This chapter combines national-level violence and volatility data with in-depth elite interviews to demonstrate the relationship between short projected party lifespans and recurring bouts of ethnic party violence in multiparty Kenya. The chapter proceeds in three phases from the KANU era to the period after the promulgation of the country’s new constitution in 2010. The central findings reveal that although Kenyan voters are not lacking in information about the political nature of party conflicts and actually reject violence-wielding politicians, high levels of party replacement and attendant changes in coalitional arrangements tend to prevent them from holding these leaders to account. As a result, politicians from different parties have been able to organize and sponsor violence on a repeated basis.

This chapter traces political party development in Kenya and India from a comparative and historical perspective. It shows that despite many shared experiences as British colonies, nationalist parties with transoceanic connections to one another, and dominant party structures that endured for several years after independence, party development in the two countries took very different routes in the medium and long terms. In Kenya, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) emerged as a narrow, divisive, and ethnically oriented party. By contrast, the Indian National Congress (INC) developed deep societal roots, penetrated rural areas, and sought to unite Indians across caste and ethnic divides. These divergent trajectories influenced the development of new party entrants and generated differing incentive structures for instrumentalizing party violence in the two countries.

Building on Chapter 5, which established the basis of Iran’s security concerns in Africa, this chapter looks at the reasons for and nature of Iran’s support for Somalia’s Siad Barre in his war against Ethiopia in 1977–78. The chapter examines the complex relationship between the shah’s Iran and the Carter administration, and questions the extent to which the shah’s much-talked-about independent foreign policy was actually independent from US interests and demands. For although the shah wanted to support the Barre regime in Somalia, he was constrained by the United States, which would not allow him to supply US-made weapons to the regime. On the other hand, the shah’s lobbying on behalf of Barre, and his pledges to come to Somalia’s aid if it were attacked by Ethiopia, were taken seriously by, and influenced policy-making decisions in, not only the United States, but also Ethiopia, Cuba and the Soviet Union.

This chapter illustrates the relationship between politicians, parties, and communal conflict in India from the 1950s through the late 1980s. Combining national-level violence and volatility data with in-depth qualitative interviews, it shows that the weakening and decline of the Indian National Congress (INC) in the late 1970s spurred an escalation of riot violence across many parts of the country through the 1980s. Since then, however, severe riots have dramatically declined in India, as party stabilization has rendered the risks of provoking such violence prohibitive for many political parties. However, other forms of conflict – including rural clashes and targeted low-level attacks against Muslims – have escalated in recent years under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The chapter suggests that these newer modalities of conflict are part of the same recalibrated elite strategies that have contributed to declines in communal riots across India.

This introductory chapter examines the development of Iran’s relations with Africa in the late Pahlavi period. It argues that decolonisation and the Cold War profoundly shaped the shah’s worldview in the decades after the Second World War and Iran’s interactions with countries across the Global South, including in Africa. During this period, particularly in the decades following the ouster of Mosaddeq in 1953, the shah became the single most important actor in conceptualising and driving foreign policy. The chapter asks whether the shah’s ambitions in the 1960s and 70s for Iran to assume a leadership role in the Indian Ocean, and the civilisational discourse he adopted, could be considered a key component of Pahlavi Iran’s grand strategy.

In his search for allies who would help him challenge Nasserism and other radical movements, the shah found a companion in the emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie I. This chapter investigates the early years of this relationship and some of the issues that prompted the two sides to cooperate – including common security concerns in the Red Sea, threats to the global monarchical institution, and the challenges that decolonisation presented to conservative regimes in the Global South. Ethiopia provided Iran with its first ally in sub-Saharan Africa, but it was not until the Summit Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa in 1963 that Iran began seriously to consider its future role in Africa. Several emissaries from Africa had already visited Iran, for example from Nigeria and Cameroon, and in 1964, a report was published by the Imperial Court on the opportunities Africa could present to Iran. Subsequently, the decision was taken to deepen ties with the continent as a matter of urgency. Because Addis Ababa was the de facto diplomatic capital of Africa, it was perceived as a bridge to the rest of Africa.

This chapter reviews the central arguments and empirics, maps out areas for future research, and discusses the policy implications of the book’s findings. It also discusses the relevance of the theory in accounting for the events of January 6, 2021 in the United States.

During his visit to Ethiopia in 1968, the shah spoke to representatives of the Organisation of African Unity about his commitment to combatting colonialism and racial discrimination. It is surprising, therefore, that not long after the shah had returned to Iran, his diplomats began to discuss with South African diplomats the establishment of political relations between the two countries. The chapter explores the origins of this engagement and examines what drove the two sides together in this period. At the United Nations and other international forums, the shah and his diplomats spoke out in harsh terms against discrimination, racism and human rights violations in Southern Africa. But in spite of this public condemnation, the shah developed and maintained strong security and economic ties with apartheid South Africa. The chapter questions to what extent the shah was able to maintain his position as a champion of independence and human dignity, while enjoying such friendly ties with the apartheid regime.

The threat of Nasserism shaped the shah’s regional strategy in the 1950s and 1960s. This chapter explores the development of the shah’s policy of building relations with moderate allies in the Arab world who could help to contain and balance the radicalism of Nasser. The shah found two allies in North Africa: Tunisia under President Habib Bourguiba and Morocco under King Hassan II. Bourguiba and King Hassan were, like the shah, moderate rulers, with strong ties to the West, who shared the same concerns over Egyptian ambitions and the threat that Nasserism posed to regional stability. One of the strategies the shah developed, for which he sought the support of King Hassan in particular, was to challenge Nasser’s claims to leadership in the Islamic world, by attempting to form a separate grouping of Islamic countries. The ultimate manifestation of this was the Islamic Summit Conference, held in Rabat in 1969, in which King Hassan and the shah played leading roles.