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This chapter introduces the central puzzle of this study: why, in contrast to other states in Southern Africa, have Zimbabwean democratic institutions stagnated or even declined since independence in 1980? To begin to answer this question, an overview of the resource sector in Zimbabwe, particularly the large diamond found in 2006, and the development of institutions since Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, is given. Furthermore, an institutional analysis, a brief overview of past studies, and a research design are outlined. In terms of case selection, Zimbabwe is placed in the overall population of cases when it comes to resource curse dynamics, and the concept of the “opaque” state is defined. Furthermore, Zimbabwe is defined in terms of democratization and state capacity, concepts that will be used throughout the study.
This chapter draws on past theories of ownership structure in the oil sector and applies them to the alluvial diamond sector in Zimbabwe. The alluvial diamond sector in Zimbabwe presents a natural experiment for understanding ownership structure in that the state and ruling party have been the same since 2006. Still, at least six different ownership regimes have been attempted. This chapter traces each of these and examines how the unpredictability of ownership in the diamond sector has often led to large-scale diamond smuggling and a regulatory framework reflective of political dynamics. The unpredictability of ownership has, in and of itself, caused difficulty in the Zimbabwean diamond sector and has reflected the unpredictability of state institutions. Thus, this chapter argues that past approaches that have been developed to examine the oil sector of states have some relevance for states that have a large amount of alluvial diamond wealth. However, the unique ability for a large amount of diamond wealth to be smuggled into a small space has made the significant increase in diamond wealth since 2006 a challenge for the formal economy and state capacity.
This chapter focuses on past literature on resource-wealthy countries and examines how alluvial diamond wealth may present unique challenges for states. State theory is discussed, and the “opaque” state concept is compared and contrasted with these. Then, an overview of different arguments that have been made to explain the relative decline of Zimbabwean institutions is given. Most of these can fall into three central categories: the psychology of leaders in ZANU-PF, the failure of economic policy, and external sanctions. The large diamond find in eastern Zimbabwe in 2006 is presented as a “critical juncture” for Zimbabwean institutions. Thus, this chapter places Zimbabwe in the overall population of cases when it comes to resource wealth and compares and contrasts how past approaches to resource politics, which have heavily focused on the oil sector, provide a roadmap for examining alluvial diamond wealth. However, this research must also be built upon as different resources, particularly a rapid increase in alluvial diamond wealth in the case of Zimbabwe, bring various challenges to state capacity and democratization.
The final chapter generalizes the theoretical development from other chapters of this book to states in different regions. Venezuela, similar to Zimbabwe, has also experienced many similar dynamics: hyperinflation, decline of the formal sector, and while at one time having a similar if not better level of development to other countries in its region, has now fallen distinctly behind. However, similar to ZANU-PF and the large diamond production after 2006, the PSUV in Venezuela also had a source of funding to perpetuate its rule after 2012: alluvial gold. Eritrea also has some similarities to Venezuela and Zimbabwe, as they have produced and continued to discover a large amount of resource wealth in a single-party dominant political system. Nonetheless, Eritrea may have avoided some of the extreme pitfalls of Venezuela and Zimbabwe. The rapid increase in Zimbabwean diamond wealth and the resulting “opaque” institutions provide lessons for states with a large amount of resource wealth. This study illustrates that different types of resources offer some commonalities but also distinctly different challenges for the institutional trajectory of states and overall capacity.
The Ghana–Togo border separates the Ewe people from their ritual spaces and objects. In Nyive, a border town divided into Ghana Nyive and Togo Nyive, these ritual spaces and objects are in Togo Nyive. The liminal space of the border complicates ritual practice by preventing community members from moving the ritual drum Aɖaʋatram (madness has led me astray) across the river and the international border. Nonetheless, communities in Nyive use ritual archives to maintain their identities in the context of colonial separation. They remake their identities through the symbolism, origin narrative, handling, and use of the drum Aɖaʋatram.
