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The fifth chapter examines the European Union’s course correction since the late 2000s, which is characterised by a paradigm shift away from market-oriented liberalisation towards a comprehensive security orientation. Empirically, the chapter is dedicated to EU crisis management between 2009 and 2025, examining key events such as the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The analysis considers both institutional changes and the development of political narratives and priorities. It identifies a third major transformation of European integration, after those of the 1950s and the 1970s/80s. This change was brought about not by planned reforms, but by crisis-driven adjustments. The new security orientation reflects both the loss of post-Cold War optimism and the realisation that the EU must act in an increasingly dangerous world. While this transformation has strengthened the EU’s ability to survive, questions remain about the democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of the new security architecture.
This article tests claims from the comparative extractive literature by examining how state-company linkages shape civil society mobilization against extractive projects. We focus on convenios de cooperación (CCs)—contracts through which extractive companies finance branches of the Colombian armed forces or judiciary to provide security for company operations. We employ a mixed-methods design. First, we analyze a panel dataset of nearly six hundred contracts signed between 2002 and 2020, assessing their relationship to threats, assassinations of social leaders, arbitrary detentions, and other security indicators across municipalities. We then pair this statistical analysis with fieldwork in two case study sites: Jericó, Antioquia, and the Ariari region of Meta. Our analysis asks two central questions. How do CCs fit into extractive companies’ broader repertoires of community control? And what do they mean for civil society mobilization—how are they lived and felt on the ground? Findings reveal sectoral variation and differences in how CCs are activated and experienced over time. By introducing the first systematic dataset on CCs, we make visible a widespread but understudied mechanism through which firms embed repressive capacity in state security apparatuses, thereby advancing debates on corporate counterinsurgency, protest criminalization, and security governance in Latin America.
COVID-19 deepened the interface between health and security, making information the decisive currency of collaboration. This paper foregrounds the “confidentiality–utility dilemma”: how health and security communities—each premised on strict secrecy in distinct operational contexts—can share information without undermining the other side’s core values. We argue that purposeful managerial design is both necessary and feasible. First, we address the structural limitations of global rule-making and the concomitant drift toward diversification of sources and strengthened capabilities to uncover hidden information that renders security-sector actors increasingly relevant. Drawing on previous assessments and cases, we reformulate the importance of three managerial levers: (1) organizational and structural interventions including two-tier arrangements; (2) tiered classification and de-identification that embed share-by-design access controls for both health and security data; and (3) joint investigations and co-analysis, exemplified by UN-SGM (United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism)-type mechanisms, which can act as clearinghouses by enabling full sharing within the team while preserving external neutrality.
Humanity in the twenty-first century faces serious global challenges and crises, including pandemics, nuclear proliferation, violent extremism, refugee migration, and climate change. None of these calamities can be averted without robust international cooperation. Yet, national leaders often assume that because their states are sovereign under international law, they are free to opt in or out of international cooperation as they see fit. This book challenges conventional wisdom by showing that international law requires states to cooperate with one another to address matters of international concern-even in the absence of treaty-based obligations. Within the past several decades, requirements to cooperate have become firmly embedded in the international legal regimes governing oceans, transboundary rivers, disputed territories, pollution, international security, and human rights, among other topics. Whenever states address matters of common concern, international law requires that they work together as good neighbors for their mutual benefit. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This chapter is devoted to developing and clarifying one of the most unique and important constructs of attachment theory: the internal working models (IWMs) by which relationships influence other relationships and personality. We begin by describing how IWMs develop, discuss different definitions and conceptualizations of IWMs associated with different developmental stages, and then offer a new way of thinking about IWMs as both implicit and explicit representations that function at different levels of awareness. We then discuss factors that promote stability and change in IWMs, highlighting how earlier experiences with attachment figures may shape subsequent IWMs associated with other attachment figures. We next present a framework outlining the conditions under which IWMs associated with specific attachment figures earlier in life can become “activated” to influence how people think, feel, and/or behave with their current attachment figures. We conclude by proposing several promising directions for future research.
From the rise of China as a technological superpower, to wars on its eastern borders, to the belief that the US is no longer a reliable ally, the European Commission sees the world as more unstable than at any other time in recent history. As such, the Commission has become the Geopolitical Commission, working to serve the interests of the Geopolitical Union. Central to many of these conflicts is technology – who produces it, where it is produced, and who controls it. These questions are central to the Commission's pursuit of digital/technological sovereignty, Europe's attempt to regain control of technology regulation. Focusing on topics such as setting technological standards, ensuring access to microchips, reining in online platforms, and securing rules for industrial data and AI, this book explores the EU's approach to lawmaking in this field; increased regulatory oversight and promotion of industrial policy at home, while exporting its rules abroad.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Commission as a technology regulator, outlining the development of the EU’s technology policies and laws, from their beginnings in the late 1970s until the late 2000s. Reflecting on the limited interventions of the Commission during the period referred to as one of ‘Eurosclerosis’, and the beginnings of distinct technology policies and positive acts of integration around technology in the 1990s. It explores how during its development, EU technology policy was marked by a distinction between economically oriented developments, such as around intellectual property rights, and security-related ones as in the case of cybercrime and cybersecurity. However, in the period of the late 2000s/early 2010s and the EU ‘polycrisis’ of financial crisis, legitimacy crisis, and populism crisis, and concerns over the power of the private sector in technology governance, the groundwork was laid for seeing technology control in terms of interlinked economic and security goals, a growing distrust of ‘Big Tech’, and concerns about the need to externalise the EU’s rules and values, including through the Brussels effect.
