A natural phonological process is a mental substitution that responds in real time to an innate limitation of the human ability for speech perception and production. Processes are responsible for the discrepancies between the perceived and intended (lexical) representations of words and morphemes and the targets for their actuation in speech. They adjust prosodically mapped mental representations, changing some features of an intended utterance. Because these features are associations between articulatory gestures and their auditory effects, hearers can attribute the discrepancies to the application of processes. Processes are universal since they arise in universal articulatory and perceptual abilities. Inhibiting different processes makes phonologies differ from each other. The inhibitions are mastered in acquiring the pronunciation of a language. Processes that remain un-inhibited/active govern allophony, automatic alternations, variation, one’s native accent, and one’s foreign accent in L2. Processes are entirely phonetically conditioned. Phonological processes may be fortitive (to enhance properties of individual segments) or lenitive (to ease production of sequences).

This chapter attempts to chart the radical transformation of the Orthodox world across history, namely from the universal religion of Christianity to the numerous ‘national’ Orthodox churches of today. Historically speaking, this universality became mostly evident in the ecumenical ideology of the multi-ethnic Byzantine empire. Yet, at the same time, there have been continuous strong entanglements of Orthodox Christianity with various ethnic peoples that led to the formation of specific ethno-religious identities, especially through their Christianisation in the wake of Byzantine missions. Not least, this had an impact on the articulation of the Orthodox church structures in the late Middle Ages. These were later profoundly shaped anew within the modern national framework following the encounter of Orthodox Christian cultures with Western nationalism. The sweeping national and even nationalistic transformation of the Orthodox world exhibits numerous features that seemingly contradict its long ecumenical past, yet they may be explained in the context of the specific Orthodox confessionalisation and concomitant mutations during the modern era.

This chapter explores the universality of Sen’s capability approach (CA). On the one hand, the capability framework advocates for a holistic perspective on well-being, transcending conventional economic metrics. On the other hand, it acknowledges the multifaceted nature of individuals, cultures, and contexts within the realm of work, emphasising intrinsic value beyond mere productivity. This chapter delves into cross-cultural and cultural applications, examining how the CA accommodates diversity and contextuality while promoting universal values. Rooted in the work pioneered by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, the CA model recognises work as a platform for human expression, self-realisation, and alignment with personal values, echoing the principles of self-determination theory. Central to the discussion is the concept of capability sets, linking them to well-being and flourishing. While acknowledging the value of top-down approaches, the narrative underscores the importance of grassroots engagement to enable individuals effectively. This emic approach highlights the importance of nurturing loving relationships within the workplace and within communities as integral to human flourishing. Ultimately, the chapter argues for a nuanced understanding of well-being that acknowledges and respects diverse contexts, challenging the notion of a universally imposed definition and moving forward to universally guiding principles.

This chapter reflects on a few crucial terms such as locality and exteriority, arguing from the standpoint that the force of African literature lies in its call to interrogate the very idea of the global and local. Commenting briefly on the early works of two African writers, Chinua Achebe and Assia Djebar, it shows how African literature poses questions about the type of world-making that is underway, namely, who are the beneficiaries and losers in the making and remaking of conceptions of “worldliness”? The essay also speculates on conceptual and theoretical flashpoints that emerge from the encounter between notions of African literature and world literature taken as separate entities. In attempting to recharacterize the theoretical assumptions of “worldliness,” it highlights African writing’s inherent universality, its generalized orientation toward the philosophical, as well as the intersections of terms like locality and universality within African literary criticism.

This chapter introduces the meaning of human rights, what those rights are and where they can be found, but it also offers some critiques of human rights, especially the charge that they represent little more than Western values. The chapter discusses the universality of human rights, embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the fact that all human beings have human rights no matter where they live and no matter whether their own state has ratified various human rights conventions. It introduces international human rights law, which takes human rights from the moral or ethical sphere into real law. We discuss the relationship between domestic and international human rights law. We conclude with an introduction to the major players in the human rights field with examples of the kind of work these bodies engage in.

In Kierkegaard, a three-part dialectical structure is set, first, by the two elements that comprise parts I and II of Either/Or, the “esthetic” and then the “ethical life.” A subsequent, third stage comes with a “teleological suspension of the ethical” (by which Kierkegaard means “suspension of the moral” in the modern sense) and a committing “leap” of faith. Unlike Marx’s version, Kierkegaard’s dialectic takes place not at the social level, but within an individual’s life in a way that can bring about an essentially individual authenticity and what Kierkegaard called “existential inwardness.” But if Kierkegaard’s dialectic, unlike Hegel’s and Marx’s, is decidedly not world historical, thus different from Hegel’s and Marx’s, the notions of individuality and authenticity that Kierkegaard develops are nonetheless themselves distinctively modern ethical ideas, more modern, indeed, than any idea of individuality that is in place in early modern moral philosophy. Kierkegaard’s concept of the “single individual” is more closely related to Nietzsche’s “sovereign individual,” to “individuality” in John Stuart Mill, and to the radically free subject of the twentieth-century existentialists, than it is to the “forensic” notion of the individual person or moral agent as, for example, in Locke or Kant.

