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Kansas’ tumultuous, violent early years drove the development of a distinctively intrusive, inexpert model of reform. The KCIR was a clear elaboration upon this historical pattern. Constitutional restraints left the state persistently underfinanced. The conflicts of the Bleeding Kansas period catalyzed political and mob violence that persisted until the 1890s. Progressive Republicans, the dominant political force in Kansas from the 1890s through the 1920s, thus developed an aggressive program of regulation of economic and personal conduct, a program not reliant on rational administration, for which there was no fiscal capacity or expertise, but upon an expansive legal conception of regulatory (or flatly coercive) interventions justifiable by appeal to the public interest. These reforms were often ineffective or too bold to withstand scrutiny in the US Supreme Court. The state’s leaders, like Governor Allen, had considerable first-hand experience with the difficulties, and in many cases the violence, of settlement: Their commitment to the state’s forceful variant of progressivism rose from deep and genuine fear of social disorder.
Foundation models – models trained on broad data that can be adapted to a wide range of downstream tasks – can pose significant risks, ranging from intimate image abuse, cyberattacks, to bioterrorism. To reduce these risks, policymakers are starting to impose obligations on the developers of these models. However, downstream developers – actors who fine-tune or otherwise modify foundational models – can create or amplify risks by improving a model’s capabilities or compromising its safety features. This can make rules on upstream developers ineffective. One way to address this issue could be to impose direct obligations on downstream developers. However, since downstream developers are numerous, diverse, and rapidly growing in number, such direct regulation may be both practically challenging and stifling to innovation. A different approach would be to require upstream developers to mitigate downstream modification risks (e.g., by restricting what modifications can be made). Another approach would be to use alternative policy tools (e.g., clarifying how existing tort law applies to downstream developers or issuing voluntary guidance to help mitigate downstream modification risks). We expect that regulation on upstream developers to mitigate downstream modification risks will be necessary. Although further work is needed, regulation of downstream developers may also be warranted where they retain the ability to increase risk to an unacceptable level.
Local news is in crisis. Too few subscribers are willing to pay the costs required to create sustained and high-quality local news products, and the advertisers that previously subsidized local news have fled to new sites, especially social media platforms. Press organizations and policymakers have begun experimenting with possible fixes. Media institutions have looked to new private funding models, especially nonprofit institutions supported by philanthropic foundations. And state legislators have begun testing different public financing vehicles for local media. Yet these efforts represent only a small set of possible solutions to the crisis in local news. And they have proven insufficient to save news organizations from financial devastation. This chapter argues that the local news crisis should be understood as an innovation failure, one that calls for solutions from areas of the law that have long grappled with similar problems. In markets like pharmaceuticals and technology, policymakers often employ “innovation policy pluralism,” or combinations of intellectual property protections with non-IP tools such as prizes, grants, and tax credits. Such combinations harness both free-market forces and government regulation to foster socially valuable services in productive ways. This chapter surveys these different innovation policy levers and maps them onto both existing and proposed local press interventions.
Breastfeeding is the recommended way to feed infants. However, a safe and nutritious substitute for human milk is needed for infants when breastfeeding is not possible. As infants are a vulnerable population group, infant formula products are regulated by prescriptive provisions for composition and labelling. Any changes to the composition of these products must be established as safe prior to being permitted. As our knowledge of human milk expands, infant formula ingredients are developed to better replicate it. Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) has assessed the addition of ingredients for the addition to infant formula products including human identical milk oligosaccharides (HiMOs) isolated using precision fermentation methodology. These ingredients are considered to be nutritive substances as their addition to food is intended to achieve specific nutritional purposes. In accordance with the Ministerial Policy Guidelines, FSANZ must assess both the safety and the health effect of nutritive substances for their use in infant formula. FSANZ risk assessments are undertaken by a multidisciplinary team covering toxicological and nutritional considerations using the best available scientific evidence. FSANZ assessments of the health effects concluded that the use of HiMOs in infant formula products would have a beneficial outcome for infants and align with the equivalent role of these substances in human milk(1,2). The weight of evidence supports health effects through an increase in the abundance of Bifidobacterium spp. in the infant gut microbiota, anti-pathogenic effects, inflammatory suppression and facilitation of appropriate immune responses and antigenic memory. FSANZ safety and technical assessments concluded that there are no public health and safety concerns associated with adding HiMOs to infant formula products(1, 2). The permitted levels are comparable to levels in human milk and are chemically and structurally identical to the naturally occurring forms. Food Standards Australia New Zealand, Canberra, 2606, Australia Based on the available evidence and intended purpose, a number of HiMOs have been permitted for use in infant formula products including 2′- fucosyllactose, lacto-N-neotetraose, difucosyllactose, lacto-N-tetraose, 3'-sialyllactose sodium salt, 6'-sialyllactose sodium salt. Evidence continues to emerge on the beneficial effects of HiMOs on infant health.
