This chapter confronts the primary obstacle to determining the frequency of stasis: the silence of our sources concerning the occurrence of stasis in almost all the roughly 200,000 polis-years that constitute Greek history 500–301. First, it uses the proxies for prominence introduced in Chapter 4, together with the results obtained in Chapter 5 and a set of case studies, to show that our sources rarely provide any positive evidence for stability (i.e., the absence of stasis); and that their silence is, consequently, our only source of evidence for stability in most polis-years. Second, it shows that, contrary to prevailing assumptions in existing scholarship, silence has no explanatory value vis-à-vis stability in most polis-years. In other words, the fact that no extant source indicates the occurrence of stasis in a given polis-year very rarely militates against the possibility that stas(e)is occurred. Finally, it concludes that the extant sources provide us with evidence for stability in only a few, exceptional cases. Consequently, we have to recognize that unattested staseis could potentially have occurred in almost any of the 200,000 polis-years under consideration.

This chapter uses qualitative analysis to elucidate the quantitative results obtained in Chapter 10. First, it explains why most staseis began with relatively minor forms of violence, such as shows of force, assassinations, and expulsions. Next, it addresses the follow-on question of why so many staseis ended before escalating to involve more intense forms of violence, such as battles and mass executions. Finally, it discusses the implications of the results obtained in Chapter 10 from a qualitative perspective.

Ancient historians often rely on arguments from silence but rarely discuss how or when such arguments can be responsibly employed. This chapter addresses this methodological shortcoming by examining the circumstances and ways in which Thucydides engages with staseis. It argues that Thucydides’ silence concerning the occurrence of stasis has far less value than is commonly assumed and develops a method to calculate the explanatory value of any narrative historical source’s silence concerning the occurrence of phenomena like stasis. It also shows that reading Thucydides with particular attention to stasis yields important insights into his narrative and historical methodologies, as well as his account of the Sicilian Expedition.

This chapter uses the results and understanding obtained in Chapters 9–11, together with a set of informed conjectures regarding the number of fatalities produced by staseis involving different types of violence, to reconstruct the broad outlines of the probability distribution function for stasis-induced fatalities. It then refines these preliminary results through statistical modeling. Broadly speaking, it argues that most staseis produced fewer than a dozen fatalities, while many produced no fatalities at all.

This chapter introduces the Greek concept of stasis, which is the term archaic and classical authors most frequently apply to episodes of regime-threatening political violence. It also reviews existing scholarship on the nature of stasis; describes the elements and dynamics that are typical of stasis; defines this commonly misunderstood term; and introduces a set of criteria designed to enable accurate diagnosis of as many staseis as possible, allow for consistent implementation in a broad range of historical and evidentiary contexts, map onto fifth- and fourth-century understandings of stasis as closely as possible, and ensure that, when departures from that emic understanding are necessary, they are implemented in a way that strengthens the validity of the results obtained in Chapters 2–12.

During the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, the Greeks inhabited more than a thousand poleis scattered across the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions. The Greek term “polis” (plural, poleis) is often translated as “city-state,” and the translation is a good one: Poleis were states in that each of them was a sovereign political unit, independent of the others; and they were city-states in that they typically comprised a densely populated urban core along with its surrounding territory. By the standards of modern polities, poleis tended to be very small: Most had between 1,000 and 20,000 inhabitants and occupied between 10 and 100 square miles. Collectively, however, they housed a population of between 7 and 10 million. And, because the vast majority of poleis were situated on or near the coast, they occupied a substantial portion of the Mediterranean and Black Sea coastline.

This chapter estimates the distribution of cases among the categories of stasis established in Chapter 9, as well as two additional subcategories, using a blend of qualitative and (especially) quantitative analysis. Broadly speaking, it shows that only a miniscule minority of staseis involved the most extreme type of violence (internal war); that a larger minority involved less-extreme-but-still-bloody forms of violence, such as mass executions and battles; and that a majority relied exclusively on types of violence that limited the number of fatalities, such as assassinations, betrayals, and expulsions.

This chapter compares stasis to the modern conceptual category with which it is most commonly associated: bellum civile, or civil war. It focuses primarily on the “original” civil wars of the first century BCE but also considers subsequent cases that are similar in scale, duration, and the types of violence involved. Against existing scholarship, which tends to conflate stasis with modern conceptual categories, including but not limited to civil war, it argues that stasis was a historically distinctive phenomenon that differs fundamentally from its analogues in both ancient and modern societies.