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Plato's dialogues frequently criticize traditional Greek myth, yet Plato also integrates myth with his writing. Daniel S. Werner confronts this paradox through an in-depth analysis of the Phaedrus, Plato's most mythical dialogue. Werner argues that the myths of the Phaedrus serve several complex functions: they bring nonphilosophers into the philosophical life; they offer a starting point for philosophical inquiry; they unify the dialogue as a literary and dramatic whole; they draw attention to the limits of language and the limits of knowledge; and they allow Plato to co-opt cultural authority as a way of defining and legitimating the practice of philosophy. Platonic myth, as a species of traditional tale, is thus both distinct from philosophical dialectic and similar to it. Ultimately, the most powerful effect of Platonic myth is the way in which it leads readers to participate in Plato's dialogues and to engage in a process of self-examination.
The third volume of Professor Guthrie's great history of Greek thought, entitled The Fifth-Century Enlightenment, deals in two parts with the Sophists and Socrates, the key figures in the dramatic and fundamental shift of philosophical interest from the physical universe to man. Each of the two parts is available as a paperback with the text, bibliography and indexes amended where necessary so that each part is self-contained. Socrates dominated the controversies of this period, as he has dominated the subsequent history of western philosophy. He was the first to identify and grapple with some of the most intractable and persistent logical and philosophical problems; but he was also and has remained a highly controversial figure because of his extraordinary personal qualities and his remarkable career. Professor Guthrie offers a balanced and comprehensive picture of the man, his life, and his thought.
Early modern philosophers looked for inspiration to the later ancient thinkers when they rebelled against the dominant Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. The impact of the Hellenistic philosophers (principally the Stoics, Epicureans and Skeptics) on such philosophers as Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza and Locke was profound and is ripe for reassessment. This collection of essays offers precisely that. Leading historians of philosophy explore the connections between Hellenistic and early modern philosophy in ways that take advantage of new scholarly and philosophical advances. The essays display a challenging range of methods and will be an invaluable point of reference for philosophers, historians of ideas and classicists.
Concepts of place and their relation to neighboring concepts (1–5)
[1] Following the impasses we raised before about body and limits, against both the physicists and the geometers, seems to be the investigation about place; for it is held by everyone unanimously that body either is contained in place or travels over place. [2] For this reason we should begin by observing that according to Epicurus one part of the so-called intangible nature is named void, another place, and another space; the names change according to the different points of view, since the same nature is spoken of as void when in a condition of lacking all body, but is called place when occupied by a body, and becomes space when bodies go through it. However, the general term “intangible nature” is applied to it in Epicurus because of its being devoid of resistant touch. [3] And the Stoics say that void is what can be occupied by a being, but is not occupied, or a distance without body, or a distance not occupied by body, whereas place is what is occupied by a being and made equal to what occupies it – now calling body “being,” as is clear from the alternation of the names; and they say that space is a distance that is occupied over one region but unoccupied over another. [4] But some have said that space is the place of the larger body, so that space differs from place in the following respect: the latter does not indicate magnitude of the body that is contained in it (for even if it contains a minimal body, it is nonetheless referred to as place), but the former indicates non-negligible magnitude of the body in it. [5] Well, then, we have done a complicated investigation of void in “On Elements,” and it is not necessary to repeat the same argument now. At present, however, we will inquire into place, as well as space, which is connected with it, and is itself place generically speaking.
[1] The reason why the physical part of philosophy is brought forward for our inquiry after the logical part, although it seems to come before the others in time, we mentioned above. And here we will again assemble the same method of investigation, not dwelling on the particulars, as Clitomachus and the rest of the chorus of Academics have done (for by jumping into alien material and creating their arguments on the basis of agreement with the dogmatic views of others they prolonged their counter-argument immensely), but attacking the most important and all-encompassing points – by means of which we shall have the rest put into impasse as well. [2] For just as in sieges those who undermine the foundation of the wall get the towers to come down along with it, so those in philosophical inquiries who have defeated the initial assumptions of a subject have in effect ruled out apprehension of the entire subject. [3] Indeed, some people not implausibly compare those who descend into particular investigations to hunters who pursue the animal on foot, or to those who fish with a line or who catch birds with lime and a twig, while they compare those who shake all the particulars by means of the most all-encompassing points to people who put lines, stakes and nets around them. Hence, just as it is much more skilful to be able to catch many in one go than to labor over every single catch, so it is much more elegant to bring a counter-argument jointly against everything than to be stuck with the particulars.
General distinction between active and material principles (4–12)
[4] So, since those who are thought to have done the more precise classification of the principles of everything say that some are active, others material (and the first to advance their opinion is held to be the poetHomer, and after himAnaxagoras ofClazomenae and Empedocles of Acragas and lots of others. [5] For the poet gives an account of these things when he allegorizes about Proteus and Eidothea, calling the first [prôton] and most original cause Proteus, and the being that is turned into specifics [eidê] Eidothea.