This chapter examines attempts by the political opposition to ZANU-PF to modify politics in the diamond sector, particularly during the GNU government from 2009 to 2013. Many studies have focused on the failures of the main opposition, the MDC party, now CCC, to provide an effective alternative to ZANU-PF. Common arguments have been that the party has been undermined by infighting, has often been viewed as being backed by foreign governments, and has had some issues with corruption. This chapter argues that a major reason why the political opposition in Zimbabwe has been unable to make inroads politically is that the diamond sector has been wholly out of its control, even during the GNU government. Thus, this has allowed factions within ZANU-PF to gain the upper hand and has increased an already tilted playing field. Other attempts to provide critical oversight for the diamond sector from NGOs, the Kimberley Process, and foreign governments have also had difficulty. While these groups have shaped some of the policies readily available to factions within ZANU-PF and have sometimes changed their behavior, the diamond sector has remained mainly in ZANU-PF control.
This chapter examines the development of the “mode of exchange” in Zimbabwe’s diamond sector. Before 2006, Zimbabwe’s small diamond production mostly went to Western Europe. During an extensive boom in diamond production from 2006 to 2010, many diamonds were smuggled out of the country amid foreign sanctions and a decline in the formal sector. Since 2010, the formal sector has bounced back, and many diamonds have been sold to the United Arab Emirates. Since 2016, Western Europe has once again become an export destination. However, in all periods, smuggling around the formal economy has persisted and had significant consequences for state capacity and institutions, which are examined in this chapter. This also traces the mode of exchange for other resources, particularly gold and lithium, which have been increasingly important. However, the drastic increase in diamond production that started in 2006 has uniquely impacted the Zimbabwean state. It provided an outlet to ZANU-PF during the economic collapse and increased political scrutiny, especially after the contested 2008 election, and contributed to the party being able to survive politically.
This article contains editions of three new copperplate charters of the kings of Valkhā who, in the late fourth and early fifth centuries ce, ruled a territory situated to the north of the Vākāṭaka kingdom along the Narmadā river. Ramesh and Tewari, the editors of the famous Bagh hoard of plates discovered in 1982, furnished a straightforward chronology of five successive Valkhā rulers on the basis of 32 plates known to them. However, one of the plates edited here flatly contradicts the sequence they proposed. It turns out that the dating of several previously known Valkhā charters is also controversial. It has been suggested by other scholars that there were, in fact, two kings of Valkhā by the name of Rudradāsa as well as two by the name of Bhuluṇḍa. A reinvestigation of old data combined with the newly edited plates confirms the former and shows a high likelihood of the latter.
This is an extended review of Jonathan Owens, Arabic and the Case against Linearity in Historical Linguistics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023) that addresses several important issues in the methodology of historical Arabic linguistics.
African historiography is most persuasive when it refuses to let the state’s archive dictate the story of the nation. Across the last two decades, historians and historical anthropologists have widened the evidentiary field beyond bureaucratic texts—toward oral histories, ritual grammars, sacred ecologies, newspapers, vernacular maps, and the grainy everyday of rumor and reputation. This scholarly review exemplifies that methodological turn while voicing a shared theoretical wager: African political and social life is not best explained by models of institutional consolidation but by moral economies, spatial counter-imaginaries, and religious idioms through which communities fashion accountability and meaning.
Between December 2018 and August 2019, political activities in Sudan resulted in the overthrow of the incumbent regime. Despite efforts by the security apparatus to retain control, continued mobilization of Sudanese working peoples ensured civilian participation in the transitional government. How did the organization of Sudanese working peoples lead to the overthrow of the regime and challenge the state? Drawing on the work of Global African thinkers, and analyzing organizational documents, systematically collected media reports on the uprising (2018–2019), and insights from ethnographic fieldwork in Khartoum (2022), I argue that the nonhierarchical coordination of autonomous, self-organized groups - such as the Neighborhood Resistance Committees and Tea Sellers Association - representing different sections of the working poeples was central to the movement’s success. These findings enrich our understanding of the Sudanese revolutionary process by showing how coordinated self-organization served as an asset for political change.