The conclusion briefly summarises the roles of Maharaja Hari Singh and Sheikh Abdullah, and their respective impacts. It discusses some mistakes made by India in 1947, which instigated the Kashmir dispute – and some desires by people for an independent J&K or an independent Kashmir – and the possibility that either may occur, including as a result of a ‘black swan’ event or the inevitable border changes that have long occurred in South Asia. Ultimately, the book concludes that India is most likely to retain Kashmir, partly because of its strengths, and Pakistan’s inability to force India out, but also mainly because of some weaknesses that the disgruntled Kashmiris have, particularly their disunity and inability to decide what status they actually want for Kashmir. Meanwhile, India has suppressed the Kashmiri identity, but it will again re-emerge. Also, independence might be a good thing for Kashmir as it would end the India–Pakistan struggle over it, with the result that this region could then become a bridge between both nations, not an object of contestation.

This chapter discusses Sheikh Abdullah and his attitudes to independence, autonomy or self-determination for J&K between 1953 and 1982. After the Head of the State dismissed him from office in 1953, Abdullah was denied the opportunity to confirm his majority in the Constituent Assembly. Instead, he was detained. With him sidelined, other Kashmiris came to the fore, enabling New Delhi to slowly tie J&K into the Indian Union. In 1957, the new J&K Constitution reiterated that J&K was with India. In 1964, Abdullah was finally released, after which he reconciled with Nehru then visited Pakistan seeking agreement on the Kashmir dispute. Tragically, Nehru died while Abdullah was away. During brief periods of release, and certainly after his final release in 1968, Abdullah would talk of self-determination, or sometimes autonomy or independence, for J&K-ites via the Plebiscite Front, a political party. He also sought a solution to the Kashmir issue via two important People’s Conventions in 1968 and 1970. A major turning point occurred when India conclusively defeated Pakistan in their 1971 war and Bangladesh was created. This confirmed that Islam was not a monolith, that Pakistan could not liberate J&K, and that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was politically unassailable. These factors greatly moderated Abdullah’s aspirations for J&K’s international status. In 1975, he agreed the Kashmir Accord with Gandhi, which enabled him to return to power in J&K. However, he had to accept unequivocally that J&K was an integral part of India. Abdullah died in office in 1982.

This chapter focuses on azadi, particularly on aspects associated with its interpretation as ‘independence’. After a scene-setting overview of the Kashmiris’ anti-India uprising and its five phases, the chapter discusses some of the meanings, interpretations and usages of this vexed term. It then discusses the significant constitutional and administrative changes that New Delhi imposed on J&K in 2019 – and which comprise a sixth, and uncertain, phase to the Kashmiris’ anti-India uprising. For some members of the Indian Government, these changes seemingly have resolved both the issue of J&K’s special status and Kashmiris’ sense of being special. Supposedly, Kashmiris are now just like other Indians. Taking azadi specifically to mean independence, the chapter then discusses the feasibility of either an independent J&K or an independent Kashmir surviving as an independent state. The chapter concludes that there are now two ‘realities’ concerning J&K: the Indian reality that J&K is fully integrated into India and the Kashmiri reality that most Kashmiris want little to do with India: they want azadi.

This chapter discusses Sheikh Abdullah and his often contrary attitudes to independence for J&K between 1946 and 1953. It also discusses his challenging relationship with New Delhi, which sometimes caused him to waver in his support for India and to contemplate other options for J&K, particularly independence. For New Delhi, the relationship was equally as challenging. While this relationship started positively, by 1953, there were many – indeed, too many – negative aspects. The assertive Abdullah was trying to ensure that ‘his’ state had as much autonomy and administrative distance from New Delhi as he could secure. New Delhi wanted the total opposite: for J&K, including Kashmir, to be ‘just another Indian state’ and for its residents, including Kashmiris, to be ‘ordinary Indians’. The turning point for Abdullah occurred in mid-1953 when New Delhi and some colleagues in Srinagar feared that he was seriously contemplating independence for Kashmir. By then, Prime Minister Nehru, who also had become disenchanted with the J&K Prime Minister, allowed Abdullah to be dismissed from office.

This chapter examines the political rise of Kashmiri nationalism from around 1924 until 1947 and, in particular, the overwhelming rise of one of its major proponents and political leaders, the ethnic Muslim Kashmiri, Sheikh Abdullah. Essentially, Kashmiri nationalism ‘re-awoke’ in 1931, partly, but not only, because of his significant actions, which made him a leader of Kashmir Muslims. Sixteen years later, when it was certain the British would be leaving India, Abdullah had become recognised as the undisputed leader of Kashmiris. He was then the most significant and, arguably, the most popular politician in J&K. Abdullah remained significant until his death in September 1982. He enjoyed great prestige and popularity amongst Muslim Kashmiris, both urban and rural. However, he was not as popular with non-Kashmiris and/or with non-Muslims, especially Jammuites and Ladakhis, and particularly after J&K joined India in 1947. Partly, this was because, for them, Sheikh Abdullah represented the Muslim Kashmiri identity and the aspirations of the Kashmir region, rather than acting as a unifying leader for the whole state. Abdullah’s political assertiveness would cause him problems on a number of occasions after J&K joined India on 26 October 1947.