Introduction

The popularity of local governance approaches in ecosystem management has increased over the last decades. There seem to be several reasons for why this has been the case. First, top-down approaches to ecosystem governance have not been very cost-effective as the costs of top-down enforcement of resource-use restrictions have been relatively high (Somanathan et al., 2009). This has been the case in water management, fisheries management, forest management, wetland management, nature conservation, etc. Also, especially in conservation-oriented approaches, the livelihood costs of prohibiting resource use, and sometimes even displacement of local communities, have been enormous (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2006). As a result, conservation agencies and governments have started exploring alternative approaches to ecosystem governance like integrated conservation–development approaches and community co-management in order to reduce adverse livelihood impacts, increase local participation, and reduce monitoring and enforcement costs. Second, an understanding has been emerging that ecosystems do not necessarily need to be managed by governments solely but that local communities can self-govern common-good resources effectively as well. Ostrom (1990) showed that communities can sustainably manage forests, pastures, wetlands, and other common-good resources, and that collective resource rights do not need to result in a “tragedy of the commons” if local governance mechanisms exist. This understanding, in combination with the finding that top-down governance of ecosystems has often not been very effective, has resulted in a decentralization of common-good resource management worldwide. Third, the human right to self-determination has become an important argument for local ecosystem governance, especially since people living in biodiversity-rich spots are often marginalized: not only are poverty and biodiversity strongly correlated, biodiversity hotspots coincide with indigenous peoples’ territories, indigenous peoples that are often not well represented in decision-making processes concerning their livelihoods (Colchester, 2004).

Introduction

Studies of language policy, language planning, or language management have generally dealt with the activities of the nation-state. More recent books such as Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 6) have drawn attention to the existence of a multitude of government and education agencies, quasi-government and non-governmental organizations, even if their emphasis is naturally and quite reasonably on the centralized political agency. Schiffman (1996: 2) too pointed out that a language policy can operate not only at the level of nation-state, but also at that of territorial divisions, and may differ at the municipal level, in educational institutions, at different levels of bureaucracy, and in non-governmental bodies. In his detailed studies, he included three nation-states (France, India, and the United States) and two territorial units (Tamilnadu and California). While Shohamy (2006) sees language policy as essentially the manifestation of hidden ideological agendas, her policy agents are identified as governments, educational bodies, the media, and other guardians of official language hegemony. In this chapter, we move inevitably to the level of government, a domain in which there is an obvious definition of authority, by which we mean rightfully exercised power. It is true that much of language management consists of attempts to persuade, but, as we saw with the military, the simplest situation is when the putative manager can reasonably expect that instructions will be followed; governments like commanders are assumed to have the power to enforce their decisions.

Introduction

To profile a better physiognomy of contemporarytechnocratic logics of planning, this chapterexplores the reform of the working processes andorganisational structures of the public managementbureaucracies in the Amsterdam municipality. It doesso in order to reflect on the mechanisms throughwhich technocratic thinking gets institutionalisedwithin existing public government bodies, and toreveal the development of public planning expertisein contemporary urban governance. As in otherchapters in this section, here we particularlyquestion the changing role of public bureaucraciesin the Netherlands, a country where public expertisestill plays a central role in urban governance, butis progressively being reformed to accommodateprivate actors.

Since the mid-1990s, political leaders and industrialelites have been celebrating the value oflarge-scale and integrated urban developmentprojects in responding to the socio-economicchallenges of cities (Healey, 2010). The tightalliances between local governments, landowners,financers and major developers that characterisethese projects have been hit hard by the globalfinancial crisis (GFC) (Enright, 2014; Savini andSalet, 2017), creating a rapid decline of demand andan oversupply of available locations for urbandevelopment. Strong austerity measures have alsoreduced the capacity and the willingness of localgovernments to provide large upfront investments ininfrastructure, public spaces or iconic buildings inmany western settings – in the recent past thesewere all important strategies to trigger privateinvestments. Recent studies on the governmentalreactions to the crisis show that public governmentshave adapted their management practices in order toaccommodate smaller scale, more ‘organic’ andpeople- oriented, demand-led practices of urbandevelopment. This change was reportedly oriented toenable investments under uncertain economiccircumstances and invite smaller investors inreal-estate projects (Savini et al, 2016; Bertoliniet al, 2011; Buitelaar, 2012; Hajer, 2011).

