In Chapter 1 I advocated a minimalist view on the basis of which the Cyrenaics are Socratics because the founder of the school was an associate of Socrates. I have also warned that at a later stage I would give a more committed meaning for the adjective “Socratic” when attached to the Cyrenaics. I do so now in so far as I claim that the interest in epistemology the Cyrenaics clearly had is clear evidence of their Socratic legacy. Socrates' philosophy (whatever interpretation one may offer of it) rests on the assumption that the ethical enquiries that are so typical of Socrates' dialogical activity coincide with an epistemological search for moral knowledge. In Socrates there is an isomorphic coincidence between epistemology and ethics.

THE CYRENAICS AS SOCRATICS ONCE AGAIN

In a fully Socratic spirit, the Cyrenaics conceived of epistemology and ethics as parts of philosophy that are the two undividable faces of the same coin. Both Cyrenaic ethics and epistemology are centred on the crucial notion of affection (pathos), which serves as the epistemological factor for human knowledge and, at the same time, as the ethical key element of human behaviour. In the philosophy of Socrates, it is arbitrary to postulate a predominance of the ethical above the epistemological, in so far as the former presupposes and rests on the latter.

Together with Aristippus, Plato was a follower of Socrates. Plato and Aristippus were contemporaries and, both being philosophers, could have met and had discussions on many occasions. More importantly, Plato could have had first-hand knowledge of Aristippus' philosophy and doctrine. If this is so, Plato is likely to have confronted Aristippus' views in some of his dialogues. So if there is evidence that Plato discusses Cyrenaic views in some of his dialogues, we shall be in an excellent position to have vital information on Aristippus and his school. In short, we will be in a better position to argue for the foundation by Aristippus of the Cyrenaic school. It is plain that if Plato refers in his dialogues to some philosophical views that we can, with good reason, ascribe to Aristippus, this will show that Aristippus was a real philosopher whose views Plato wished to discuss for their doctrinal relevance. If Plato held Aristippus to be a philosopher, the probability that he founded a Socratic school would be much higher. That is why detractors of Aristippus aim to disregard Plato's testimony. They wish to prove that, since there is no real evidence that Plato refers to Aristippus in his dialogues, that is a clear sign that Aristippus did not elaborate any of the views that are characteristic of the Cyrenaic school (see Giannantoni 1958: 117–69; 1991: vol. I, 1H Appendix).

CYRENAIC PHILOSOPHY

In this book I have tried to amplify the field of interests of the Cyrenaics by adding metaphysics and philosophy of language to ethics and epistemology. In so doing, I have also offered an ambitious interpretation of the Cyrenaic school by showing that, in addition to the school, there is a Cyrenaic philosophy for us to account for. By Cyrenaic philosophy I mean a coherent set of philosophical views (ethical, epistemological, metaphysical and semantic). I say that the set of philosophical views I see as representing Cyrenaic philosophy is coherent because I take Cyrenaic ethics to be perfectly organic with the epistemology and metaphysics of the school, as much as epistemology and metaphysics are in perfect accordance with the semantic approached adopted by the Cyrenaics.

The cardinal concept for Cyrenaic ethics and epistemology is that of affection (pathos). The two ethical key affections for the Cyrenaics are pleasure and pain, while they admit of an (epistemological) affection that is neutral from the ethical point of view and is purely representational. Cyrenaic pathē – both affective and representational – are best interpreted as originating from movements and alterations in us. In Cyrenaic philosophy, affections are wholly subjective. If I see a table as white, on the basis of Cyrenaic epistemology, I can be said to be whitened.

As far as Cyrenaic ethics is concerned, the most relevant source is Diogenes Laertius:

We are immediately given the kernel of Cyrenaic ethics: pleasure is the end and pleasure is desirable in virtue of itself. On the other hand, the importance of happiness is derivative of pleasure, since happiness is not desirable for itself but in virtue of particular pleasures. In light of the predominance of pleasure over happiness, it has been claimed – quite correctly – that the Cyrenaics constitute the only exception to Greek eudaemonism: the view, absolutely central to Greek ethics, that happiness is the end of life. Later, while still endorsing the claim that the Cyrenaics are anti-eudaemonists, I shall restrict the scope of Cyrenaic hedonism by describing the secondary, yet proper role of happiness in the ethics of the Cyrenaics. For the moment, let us concentrate on the kernel of Cyrenaic hedonism, namely on the view that pleasure is the end.