From its origins in ancient Mesopotamia, through the advent of coinage in ancient Greece and Rome and the invention of paper currency in medieval China, the progress of finance and money has been driven by technological developments. The great technological change of our age in relation to money centres on the creation of digital money and digital payment systems. Money in Crisis explains what the digital revolution in money is, why it matters and how its potential benefits can be realized or undermined. It explores the history, theory and evolving technologies underlying money and warns us that money is in crisis: under threat from inflation, financial instability, and digital wizardry. It discusses how modern forms of digital money (crypto, central bank digital currencies) fit into monetary history and explains the benefits and risks of recent innovations from an economic, political, social and cultural viewpoint.
The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) on plastic pollution are United Nations member states who will convene for the second part of the fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee in Geneva (INC5.2) 5-14 August, 2025 to negotiate a global plastics treaty. The Scientists’ Coalition for an Effective Plastics Treaty (‘The Scientists’ Coalition’) is an international network of independent scientific and technical experts who have been contributing robust science to treaty negotiators since INC1 in 2022. The Scientists’ Coalition established a series of working groups following INC5.1 in Busan, Korea 25 November – 1 December 2024. Each working group has produced science-based responses to the selected articles of ‘the Chair’s text’ (the latest version of the draft global plastics treaty text). This Letter to the Editor summarises those responses.
This article explores the interaction between the Conseil de la Concurrence (Competition Council) and the Autorité de Régulation de la Poste et des Communications Électroniques (Telecommunications and Postal Regulatory Authority) (ARPCE) in the Algerian legal system. Algerian policy-makers have given special consideration to the issue of overlapping jurisdiction between these two authorities. The article discusses the Algerian strategy to resolve regulatory overlaps in the electronic communications market and also highlights the intervention of the ARPCE as a competition authority for the electronic communications market. Furthermore, the article analyses the Optimum Telecom Algeria case as a turning point in restoring the Competition Council’s role and highlights the need for systematizing the intervention of the two authorities. Finally, the article provides a forward-looking perspective through proposing a memorandum of understanding to promote cooperation between the Competition Council and the ARPCE.
The same developmental principles account for both normal and disturbed development. Disturbed behavior too is coherent and meaningful. Psychopathology is an outcome of development. This applies to common problems such as idealization or over-control; childhood disturbances such as ADHD; and to extreme symptoms, such as the stereotypes of autistic children and the dissociation and thought disturbances of adults. All of these become more understandable when looked at through the lens of meaning.
Across the twentieth century, CEOs became more powerful, and their decisions had a sizeable effect on their company’s performance and the British economy. Some CEOs harnessed technological and organisational innovations which allowed companies to grow and become more efficient, resulting in improvements in national productivity. In contrast, the insularity and lack of dynamism of some CEOs played a significant role in Britain’s economic stagnation. History shows that who gets to the top matters. Based on this, the chapter goes on to argue that those involved in selecting and preparing CEOs need to develop pathways to the top that identify individuals with interpersonal characteristics, values, and vision focused on the long-term stewardship of companies. They need to improve diversity to ensure that a range of cognitive abilities and insights get to the top. Across the century, various corporate governance mechanisms have been used to address the principal–agent problem at the heart of the corporation. The chapter closes by arguing that corporate governance needs to be strengthened through legislation to align CEOs to the long-term interests of company stakeholders.
In April 2023, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published a draft of revisions to Circular A-4, the first changes proposed since its publication in 2003. Following a public comment period, OMB published the final revised Circular A-4 in November 2023. In this article, we provide a section-by-section comparison describing the similarities and differences between the April draft and the November revision of Circular A-4. Among other observations, we note that the revised Circular A-4 changes the default social rate of time preference from 1.7 to 2.0%, retains recommendations for using distributional weighting in benefit–cost analysis, and retains recommendations to use a global point of view when determining the spatial scope of the analysis.
