The Safavid community forged its sense of cohesion through the years by binding the sources of religious and political forces within their reach. Their proselytizing brand of Sufism at the inception of the order channeled the principles of legitimate spiritual leadership to the person of Safi al-Din and epitomized in his life and teachings, a mission that later deputies, elders, and disciples took up and disseminated. The foundation of the Safavid claims to spiritual authority whence they hailed was laid at this stage and is reflected in the birth of the community’s sacred history, Quintessence of Purity (Safvat al-Safā). Having control over the community’s history further strengthened the perception that spiritual authority laid in the house of the Safavid family through descent from Sheikh Safi.

This introduction argues against analyzing the Democrat Party in terms of strict binaries such as liberal–illiberal, center–periphery, secular–reactionary, or victim–perpetrator. While the divisions that scholars emphasize are real enough to affect the lives of people in Turkey, these divides are multiple and cross-cutting. Instead, I present an account of the Democrat Party, its role in Turkey’s democratization, and its engagement with the emerging Cold War order that is mindful of the divides in Turkey but that also acknowledges the party’s ability to transcend those divides – or, at least, embody their multiple contradictions. This book presents a portrait of the Democrat Party that encompasses these contradictions while also emphasizing Democrat Party leaders’ connections to the domestic political order that preceded them and to the international order of the 1950s.

This chapter focuses on the Democrat Party’s final years in power (1958–60), which followed a debt restructuring agreement with creditors. During these years, Democrat Party leaders attempted to implement unpopular economic policies while still holding on to power. Their main tactic was to create the “Homeland Front,” a mass political organization. Though many people joined willingly, the Democrat-led government relied on high-pressure tactics and propaganda to ensure participation. It also increased pressure on its opposition through both legislation and extralegal actions such as mobilizing mobs to attack opposition leaders. These methods were, I argue, part of a more general shift toward illiberal, less democratic norms of governance among American Cold War allies in the late 1950s. By 1960, however, the Democrat Party’s authoritarian actions had alienated important domestic groups, including academics, bureaucrats, and military officers, which led to its removal from power. Rather than explaining the origins of the May 1960 coup, this chapter reveals how hollowed out the democratic political order had become by the time military officers finally launched their operation.

This chapter covers the period between the Democrat Party’s 1955 political crisis and its greatest financial crisis (a devaluation and bailout in 1958). During this period, Prime Minister Menderes and his allies sought to sustain their economic policies while also retaining political power. Achieving these goals required illiberal tactics while seeking aid from the United States and other allies with increasing desperation. Democrat Party leaders marginalized intraparty critics and silenced the media, academics, and opposition. Unlike in previous chapters, however, we see Democrat Party leaders’ gambits either failing outright or achieving less than satisfactory results. In this period, US and European creditors took a harder line with the government; radical political movements gained popularity in neighboring states such as Syria and Iraq; and turnout in the 1957 elections fell such that the Democrat Party won with only a plurality of the vote. By the summer of 1958, a currency devaluation and bailout were no longer avoidable. Only the uncertainty caused by a revolution in Iraq enabled the Democrat-led government to secure comparatively favorable terms in negations.

This chapter weaves together the biographies of the Democrat Party’s four founders up until early 1946, when they established the party. Each of these founders (Mahmut Celal Bayar, Bekir Refik Koraltan, Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, and Ali Adnan Menderes) played an important role in Turkey’s politics long before their break with the single-party regime. While accounts of the Democrat Party typically note that these men had once been members of the regime, few accounts give more than thumbnail sketches. By contrast, this chapter emphasizes the extent of their involvement in the politics of both the late Ottoman Empire and the early Republic of Turkey, crafting economic, educational, and legal institutions.

This chapter covers 1946–50, when the Democrat Party challenged the ruling Republican People’s Party, looking at some of the young activists whose efforts helped the party achieve victory. These include Samet Ağaoğlu, a well-connected bureaucrat and intellectual, who played a key role in promoting the Democrat Party as a “liberal” party seeking to limit the role of the state. The chapter also looks beyond campaigns in Istanbul and Ankara to consider the ways in which the party took shape in the provinces, specifically Balıkesir and Malatya. The first was a province on the west coast with a majority Sunni/Turkish population; the second was an eastern province with a sizeable Kurdish/Alevi population. In both cases, we see that political parties were closely allied with wealthy landowners, and the difference in affiliation tended to depend on which local faction had established a closer relationship with the state c. 1946. In other words, while intellectuals such as Ağaoğlu promoted the DP as an anti-statist party, in tune with postwar liberalism, we see from early on that, at the provincial level, supporters were more concerned with who controlled the state.

At the heart of the Safavid political order lay its inner circle, a group of devoted followers whose unwavering loyalty to their leader exemplified the ideal form of submission – lifelong, devotional, and absolute. This chapter examines the political center of the Safavid Empire, focusing on the decision-making organ of the regime. Through sociolinguistic analysis, the chapter highlights how the term muqarrab – meaning “he who is brought near” – became a key descriptor for those who had attained proximity to the Sufi king, the focal point of both spiritual and temporal power. Muqarrab, derived from qurba, one of the psychological states (ahvāl) sought by their disciples, signified nearness to the divine in Sufism. Adapted to Safavid political theology, it described the relationship between powerful officials and the king, framing their submission as a sacred bond. This concept served the Safavid order’s political needs by signifying the officials’ journey to attain proximity to the Sufi king, thus inscribing mystical meaning into their sociopolitical ties.

By tracing the origin and evolution of the Safavid order, the book offers fresh insights into how religious and sociopolitical forces merged to create a powerful Shiʿi empire. Iran remains the only Shiʿi nation in the world today. Ideal for readers interested in Middle Eastern history, religious studies, and political thought, Mantle of the Sufi Kings is essential for anyone seeking to understand the complex roots of Iran’s identity.

For the Safavid community, the figure of Imam ʿAli, Islam’s archetypal disciple, was central to their spiritual and political identity. The narrative surrounding the Prophet Muhammad’s death, particularly the gathering at his deathbed, became a crucial source of inspiration for the Safavids’ belief in Imam ʿAli’s sanctity and leadership. By the late fifteenth century, the Safavid branch of Sheikh Junayd’s line claimed direct descent from ʿAli, deepening their followers’ sense of spiritual connection to him.