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In this chapter, we start off by focusing on Cyrenaic metaphysics: a quite unfashionable topic to address because the general view among scholars is that the Cyrenaics had no real interest in metaphysics. The Cyrenaics are traditionally believed to concentrate only on ethics, leaving aside, if not rejecting, the other branches of philosophy. This view rests on a misunderstanding of two passages by Sextus and Seneca (Sext. Emp. Math. VII 11 and 15 [=SSR IV A 168=T 31]; Sen. Ep. ad Lucilium XIV 1, 12 [=SSR IV A 165]). In those passages Sextus and Seneca explain that the Cyrenaics only apparently adopted a moral approach to philosophy. They effectively reintroduced those branches of philosophy (such as logic, the study of nature and of the causes [=metaphysics], and the study of affections [=epistemology]) that they seem to have rejected by dividing their moral philosophy into these sub-branches.
One may add that Aristotle is historically responsible for the invention of metaphysics as a proper branch of philosophy in the middle of the fourth century BCE, that is, at the time when the Cyrenaics were flourishing. The focus on metaphysics as a proper branch of philosophy is something that only Hellenistic philosophers could have witnessed. It would be inappropriate to say that Plato, Protagoras, Democritus and the Socratic schools had no interest in metaphysics and did not elaborate any metaphysical views.
Among the sources on the Cyrenaics, Sextus is the only one who reports a rather interesting Cyrenaic argument on language. I quote Sextus' passage in full:
They [the Cyrenaics] say that no criterion is common to human beings, common names are assigned to objects [onomata de koina tithesthai tois chrēmasin]. (196) All in common in fact call something white or sweet, but they do not have something common that is white or sweet. Each human being is aware of his own private affection. One cannot say, however, whether this affection occurs in oneself and in one's neighbour from a white object, since one cannot grasp the affection of the neighbour, nor can his neighbour, since he cannot feel the affection of that other person. (197) And since no affection is common to us all, it is hasty to declare that what appears to me a certain way appears the same way to my neighbour as well. Perhaps I am constituted so as to be whitened by the external object when it comes into contact with my senses, while another person has the senses constructed so as to have been disposed differently. In any case, the phainomenon is absolutely not common to us all [ou pantōs oun koinon esti tophainomenon hēmin].[…]
I list the sources and testimonies on the Cyrenaics in translation in alphabetical order of the authors. The title of the work from which the passage is quoted is bracketed. The corresponding testimony in Giannantoni's Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, if available, is indicated at the end of the passage.
THE ANONYMOUS THEAETETUS COMMENTATOR
1. “Something is the agent [to poiēsan], something else is the patient [to paschon]. But, if people undergo affections that are opposed to the thing in itself, they will agree that the intrinsic feature of the agent is not defined [mē einai hōrismenēn tēn tou poiēsantos idiotēta]; if it were so, the same thing at the same time will not produce different affections. Because of this, the Cyrenaics say that only affections are apprehensible [mona ta pathē phasin katalēpta], while external things are not [ta de exōthen akatalēpta]. That I am being burnt – they say – I apprehend; that the fire is such as to burn is obscure. If it were such, all things will be burnt by it” (col. LXV, 19-35=SSR IV A 214).
ARISTOCLES AND EUSEBIUS
From Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel
2. “Aristippus from Cyrene maintains that the end of good things is pleasure, of bad things pain [telos agathōn tēn ēdonēn, kakōn de tēn algēdona]; he rejects all the other sciences of nature, saying that the only useful thing to do is to look for what is good and bad” (Euseb. Praep. evang. 1.8.9=SSR IV A 166).
Desire is a central concept in Aristotle's ethical and psychological works, but he does not provide us with a systematic treatment of the notion itself. This book reconstructs the account of desire latent in his various scattered remarks on the subject and analyses its role in his moral psychology. Topics include: the range of states that Aristotle counts as desires (orexeis); objects of desire (orekta) and the relation between desires and envisaging prospects; desire and the good; Aristotle's three species of desire: epithumia (pleasure-based desire), thumos (retaliatory desire) and boulêsis (good-based desire - in a narrower notion of 'good' than that which connects desire more generally to the good); Aristotle's division of desires into rational and non-rational; Aristotle and some current views on desire; and the role of desire in Aristotle's moral psychology. The book will be of relevance to anyone interested in Aristotle's ethics or psychology.
Plato's entire fictive world is permeated with philosophical concern for Eros, well beyond the so-called erotic dialogues. Several metaphysical, epistemological and cosmological conversations - Timaeus, Cratylus, Parmenides, Theaetetus and Phaedo - demonstrate that Eros lies at the root of the human condition and that properly guided Eros is the essence of a life well lived. This book presents a holistic vision of Eros, beginning with the presence of Eros at the origin of the cosmos and the human soul, surveying four types of human self-cultivation aimed at good guidance of Eros and concluding with human death as a return to our origins. The book challenges conventional wisdom regarding the 'erotic dialogues' and demonstrates that Plato's world is erotic from beginning to end: the human soul is primordially erotic and the well-cultivated erotic soul can best remember and return to its origins, its lifelong erotic desire.