Ex ante, my primary concerns were about implementation across the wide expanse of federal applications, supporting the supplemental use of distributional weighting, trying to find a supportable middle ground on discounting using the expected value of bounds and a more consistent scope of analysis. Ex post, I felt heard if not followed, perhaps not uncommon for reviewers.
Cities demobilize migrant workers through partial and incomplete inclusion at what is perceived by local authorities and migrants as the higher meso-level of regulation of institutions. The local state plays two main roles in migrant education services. As regulators, municipal authorities shut down, take over, or certify private, “people-run” migrant schools that serve as informal substitutes when rural students cannot enroll in urban public schools. At the same time, they exclude, segregate and separate, or include those students in public schools as providers. Three main approaches to regulation and integration are (1) suppression and exclusion, (2) selective absorption and segregated inclusion, and (3) certification and full inclusion, as exemplified by Beijing, Shanghai, and Chengdu, respectively. Municipal and district officials use migrant social policy in this area to push visible results and avoid blame and criticism and employ complementary approaches between private regulation and public integration.
This chapter wraps up the arguments and delineates possible avenues ahead for central banks. Central banks may become Banks of the State, financing government deficits as they have done recently. This may imply a retreat from central bank independence. With large holdings of public securities in central bank balance sheets, the pressure to finance governments would increase. Another option is for central banks to change their job profile, becoming Banks for Everybody. This would happen if they decided to issue all-purpose retail central bank digital currencies. This would risk weakening private initiative in the payment industry, a sector where private markets have worked well recently. The third avenue is for central banks to remain Banks of the Banks, the dominant model that prevailed until the Great Financial Crisis of 2008–09. Central banks would continue to exert rigorous surveillance and use their regulatory powers to encourage further progress and foster efficiency and stability in the underlying settlement infrastructures. We express support for this line but also highlight some challenges, first and foremost the regulation of crypto assets and the extension of safety nets and central bank competence on “shadow banking,” the growing unregulated segment of financial markets.
This paper considers whether assisted suicide and euthanasia (AS/E) is an area for medical regulation or whether there is a better alternative regulatory mechanism to govern it. Drawing from empirical evidence across a range of jurisdictions where it is legalized, the paper argues that there are at least four good reasons to consider demedicalizing AS/E: (1) pragmatic ethical issues of infrastructural weakness in AS/E service provision in already overstretched healthcare systems globally; (2) challenges of medicalization; (3) regulatory complexities concerning medical law (including pharmaceutical law) and criminal law; (4) the risk that AS/E becomes more easily susceptible to healthcare economics. The paper suggests several recommendations concerning a possible “demedicalized model.”
Introductory and regulatory capitalism, and it outlines the methodology and the chapters. On the basis of a discussion of the notion of ‘regulatory violence’ in the context of various relevant legal, political, philosophical and criminological literatures on regulation and violence, I propose to define regulatory violence as the forseeable and possibly preventable violence that obtains when regulation is created and applied for reasons that are illegitimate. In the field of regenerative medicine, this means that when research regulation is developed for reasons other than patient safety and scientific development, it is likely to cause foreseeable harm to patients, the development of science and the public at large. Although in a world dominated by regulatory capitalism, regulatory competition is a main driver of regulatory adjustments, regulatory violence is not unavoidable: some countries manage to change regulation by prioritising patient needs and high-quality science. The Chapter also discusses the challenges involved in regulating the safety and scientific quality of clinical research and the marketing of new regenerative therapies and the main arguments for moving from ‘competitive desire’ to ‘caring solidarity’.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the international regulatory landscape and explores the international dynamics of regulatory competition in regenerative medicine over a turbulent period of six years (2008-2014). The overview indicates that wealth conditions and country size in jurisdictions are associated with particular preferences for clinical research regulation. At the same time, international movements of patients and research to some extent change with regulatory politics. One dimension of this, I describe in terms of regulatory boundary-work, that is, the international politics of regulatory reputation. As a heuristic tool, ‘regulatory boundary-work’ calls for attention to how countries formulate stem cell policies through locally available political and regulatory mechanisms to articulate circumstances ‘at home’ with global regulatory trends. I argue that regulatory capitalism creates conditions that are affected by other countries, where perceived competitors benefit from what they regard as beneficial regulation. The regulation in competitor countries is seen as ‘captured’ or influenced by industry, scientists and other players. Exploring international drivers and the dynamics of regulatory competition, we see that regulatory capture takes place next to and entwined with ambitions to gain international competitive advantage as well as the interests of industry, hospitals, patients and science at home.