TEXTUAL EVIDENCE: DIOGENES LAERTIUS

Diogenes Laertius gives us by far the most extended treatment of the Cyrenaic school and its genealogy, in terms of the persons involved in that school and of the doctrinal views endorsed by its members. Diogenes' life of Aristippus is contained in The Lives of Eminent Philosophers, book II, sections 65–104: rather a lengthy exposition. Before entering into the details on Aristippus' life and doctrine that Diogenes offers us, I shall give a brief outline of the whole section. Diogenes' account opens (DL II 65) with a brief biographical note on Aristippus; a long section on anecdotes about him follows, where many of his apothegms are reported (II 66–83). A short section (II 83) on the homonyms is then followed by the catalogue of Aristippus' writings (II 83–5). At the end of this section, there is a much-debated sentence reporting the attribution of an important doctrinal view to Aristippus. According to Diogenes, “he declared that the end [telos] is the smooth motion [leian kinēsin] resulting in perception [eis aisthēsin anadidomenēn]”. After this sentence, there is the proper doxological section (II 85–104), reporting, in a detailed way, the main philosophical views to be attributed to the Cyrenaics.

This book is an introduction to the main figures and to the philosophical thought of the Cyrenaic school, one of the three (minor) schools that – together with the Cynics and the Megarics (or Dialecticians) – goes under the traditional label “Socratic schools”. On these terms, the Cyrenaic school is a Socratic school: why is it Socratic and why a school?

THE CYRENAICS AS A SOCRATIC SCHOOL

On a minimalist interpretation, the Cyrenaics are Socratic thinkers because the supposed founder of the school, Aristippus of Cyrene, was a close associate of Socrates. On a more committed interpretation, the Cyrenaics are Socratic thinkers because they developed further both the kind of personal commitment to knowledge that is already fully present in Socrates' theoretical activity and his lifelong concern for ethics. In particular, the Cyrenaics had a major interest in Socrates' idea – dealt with in the last part of the Protagoras – that pleasure and good are closely related, if not fully identifiable. On the basis of this more committed interpretation, the Cynics were instead exclusively concerned with the ethical aspect of Socrates' philosophy, which, again, was developed by them in ways that were different from Socrates' original ethics. On the other hand, the Megarics were interested in the logical side of the Socratic activity, but they also shared, like all the other Socratics (and this is the overall common feature of the three schools), a certain interest in ethics.

This book aims to fill in a lacuna for the English-speaking reader by providing an introduction to the Cyrenaic school. It is intended both for undergraduates of philosophy, ancient philosophy and classics approaching the Cyrenaics for the first time and for more skilled postgraduates and scholars, who lack a general account of Cyrenaic philosophy at the moment. The book can be read at two different levels, corresponding to the two different readerships I have in mind. Informative parts will alternate with more philosophically sophisticated parts. These latter will be useful also to readers with little philosophical expertise but they are specifically targeted for a more skilled readership. Those readers, especially undergraduates, wishing to delve immediately into the philosophy of the Cyrenaics can begin with Part II. Part I intermixes philosophical questions with more historical matters and is more scholarly tuned.

The overall interpretation of the Cyrenaics I recommend in the course of the book is that of a school with a complete philosophical agenda, spanning ethics, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of language. More unconventionally, I also defend the claim that, together with other ancient philosophers such as Protagoras and Pyrrho, the Cyrenaics can be inscribed into a line of metaphysical enquiry that is centred on indeterminacy; namely, the view that things in the perceptual world do not have any intrinsic ontological essence. This claim is doubly radical, in its own right and in relation to the Cyrenaics.