This fourth chapter begins by exploring one of the central problems with the description of conscience outlined in Chapter Two. If conscience is really a broad concept, then there is the possibility it can be used to severely limit patient choice. Chapter Four attempts to resolve this difficulty by arguing that conscience should not be protected as a right. Instead, it is an interest, and its protection should be based on whether the person claiming conscience acts responsibly in doing so. Three responsibilities of conscience are set out – humility, universality, and reciprocal respect. Each is shown to be crucial to the protection of conscience.

This chapter explores how international law and its legitimacy could be improved and made more aligned with the demands of justice. It focuses on two types of requirements. First, there are the principles and accompanying procedures on the basis of which actors ask their agency (and their rights) to be recognized by international law and its culture of legitimacy. These principles are consent, justification, accountability, consistency, representation and participation, and non-abuse of power. Second, there are the topics around which this quest for the recognition of agency (and rights) takes place. They are better universality of international law, human rights as a benchmark of the legitimacy of sovereignty, compliance/enforcement/accountability, and human rights supported by public goods. These two kinds of requirements have been at the center of the efforts to make international law more inclusive as well as more legitimate, and they need to be taken more seriously in the future.

The worldwide scope and depth of the present international system and its sense of legitimacy have not been applied in the same way everywhere. There is still much diversity among countries and the courses of action and the policies that they embrace. This explains, in part, the tensions and disagreements concerning the nature and dynamic of this international system as well as the claims of legitimacy in it. The redistribution of power currently underway at the international level, epitomized by the rise of China, could create more stress in the future. Nevertheless, overlooking the scope and depth of the present international order and its culture of legitimacy would be a mistake. The scope and depth of the present international order and its culture of legitimacy are the manifestations and the products of the following elements working together: position of power dominance, means of penetration and integration, values and norms, and secularization and democratization.

This chapter concentrates on the conditions of access to and the nature of membership in the international system as established by international law—specifically, three issues. The first issue is the type of society that is presented as a legitimate collective member of the international order. One of the first steps that international law takes to determine legitimacy at the international level is to identify the criteria necessary for a collective actor to be viewed as a full-fledged legitimate member of the international community. The second issue is that after World War II and the creation of the United Nations (UN), access to international membership in the international order moved toward a form of universality that has been relatively pluralistic. The third issue is that despite this movement toward a pluralistic universality, there are limits to the universality and pluralism of international membership in the international system as defined by international law.

This chapter examines the specificities at work at the international level and their implications for the issue of legitimacy, concentrating on the contemporary context. These specificities have to be understood in relation to the notion and experience of the international community. There are five distinctive features that characterize the international level in connection with the sense of international community. Although the interactions of these characteristics make the international system what it is, this chapter addresses them individually to identify clearly their nature and respective significance for international legitimacy. These features include the ambiguity of the international community; the national bent of international life; cultural diversity and disparity of development; the hegemonic and yet fragmented and contested conception and exercise of power; and the extent to which actors (states and individuals, in particular) have the possibility of ownership—that is, of being represented and of participating at the international level, including in terms of consent.

The chapter is an introduction to basic equilibrium aspects of phase transitions. It starts by reviewing thermodynamics and the thermodynamic description of phase transitions. Next, lattice models, such as the paradigmatic Ising model, are introduced as simple physical models that permit a mechano-statistical study of phase transitions from a more microscopic point of view. It is shown that the Ising model can quite faithfully describe many different systems after suitable interpretation of the lattice variables. Special emphasis is placed on the mean-field concept and the mean-field approximations. The deformable Ising model is then studied as an example that illustrates the interplay of different degrees of freedom. Subsequently, the Landau theory of phase transitions is introduced for continuous and first-order transitions, as well as critical and tricritical behaviour are analysed. Finally, scaling theories and the notion of universality within the framework of the renormalization group are briefly discussed.

This part focuses on the foundational aspects of international human rights law, exploring its theoretical, historical, and philosophical underpinnings. It examines the evolution of human rights ideas, the influence of various philosophical traditions, and the ongoing debates about the nature and universality of human rights. The sections address the epistemological ruptures between philosophy and law, and between law and justice, highlighting the challenges in reconciling these perspectives within a coherent human rights framework. The part also delves into normative pluralism, discussing the coexistence and interaction of multiple legal systems and norms within the global human rights framework. It covers treaty-based structures, customary international law, general principles of law, and the role of judicial decisions and soft law instruments. By critically analyzing these foundational elements, this part aims to provide a deeper understanding of the principles and values that underpin international human rights law and to highlight the complexities and nuances involved in defining and protecting human rights in diverse cultural and legal contexts.

In this chapter, a notion of Tietze transformation for 2-polygraphs is introduced, consisting of elementary operations on 2-polygraphs that preserve the presented category, such that any two finite 2-polygraphs presenting the same category can be transformed into one another by applying such transformations. By using Tietze transformations, the goal is to turn a given presentation of a category into another one that possesses better computational properties. In particular, the Knuth-Bendix completion procedure applies those transformations to turn a presentation into a confluent one. Convergent presentations lead to a solution of the word problem: for those, the equivalence between two words is immediately decided by comparing their normal forms.To tackle the word problem for an arbitrary presentation, a good strategy consists in trying to transform it into a convergent one by using Tietze transformations. From this point of view, a natural question arises as to whether a finite presentation of a category with decidable word problem can always be turned into a convergent one by applying Tietze transformations: this problem is called "universality of convergent presentations".