The book concludes with the practical and theoretical implications of the study. The chapter shows that ZANU PF gained from a combined HIV/AIDS and migration exit premium of 5 percent in the 2000 and 2002 elections, 2 percent in the 2005 elections, 12 percent in the 2008 elections, and 4 percent in the 2013 elections. If not for voter exit, the opposition would have had more parliamentary seats and won the presidency in the disputed 2008 elections. This chapter also demonstrates that the theory of exit and party sustainability can be generalized to other states, including but not limited to Russia, Venezuela, and Syria—countries that have also experienced a mass exodus of citizens from authoritarian regimes. This chapter provides a brief comparison of the role of migrant voters in Ghana and the Gambia, where democracy struggled but ultimately thrived. I discuss the study’s policy implications, considering ongoing debates about the global immigration crisis.

This chapter examines the interplay between the HIV/AIDS pandemic and political dynamics, affecting both ruling and opposition parties. The chapter argues that governments can exploit public health crises to their advantage, mainly through their control over healthcare access and the movement of citizens. The HIV pandemic disproportionately impacted urban areas, which are also opposition strongholds. Thus, the majority of those who became ill and or died from the disease were urbanites who would have been opposition voters. The prolonged nature of HIV/AIDS also had a debilitating effect on entire families, where caregivers faced significant exhaustion and burnout, reducing their capacity for political engagement, protests, or voting. The HIV/AIDS pandemic also changed the political and cultural landscape. The death of politicians resulted in multiple elections that favored the ruling party, which had better resources. The loss of cultural leaders, musicians, and others in the arts also diminished the voices of those willing and able to speak up against the regime. The chapter provides a calculation of the exit premium of 4 to 12 percent due to HIV/AIDS-related voter exit.

This chapter analyzes the impact of remittances – the money migrants living abroad send to their family members in the home country – on the survival of authoritarian regimes, particularly in developing countries where poor economic and political conditions lead people to exit en masse. Immigrants have remitted over $500 billion in the last decade, with much of the money flowing from high-income to low- and middle-income countries. In 2018 alone, officially tracked remittances to low- and middle-income countries reached $529 billion. The actual amount is probably more because much money is channeled via unofficial routes. Ethnographic data from family interviews shows that senders can bargain for or against political participation with their receivers. Parents of young adults were likely to discourage them from engaging in politics, fearing for their lives. Receivers could also opt out of political engagement because they did not see the government playing an essential role in their economic lives. Remittances also cushioned the government from possible voter protests and welfare demands.

This chapter explores the relationship between voter migration and the political landscape in Zimbabwe. The chapter shows that the profiles of migrants often match the profiles of opposition voters: urban, educated, and younger. Upon exiting, these migrants forfeit their voting rights, as Zimbabwe does not permit voting from abroad, and the costs associated with returning home to vote can be prohibitive. Despite this disenfranchisement, migrants continue to engage with the politics of their homeland by raising awareness, writing for media outlets, and supporting local activists, thereby maintaining a form of political participation. ZANU-PF benefits from a migration exit premium of up to ten percent in elections between 2000 and 2010. This chapter also draws from examples of countries where diaspora votes directly impacted the election outcome to contrast the challenges in Zimbabwe.

The chapter presents a novel perspective on exit, expanding it beyond physical migration from one country to another. It introduces the idea of death as a permanent form of exit, emphasizing its substantial influence on political dynamics. The text posits that voter exit is a critical factor in the survival of regimes, complementing various strategies employed by ruling parties to maintain their grip on power. This chapter also discusses the literature on dominant parties and different regime types. This chapter lays the groundwork for the rest of the book, exploring these themes in greater depth and detail. Exit, through migration and mortality, is a pivotal element for understanding the complexities of political stability and regime longevity.

This chapter outlines a comprehensive multimethod approach that integrates ethnography and quantitative data analysis to explore the concept of exit. Building on Hirschman’s exit–voice–loyalty theory, the chapter delineates two distinct forms of exit: permanent exit, characterized by the death of voters, and partial exit, which can be either forced or voluntary and does not always involve physical migration. The latter includes phenomena such as migration-related remittances, which symbolize loyalty from emigrants to those who remain. The chapter highlights how partial exit can manifest through voter attrition, often attributed to pandemic fatigue. The narrative indicates that the government did not instigate this exit, but it later discovered covert methods to leverage it for political gain. The chapter introduces the reader to the voter exit premium, the additional votes bolstering ZANU PF due to voter exit. Exit premium is calculated in Chapters 3 and 4.