Chapter 1 examines faith in Lancelot Andrewes’s preaching. It shows that his discussions of religious belief frequently draw on the methods used in early modern England of evaluating forensic testimony. After a survey of Andrewes’s interest in religious belief and witness evidence, it turns its attention to discussions of faith and epistemology in his lectures from the 1580s. The chapter then shows how Andrewes’s interest in religious belief is reframed in explicitly legal terms in his seventeenth-century Easter sermons at court. Andrewes valued legal evidence for its ability to establish the Resurrection as an attested matter of fact. Yet these sermons also trace the limitations of legal methods of proof. For Andrewes, a true faith in the Resurrection involves a more diverse set of epistemic resources – bodily participation in the Eucharist, for instance. These mysterious aspects of faith are nevertheless articulated through the framework of legal proof and evidence.

Chapter 2 focuses on discussions of faith in John Donne’s religious prose. Donne often addresses such questions by turning to legal discourses. Processes of evaluating forensic testimony provide useful structures for measuring probability or certainty in evidence and the assent that it generates. This is exemplified in Donne’s Pseudo-Martyr, which relies on widely recognised rules about forensic testimony to discuss pressing questions regarding belief and its legitimacy in post-Reformation England. The chapter then shows how Donne adapts this legal handling of belief to address questions about salvation and certainty for a variety of audiences. To lawyers at Lincoln’s Inn, Donne uses the technicalities of civilian law to support and critique post-Reformation understandings of soteriology. To a broader congregation at St Paul’s, he deploys common law evidentiary procedures to show that, to a limited but helpful extent, the evidence of salvation can be apprehended through legal methods.

This book’s Introduction sets out the key intellectual and historical contexts for its argument. It shows that religious belief gained an important cultural emphasis after the Reformation and that it was considered to be distinct from other kinds of belief or assent. Engaging with scholarly discussions of belief, this introduction suggests that the period from around 1580 to the 1650s witnessed an attempt to investigate what was particular about a specifically religious kind of belief. Its certainty and spiritual origin were compared to, and contrasted with, other kinds of assent that were generated by probable forms of argument. An important and widespread way of effecting this comparison involved considering religious belief alongside the kinds of assent generated in legal settings – when witness evidence is evaluated for its credibility. The introduction roots this discursive method in contemporary legal culture, before surveying recent scholarship on literary culture, law and religion.

Chapter 3 considers Francis Bacon’s use of legal evidentiary procedures and the important role they play in his discussions of religious belief. Its first half is given over to a wide-ranging account of Bacon’s philosophical prose. It sets out to establish that Bacon uses his knowledge of Romano-canon law and its evidentiary practices to shape his methodological reforms for natural philosophy. This chapter applies the findings of this survey to Bacon’s prose fiction narrative, New Atlantis. Requirements for credible legal testimony are, on the one hand, shown to shape the style of Bacon’s narration. On the other, though, Bacon’s discussion of evangelical conversion shows that, as a spiritually derived form of assent, religious belief transcends such legally derived criteria for credibility. New Atlantis thus develops Bacon’s philosophical distinctions between faith and knowledge. It also asks probing questions about religious belief and intercultural encounters in early modernity.

Chapter 4 moves forward to the religious and political conflicts of the 1640s and 50s, focusing on the Royalist, Church of England poet Henry Vaughan. For Vaughan, the method and structure of evidentiary procedures at law present a crucial resource for negotiating the challenges of mid-century tumult. Having established Vaughan’s legal interests in his career and earlier writing, the chapter explains why questions of legal process became especially charged in the civil wars and Interregnum and why they presented Vaughan with a framework for discussing faith in Silex Scintillans (1650, 1655). The chapter surveys a range of attitudes adopted by Vaughan’s verse towards legal methods of proof: while they can cause activities of biblical interpretation to go awry, they can also, as exegetical processes, help to underpin an enduring faith in God’s mercy and salvation. In the end, it is the regularity of due evidentiary process that itself helps to articulate the justice and order of God’s providence.

