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This chapter focuses on the role of the Argead dynasts of Macedon and the Qin rulers, who transitioned in title from Gong to Wang to Huang Di. Despite both of these figures being “sole rulers” which initially operate along very similar lines, the resulting final forms of those rulership modes – Philip and Alexander in Macedon, versus the First Emperor in Qin, are evidence of dramatically different dynamics at work on these rulership traditions. This chapter focuses on the differing roles of ruler legitimation, the limitations of power
This chapter compares specific features of the reigns of Philip II , Alexander III, and Ying Zheng. This chapter attempts to understand the lives of these figures not as Great Men history traditionally has, but rather to understand them as culminations of evolutions and processes that were centuries in the making, and representing evolutions which, in many ways, are cut off after their own eras. Major topics examined include the differing approaches taken to mass population transfer by Alexander and Zheng, the differing expressions of dissent under Philip, Alexander, and Ying Zheng, their various attempts to portray themselves as heroic and divine, and the sociopolitical motivations for their activities in the first place. Findings include the nature of Ying Zheng’s efforts at self divinization as itself bureaucratic. Alexander’s equivalent efforts are limited by the nature of Macedonian kingship as first-among-equals, which his campaigns had massively distorted, but never actually broke down, explaining the attitudes and behaviors of Macedonians towards his increasing power and prestige, as well as providing hard political and social incentivization for Alexander’s campaigns other than the notion of “Pothos”.
This introduction lays out the uses and methodology of comparative historiography. The larger suitability of Macedon and Qin for particular emphasis in a comparative study is addressed and defended based on their numerous historical features that are found to parallel each other.
This chapter moves beyond the figure of the sole ruler into the dynamics of Macedonian and Qin society. Surrounding the figure of the ruler are subordinates and subjects of differing levels of power and authority. Major findings reinforce the nature of the extremely personal Macedonian governmental framework. The comparison of military practice is also revealing of an emphasis on killing greater among the Zhou than Greek armies, as the importance of captives, citizenship, and submission among the Greeks reveals a vastly different understanding of the cultural act of killing than exists among the Zhou. Incentivization is also examined, and the role of political personhood among the Greeks and Macedonians is highlighted as a means by which soldiers are incentivized to action.
As plebeian tribune, Clodius enacted laws designed to strengthen his support among the urban plebs and neutralize Cicero’s backers. Hence, when a Clodian law criminalizing the execution of citizens without a trial was put to a vote, Cicero preemptively departed into exile in mid-March 58. Another Clodian law was then enacted, formalizing Cicero’s banishment and requiring him to remain 500 miles from Rome. Cicero found refuge with Cn. Plancius, a quaestor based in Thessalonica. In 57, however, the new magistrates, led by the consul Lentulus Spinther, pushed for Cicero’s recall. After the plebeian tribunes Milo and P. Sestius organized their own gangs to counter Clodius’, the latter lost control of the streets, and Cicero’s recall took shape. He arrived back in Italy in August and entered Rome on September 4, delivering speeches in the senate and before the people that expressed thanks and vowed a continuation of his previous policies.
Disappointed by this second defeat, Catiline formed a conspiracy to overthrow the government and install himself in power. He acted in league with C. Manlius, who had gathered a band of Sullan veterans and other malcontents in Faesulae (in Etruria). Cicero’s warnings to the senate were at first disbelieved. But when the conspirators’ rising in Etruria was independently confirmed, he obtained the senatus consultum ultimum authorizing him as consul to act in the defense of the state. The waiting continued until, on the night of 6–7 November, assassins appointed by Catiline appeared at Cicero’s door. He had, however, been forewarned and denied them entry. That event spurred Cicero to denounce Catiline in the senate (Catilinarian 1), leading Catiline to depart Rome. Though further conspirators remained in the City, Cicero was able to obtain evidence against them and a decree of the senate calling for their execution, which he supervised.