In the following, we show how the GFC, often perceivedby public managers as an extreme economicturbulence, has triggered a process ofreorganisation of the internal processes of publicgovernments in order to allow transitory andcontingent approaches to urban development based onthe prime goal of delivery and realisation. Urbanprojects have to be studied in relation to, and ininteraction with, a changing environment.

Before 1997

Local government had long played a key role in the Labour Party's organisation and activist base. Several parts of the country, notably South Wales, Tyneside and parts of east London have been dominated by Labour ever since the party developed. During the eighteen years of Conservative rule from 1979 to 1997, Labour had developed huge strength in town halls. However, during Labour's long years in opposition the party had often been embarrassed by so-called ‘loony left’ councillors in places such as Liverpool, Sheffield and Lambeth. Margaret Thatcher's government had abolished the Greater London Council and metropolitan county authorities, introduced the poll tax and ‘rate capping’, and more generally conducted a prolonged war against town halls. Although John Major's ministers were more emollient, the central–local relationship in 1997 was still fragile.

Many senior New Labour politicians were wary of local government. The behaviour of radical Labour councils in the 1980s and early 1990s was widely believed to have cost the party votes in general elections. Tony Blair had never been a councillor and showed no particular concern for he subject.Moreover, his 1997 government wished to project an image of modernity and prudence. There was no room for outdated practices within government, including at the local level. However, despite this challenging background, many senior figures within local government hoped the new Labour government would improve and streng then local democracy.

Scotland has its own system of local government. The present system dates from 1975, and was established by the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1973 (see Table 23 for its structure). From the very beginnings of local government, Scotland has had its own local authorities, and these can be contrasted with the local authorities in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Here the comparisons will be with the English system, which is the model followed in Wales and Northern Ireland (the latter has, however, a very reduced system today).

The establishment of the present local government systems in Britain involved a process of enquiry and legislation. Two Royal Commissions on Local Government were set up in the 1960s: Redcliffe-Maud for England (Report, Cmnd 4040), and Wheatley for Scotland (Report Cmnd 4150). The new structures were established by Acts of Parliament, that for Scotland being the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1973. Scotland was one year behind England in changing over to the new system, and the first elections took place in May 1974. The transfer was completed in May 1975, when the system became fully operational.

It is pertinent to ask why Scotland and England should have different systems of local government. In part, the reason is historic. Each country developed its own self-governing local communities from medieval times, and in Scotland these were the Royal Burghs. They were typically small towns or villages, and represented isolated pockets of trade and civilisation in a somewhat barbarous environment. Only after 1889 were County Councils established, and the pre-reform structure dated from 1929.

Of paramount concern during the immediate post-war period was the necessity of bringing a greater degree of managerial efficiency to the dockyards [333]. A fundamental weakness was the position of the resident Commissioner. Working as a member of the Navy Board, it was the Commissioner's task to provide a link between the subordinate Board and the dockyard. All correspondence between the Boards in london and the respective officers of the yard passed unsealed through his office [342]. Aware of any Navy Board instructions, it was the Commissioner's task to report upon any shortcomings in the subsequent performance of the principal officers. However, should chastisement appear necessary, this would emanate entirely from the Navy Office [337, 340]. While sir thomas byam martin felt that this was sufficient for effective management [343], the Board of Admiralty disagreed and believed the authority of the Commissioner should be strengthened [341].

A further structural weakness identified by the Board of Admiralty during one of their post-war inspections was the number of post holders who had either overlapping authority or sub-divided duties. Between them, the Master Shipwright and Master Attendant were responsible for all the artisans and labourers employed in the yard. The former had authority over those directly employed on ships building and repairing, while the Master Attendant controlled similar groups employed on vessels moored in the harbour [332]. The storekeeper, clerk of the survey and clerk of the check were responsible for overseeing the delivery of stores. Additionally, the storekeeper was charged with the safekeeping and distribution of these stores; the clerk of the survey kept accounts of the quantities arriving and held in stock; and the clerk of the check examined the storekeeper's accounts [332]. The clerk of the check was also responsible for keeping the pay and muster books. It was his office that inspected the indentures of all new artificers and kept a record of workers employed and discharged [332]. The ropeyard was regarded as a completely separate entity. The clerk of the Ropeyard took responsibility for stores while the Master Rope-maker [337] was responsible for the direction of the workforce [341].

It was not only at principal officer level that there was an apparent excess of managers. The same was true at ‘inferior officer’ level. Here was a diverse group, which included some eligible for a dockyard house with others paid only slightly more than the ordinary yard artisan.