Chapter 5 focuses on the regulation of social media platforms and platform architecture, with changes in EU perceptions regarding the reliability of these platforms and the values of their owners. It examines the shift from economically motivated self-regulatory regimes in these sectors based in logics of efficiency to a digital sovereignty-motivated move to a logic of security in regulation. It identifies the explicit linkage between economic and security concerns, particularly as it relates to disinformation and political advertising, with the promotion of co-regulatory regimes with significant levels of oversight provided by the Commission. It explores the approach to regulatory export adopted in these initiatives, with an emphasis on control of platforms regardless of where they are based, so long as they offer services in the EU.
Chapter 7 considers the developments that have taken place since the beginning of the von der Leyen II Commission, identifying how there has not only been continuity in the EU’s approach to technology control and its links to digital sovereignty but also an expansion and reinforcement of the approach. Faced with increased instability and geopolitical threat, the linkage of security and economy has become even more explicit for the von der Leyen II Commission, with the Competitiveness Compass taking an approach that appears to be a more assertive form of regulatory mercantilism, in which the element of defence is specifically incorporated into the EU’s rationale for action, with an expansion of technology controls including the development of an explicit push for defence technology industrial policy, the increased control over external dependencies and supply chains through its Preparedness Strategy, and an AI policy for Europe that includes significant investments for AI gigafactories.
To explore what it meant to own and possess in the eighteenth century, Keeping Hold looks to instances in which people lost possessions and how they responded to such experiences. Chapter 2 begins the book’s focus on loss and does so by looking to urban sites. It looks to the city of the eighteenth century: London. The capital was of growing importance in this period as an economic powerhouse and social hub. Guidebooks emerged as an important genre for those seeking to comprehend London’s densely filled and ever-lengthening streets. The chapter explores these sources and finds how the capital was increasingly imagined as a site of deception and loss, where possessions might be pickpocketed or simply left in the bustle and in which servants and apprentices regularly ran away. The chapter examines how eighteenth-century Londoners responded to such perceived threats by utilising technologies of security, such as pockets and collars. By doing so they worked to prevent loss.
Chapter 3 moves to the global level, exploring the history of technology control and its historical links to geopolitics. It begins by considering control of technology in the context of the Cold War and technology as being explicitly considered a security issue in terms of the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union. It covers the CoCom technology restrictions imposed by the US, and Soviet Union attempts to gain access to critical technologies through Comecon, before considering how the approach to technology changed substantially with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the belief in the triumph of the liberal international order and globalism as reflected by the World Trade Organization and ‘free trade’. It then explores the multifaceted crises impacting upon this conviction in the benefits and resilience of the global trade system, the increased economic conflict between the US and China as a rising technological power, and a move from multilateralism in a ‘unipolar’ system to increased nationalism and protectionism in a ‘multipolar’ system, and what this meant for the EU’s sense of insecurity and vulnerability in the context of geopolitical reordering.
Chapter 9 begins with Fayiz Al Kandari contemplating the departure of his last fellow Kuwaiti, Fawzi Al Odah, and considering the consequences of his aggressive approach in his first PRB hearing, which was likely to have led to the denial of release. Both Fayiz and his lawyer had made numerous statements questioning the good faith of the US and Kuwaiti governments and suggested that citizens of both countries rise up against this injustice. This criticism would only alienate the decision-makers. Fayiz felt gratitude and loyalty to his previous lawyer but hired the author and his team to try again. Under PRB rules, he was not entitled to a full hearing for three more years. This chapter takes the reader inside the team as it planned strategy both to get an earlier hearing and to get support from Kuwaiti authorities, the military representatives and from Fayiz’s family to convince the board that despite the blemishes in his record, Fayiz was now forty; he had learned from his ordeal; and he was ready to go home. The chapter ends with his return home and being greeted by his father who had only a few months to live.
Chapter 4 critically examines the fact that sometimes innovations not only fail to solve crucial problems, but are the problem itself. Specifically, it explains why Ring doorbell exemplifies the threat of home surveillance innovation. The billion-dollar Amazon subsidiary sold millions of Americans on the promise of security via surveillance without any credible evidence that its system works. But rather than encouraging people to adopt proven security upgrades, such as better locks and secure package drops, Ring wins customers by making its digital innovation seem essential amid a climate of rising fear. By fighting against boring yet effective alternatives, Ring’s anxiety-inducing features have further normalized intensive networked surveillance and helped turn innocuous neighborly interactions into potential threats.
