While Rawls’s theory has often been used to critique inherited wealth inequalities, this paper explores an underexamined possibility: a Rawlsian justification of inheritance. I argue that the right to bequeath can be justified when regulated by the Difference Principle. According to this principle, bequests can be permissible if they function as an incentive that maximally benefits the least advantaged. To meet this condition, I propose a specific inheritance tax design – sensitive to the disincentive effects of receiving large inheritances and the incentive scope of bequeathing – with progressive rates based both on the amount received and the number of transfers.

Why and how should we tax inheritances, gifts, and bequests? This article examines the political theory debate on inheritance taxation and identifies four main arguments and three objections in favor of and against it. It reviews the most common forms of inheritance taxation in OECD countries and proposes an alternative: a lifetime capital accessions tax. This alternative is broadly delineated to compare it with the “average inheritance tax” and assess which of these two options better meets the requirements of the arguments and objections previously stated. The analysis shows that the capital accessions tax is normatively superior to the average inheritance tax. It better satisfies the reasons we have for taxing intergenerational wealth transfers and offers strong replies to three classical objections to inheritance taxation. Discussing the details of the accessions tax allows us to show how it can respond to popular objections to inheritance taxation and gain popular support.