This article is based on feedback I submitted in response to the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) April 2023 request for comments on its draft revisions to Circular A-4, “Regulatory Analysis.” Much has changed since I submitted my comments in June 2023. OMB issued a final circular in November 2023 and subsequently rescinded it in February 2025. This article includes my comments as submitted, along with an introductory “prologue” and an “epilogue” that reflects on the decision to abandon the 2023 revisions and return to the 2003 Circular. My comment addressed key elements of regulatory analysis, suggested areas where OMB could provide more guidance, and identified several aspects of the 2023 Circular that appeared to be internally inconsistent or contradictory. It concluded that some of the 2023 revisions were worthwhile, while others would have obfuscated for policymakers important information on the welfare effects of regulatory actions.
This article presents my 2023 peer review panel comments on the 2023 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-4 and offers recommendations for future revisions of this circular. The Prologue section introduces my official peer review comments and indicates how the structure of my comments was tailored to the guidelines established by the OMB. The main section consists of my 2023 peer review comments as they were submitted to OMB. I recommended changes in the draft Circular A-4 to increase the discount rate from the 1.7% rate that OMB proposed, to report domestic benefits whenever global benefits are reported, to adopt a behavioral transfer test for the use of behavioral economics findings, to update the procedures for estimating the value of a statistical life, and to abandon the proposed distributional weights. The most problematic component of the new Circular A-4 is the OMB distributional weights, which will shift the role of benefit–cost analyses away from the current role of providing an efficiency-oriented test. The Epilogue to my comments summarizes how the final version of Circular A-4 differs from the draft version and how future administrations might revise Circular A-4 after President Trump rescinded it.
Benefit–cost analysis is a protocol for assessing alternative public policies, primarily in terms of efficiency. An important complementary element can be estimating distributional impacts to show net benefits for groups of interest. The fundamental advantage is enabling decision-makers to see and weigh the importance of changes in efficiency and changes in distribution. Rigorous estimates of any distributional effects should incorporate credible baselines, private behavior, and markets. Estimation for groups with limited evidence and data is hard. Primary estimates of net benefits should be based on conventional market values. Any estimates based on distributional weights should be supplementary estimates. Combining them into a single number, risks masking the impacts of efficiency and distribution. The values of regulatory effects to U.S. citizens and residents depend on where the risks of damage take place. Willingness to pay values by U.S. citizens and residents to adopt a global value of benefits to increase the probability of international agreements can be positive but will reflect uncertain negotiation and compliance. The primary analysis should focus on benefits and costs to U.S. citizens and residents within domestic borders. The recommended rate of 1.7% does not reflect the rates relevant for all members of society. Given the emphasis on distribution effects, rates should include those facing rates of 3% or more. Sensitivity analysis should include several rates. The onus should be on making the case for a specific behavioral bias and nudge that will successfully address the perceived problem. Recent meta-analyses of nudge interventions indicate difficulty in implementing effective nudges.
The evidence-based psychological therapy for obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) delivered by mental health professionals who are trained and regulated by a professional standards authority. In recent years, people with OCD have reported consulting unqualified and unregulated coaches. We aimed to explore the experience of people who sought unregulated coaching for OCD. Using semi-structured interviews, we explored the lived experiences of 13 people with OCD who have undertaken sessions with an unqualified individual (referred to as a ‘coach’). Thematic analysis was conducted. There were four coaches rated negatively and one rated positively. Four over-arching themes were identified in the coaches who were rated negatively: (1) Appealing content, (2) Vulnerability, (3) Cult-like experience, and (4) Complex peer relationships. There were some positive experiences of coaching described, such as positive peer support from others receiving coaching in group chats. Many of the experiences documented by people who received OCD coaching were negative. It was highlighted that unqualified coaches may increase vulnerability of people seeking OCD treatment, due to unprofessional conduct. We suggest that this unprofessional conduct may be investigated by a regulator. We suggest that people seeking OCD treatment seek help from qualified professionals and that clinicians are aware of the potential negative effects such coaches can have on people.
Key learning aims
(1) To understand the potential risks, vulnerabilities and potential positive aspects associated with unregulated coaching for individuals seeking OCD treatment.
(2) To discuss our findings to promote informed decision-making by encouraging individuals with OCD to seek treatment from regulated and qualified mental health professionals.
(3) Increase clinician awareness of the potential harms associated with unqualified coaching and equip them to guide patients towards evidence-based treatment options.