Here, by drawing on survey data on Spanish interest groups obtained between December 2016 and May 2017, this article seeks to fill this gap by taking into account party status, issue salience and a group’s resources as explanatory variables. It shows that mainstream parties are the primary targets of interest groups, that groups dealing with salient issues are more likely to contact political parties and that the groups with most resources interact with a larger number of parties.
I present a novel measure of partisan alignment between firms and employees. This measure is constructed using data matching 1,691,790 US federal campaign contribution filings of 85,109 individuals to the donations of 874 Political Action Committees (PACs) of publicly listed US companies between 2003 and 2016. The alignment measure shows that employee and employer contributions are highly correlated. Furthermore, firm- and occupation-level factors are significantly associated with firm–employee alignment. Uniquely, these new data can be easily linked to external data on industries, firms, and occupations and consequently allow for in-depth analysis of precisely how companies can influence employees’ politics.
This chapter examines how different political groups organized the rural sector during the Second Republic. Socialism remained heavily influenced by orthodox Marxism, and their policies centred almost exclusively on improving the living standards of the landless labourers, a group that represented just 5 per cent of Spain’s active population. Both large and small family farmers had to pay higher wagers at a time of weak farm prices and technical difficulties to increasing farm output.The legislation of the first republican-socialist coalition governments of 1931 and 1932 threatened traditional property rights and religious privileges, finally drawing both the Church and rural elites into mass party competitive politics. While a small but influential sector never accepted either the 1931 Constitution or a democratic republic, a new conservative party (CEDA) attracted support from across the country in defence of property rights, the Church, and Spain’s political unity. By 1933, it claimed around 800,000 members. The chapter ends by showing how the significant regional land-tenure regimes helped develop strong regional political movements in Galicia and Catalonia.