Rare Earth Elements (REEs) are essential for green energy technologies and defense systems, yet global supply chains remain concentrated in China. This has intensified geopolitical competition for alternative sources, positioning the Arctic as a strategic frontier, as retreating ice exposes mineral deposits. A comprehensive discourse analysis of strategic documents, scholarly literature, and media sources from 2010 to 2025 reveals a dramatic shift from geological characterization and economic speculation to urgent securitization and strategic alliance formation. Academic research has evolved from establishing natural baselines to governance and social conflict analysis. Media coverage of REE in the Arctic peaked in 2025, with rising emphasis on governance, sovereignty, geopolitics, and Greenland’s strategic position. Critical gaps persist in addressing Indigenous rights, holistic impact assessments, and Arctic-specific innovation. Sustainable Arctic REE development requires integrated frameworks that balance geopolitical imperatives with environmental protection and Indigenous self-determination, preventing the region from becoming a sacrifice zone for global decarbonization.
This article investigates the profound impact of artificial intelligence (AI) and big data on political and military deliberations concerning the decision to wage war. By conceptualising AI as part of a broader, interconnected technology ecosystem – encompassing data, connectivity, energy, compute capacity and workforce – the article introduces the notion of “architectures of AI” to describe the underlying infrastructure shaping contemporary security and sovereignty. It demonstrates how these architectures concentrate power within a select number of technology companies, which increasingly function as national security actors capable of influencing state decisions on the resort to force. The article identifies three critical factors that collectively alter the calculus of war: (i) the concentration of power across the architectures of AI, (ii) the diffusion of national security decision making, and (iii) the role of AI in shaping public opinion. It argues that, as technology companies amass unprecedented control over digital infrastructure and information flows, most nation states – particularly smaller or less technologically advanced ones – experience diminished autonomy in decisions to use force. The article specifically examines how technology companies can coerce, influence or incentivise the resort-to-force decision making of smaller states, thereby challenging traditional notions of state sovereignty and international security.
Since a few years, humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are faced with increased insecurity in regions where armed conflicts prevail, such as in Afghanistan, Somalia or Sudan. An analysis of the NGOs’ reaction to this development based on 23 semi-structured interviews reveals that identity matters and plays a crucial role. On the one hand, for reasons related to their identity, addressing this insecurity proves challenging for NGOs, which is why they tend to shy away from taking steps in this direction. On the other hand, identity can facilitate organisational learning and help overcome organisational barriers related to it. In this respect identity allows NGOs to join security networks and cooperate across NGO boundaries, while at the same time using it as an indicator to distinguish between who they can trust and who therefore is part of the network and who is not.
More than 40 years after General Charles de Gaulle's historic decision to withdraw France from the integrated military branch of the Atlantic Alliance in 1966, Nicolas Sarkozy has decided to normalize France's NATO ties. Does this decision mark the abandonment of ‘Gaullism’? What will be the impact of France's reintegration and are we likely to see not only an institutional but also a political normalization of France's policies within the Alliance?
Russia’s unprovoked war on Ukraine has deteriorated the security environment in all neighbouring countries. Some of these countries are terrified of the risk of further Russian invasions while others express less fear of Russian hostile and unlawful actions. The aim of the paper is to outline the Kremlin’s narratives presented in Romanian and Bulgarian media and their impact on the security concerns of both countries. The paper argues that Russia uses media to spread narratives trying to reshape public opinion and to aggravate insecurity and distrust. The arguments are divided into the following parts: First, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s perceptions of Russia are analysed; second and third sections describe the Russian official rhetoric presented in the local media. The conclusion sums up the outcomes of both cases and the impact of the Kremlin’s narratives on Romania and Bulgaria.
Chapter 2 considers the state’s legal power in acquiring land and materials for construction and maintenance of public amenities, the management of the built environment in Rome and the activities of its inhabitants, the nature of urban life, and the provision and protection of amenities, such as corn, the water supply, baths, and games. The emperor assumed responsibility for the welfare of his people; this was his duty but was also politically important. The emperor provided for security and control in the city, sponsoring firemen (vigiles), urban cohorts, and praetorian guard under the command of officials with defined legal powers: prefects of the city, of the praetorians, and of the vigiles. Outside Rome: the management and status of communities in Italy, the organization of land and people, facilities including roads and bridges, important institutions in society, such as collegia and alimenta, and the legal jurisdiction of the praetorian prefect within Italy.
Preparing and filing taxes has become an increasingly digital task. Older adults need to file taxes to qualify for benefits, but little is known about how older adults in Canada manage tax preparation, nor about how they get help. We investigated delegation mechanisms provided by the Canada Revenue Agency, documenting workflows needed to set up delegation and identifying privacy and security risks. We conducted a semi-structured interview study (n = 19) with older adults, formal tax volunteers, and informal tax helpers to understand the challenges and experiences in tax delegation. Our results show that the CRA’s delegation mechanisms are lightweight and enable older adults to delegate tasks to others with minimal privacy and security risks. However, we found these lightweight mechanisms were not known about or used by the older adults who delegated to informal tax helpers, nor were they known about or used by any of the informal tax helpers we interviewed.