This chapter moves from the semi-privacy of homes to the more public arena of urban courts. It looks at the surprising role of the pox in two different kinds of legal cases involving unlawful sex: suits for separation and rape cases. In both types of case, the disease served as a proxy for sex, material evidence of otherwise unprovable acts. Yet its role in court was much more complex than this. Marks of the disease were visible and long-enduring, an early form of medical forensics, and women could talk about the disease more freely than they could talk about sexual matters. Mothers of rape victims could bear witness to the horrifying effects of disease and disgruntled wives could frame their husbands’ abuse as contagion stemming from illicit sex. The disease allowed women to speak the unspeakable. What is more, cases did not rest wholly on women’s words, which were accorded little value in courts. Confirming the existence and transmission of disease called for the allegedly more trustworthy testimony of medical men. The disease centered legal cases about sex on to the words and bodily inspections that the court deemed reliable.

This paper aims to assess the cogency of Hume’s famous argument against testimony for miracles. Hume starts by arguing in favour of a “general Maxim” which involves balancing the strength of the testimony “considered apart and in itself” against the inductive unlikelihood of the reported event. But although this reasoning shows real insight – anticipating what is now known as the “base rate fallacy” – it turns out that such a separation cannot work, and an adequate maxim must inevitably take into account the specific nature of the reported event when evaluating the epistemic strength of the testimony. There is also a deeper problem with Hume’s argument, which arises from his treating a miracle as an extreme example of an inductively unlikely event. For the believer can agree that miracles are inductively unlikely – or even physically impossible – whenever the world is proceeding normally. Where she will differ from Hume is in claiming that divine activity can interfere with the natural order, and can sometimes be identified through its purposive nature. Naturalist philosophers – like Hume – are likely to reject this, but their best argument for doing so comes not from theoretical probabilistic maxims, but from the hopelessly unconvincing track record of miracle reports, combined with the lack of evidence for divine purpose in the world (as revealed so artfully by Hume’s Dialogues).

Chapter 6 makes it clear that definitions, categories and expertise have not ended interpretive issues. Definitions are disembodied. All forms of violence and suffering, their definition and recognition remain relational in reality, born out of a labyrinthine complexity – in terms of how they are constructed, communicated, filtered and understood. Preconceptions of who is deserving of recognition, the requisites for social identification, moral commitment or collective empathy reveal this to be the case. Social science takes suffering to be (inescapably) intersubjectively, textually and sensorially understood – so judicial determinations must also go beyond the technical and doctrinal. The chapter’s discussion on temporality continues the theme of sensing. It examines temporal registers in the recognition of torture – exploring the questions: how does time feature and function in juridical understandings of torture? This discussion on time adds to the kaleidoscopic catalogue of sense-centric registers and reasoning operating in the anti-torture field – illustrating it to be a device of inclusion and exclusion.

This chapter discusses poets of the South West Asian and North African diasporas who have experienced exile and loss, some as refugees. It describes a translingual pluriverse of diasporic poets from a region that has come to have many names and terminologies assigned to it. The chapter reflects on the political and cultural conditions in which diasporic writers produce poetry in Australia, in both spoken and written forms. Themes of witness, protest and identity, often interwoven, are analysed. The chapter considers the presence of poets from Arabic-, Kurdish-, Dari- and Farsi-speaking backgrounds, some of whom write in English while others have translingual practices and experiment with hybrid modes. It assesses the impact of settler monolingualism in Australia and argues for the importance of multilingual poetry in articulating cultural diversity and challenging delimiting discursive systems. The significance of literary journals is also detailed, and the value of poetry in the face of violence, displacement and prejudice is asserted.

Ch. 8 Jewish liturgy offers us a concise summary of Jewish theology. It gives us theological propositions, speech-acts, and testimonies about God. Liturgy offers a practical and dynamic Jewish theology that negotiates the contradiction of the God of Being and God as person.

The chapter addresses the problem of the nation-state centrism of transitional justice through an ethnographic analysis of the self-lustration trial of a Polish academic historian, who was revealed as a secret communist agent by a powerful rightwing politician in the local media. The chapter studies closely the evidentiary process, court testimonies, and courtroom performances to show how law mediates and reproduces the relations of domination and inequality, as it becomes an arena for critical engagement with and even deconstruction of the terms of lustration by revealing, even if sporadically, the largely overshadowed histories of friendship and solidarity. In particular, the chapter highlights that lustration’s nation-state centrism, which manifests itself in its extensive dependence on state security archives and the court’s reliance on the testimonies of former security officers, poses crucial challenges for the court in ascertaining ambiguities and settling suspicions, and thereby gives ample room for the political instrumentalization of law, especially by rightwing groups.