Introduction

Mention “local government” to most people and the mental picture conjured up is unlikely to be very archaeological. Local government means, at best, talk of the school system and municipal facilities such as public parks and recreational facilities; at worst, waste collection and petty politics. Indiana Jones it is not. Many people, including many academic archaeologists, remain largely oblivious to the existence and important role of archaeologists and related heritage professionals in the employ of local government. Local laws protect a vast number of archaeological as well as wider historic sites. Local taxes pay directly for a large amount of archaeology to be explored, understood, publicized – and, most important, protected. Local government archaeologists also represent an incredible pool of expert, locally based knowledge that is easy for the general public to call on, a more immediate and often less intimidating face of the archaeological community than CRM and academic archaeologists alike.

Archaeologists are employed at the local government level because various national, regional, and local laws make this a statutory (formally required) or semistatutory (strongly encouraged/recommended by central government) service (Figure 22). The principle has become enshrined in both common practice and legal statute that when developments such as the construction of houses, commercial buildings, transport, energy, and other infrastructure, or extraction of primary resources such as aggregates, take place, the historic environment, alongside the natural environment (i.e., flora and fauna), should be taken into consideration from the outset.

This chapter covers much ground by looking into the black box of ICRC decision making. The subject is rarely covered by outsiders, given the difficulty of obtaining reliable information. Facts and interpretations are presented about the role and influence of the Assembly (governing board), Assembly Council, presidents, directors-general, and Directorate. There is a comparative evaluation of the roles and legacies of the three most recent presidents as well as the often ignored subject of the different directors-general (who are the CEOs of the organization or are supposed to be – if the presidents do not pre-empt that role). On the one hand, bringing in outside presidents from Bern with differing styles and values does make a difference both internally and externally for the ICRC. On the other hand, a Swiss cultural tradition of collective consultation and accommodation is at work, as presidents rarely take decisions entirely on their own. It is extremely rare to have public spats or resignations at the top of the ICRC over policy disagreements.

Examination of the structure of local government in Cowra, with consideration of the possibility of elitism, reveals the arena of local politics. One might ask if the structure is elitist or pluralist, but that question does not lead directly to fruitful answers. It rather poses problems, providing a base for exploration of power relations. The community power and local government literature offers some background on local power structures, but, unfortunately, the fields covered have not coincided, although there is a place for them to do so. The Australian local government system was cast in a British mould, and local power studies have been largely American. British and Australian local government studies have seldom sought to analyse power relations. They have rather explored democratic and administrative aspects of local government using the tools of political science. The British have debated the conceptual and empirical problems of local government as manifestations of the role of the state in capitalist society more often than they have tackled the problems of local power relations. The various approaches to the study of local government are, however, instructive in the way that they have defined its problems for study and formulated research agendas.

Perspectives on local government

Perspectives on local government fall very roughly into three camps: Marxist and Weberian in sociology, and those which focus more narrowly on political apparatuses and processes. The Marxist approach sees a problem of inequitable distribution of power and wealth as a product of local government being an arm of the state, through which a ruling class maintains its dominance.

EXPENDITURES IN CURRENT PRICES

Local government in the Russian Empire consisted of a confusing interweaving of organizations, which makes the analysis of local governmental expenditures a complicated matter. For a summary description of the organization of local government, the reader is referred to the works of Yaney and Gribowski. The highest level of local government, the gubernia, was administered by the gubernator. A parallel representative governmental body, the zemstvo, existed in 34 gubernia, but this representative body was lacking in 40 gubernia (Siberia, 2 Caucasus, the Baltic). The Polish territories were administered separately by a governor-general. Moreover, the Don Cossack, Turkestan, and two Siberian provinces were under the direct administration of the War Ministry.

At the local level, there were the municipal governments of towns and cities and the local administration of agricultural collective organizations. In the latter case, individual mirs belonged to volosti, and the expenditures of tax revenues collected from the mir organizations were subdivided into volost' expenditures if expended for all volost' activities or mir expenditures if expended for the benefit of a particular mir.

Local government expenditures are not too difficult to estimate as rather substantial information on zemstvo and non-zemstvo expenditures and on municipal government expenditures is available. Less information is available on the volost' and mir expenditures, especially for the period after 1905. The greater difficulty involves the netting out of intermediate expenditures of municipal and mir and volost' expenditures.