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This article examines the theory of recollection in Plato's Meno and attempts to unravel some long-standing puzzles about it. What are the prenatal objects of the soul's vision? What are the post-natal objects of the soul's recollection? What is innate in the Meno? Why does Socrates (prima facie) suggest that both knowledge and true opinion are innate? The article pays particular attention to the ana- prefix in the verbs aneuriskô, anakineô and analambanô, and suggests that they are used for two distinct stages of recollection: a phenomenological stage of ‘finding again’ or ‘awakening’ our innate content, which Plato calls doxa, and an epistemic stage of ‘getting it back’ as epistêmê. Thinking of the verbs with this ‘back/again’ sense of the ana- prefix (instead of as ‘up’, in the common translation of analambanô as ‘take up’) allows us to understand why Plato would simultaneously imply that our souls had prenatal epistêmê, have post-natal innate true opinion and have the potential to analambanein epistêmê. He is not talking about ‘taking up’ epistêmê that he also calls doxa, but about ‘getting back’ the epistêmê we had prenatally. The article concludes with an examination of what this innate content is, suggesting that it is a type of ‘principle’ and ‘essential’ mental content.
The Peleus of Euripides’ Andromache makes claims puzzlingly incongruous with his decrepit physical state; he threatens physical violence against the much younger Menelaus and denies his advanced age outright in conversation with Andromache. Peleus’ motivations for acting in such a way, Menelaus’ cause for acting as if these claims are true, and the literary or dramatic significance of these affairs, all pose problems which this article addresses, while also offering a first step towards a comprehensive methodology for understanding old age in Euripidean drama. It presents a unified view of old men across several plays, highlighting key patterns of their interaction with old age, and applies this broad perspective to a close analysis of Peleus’ portrayal in the Andromache. It argues that old men in the plays of Euripides can be viewed generally on either side of a dichotomy between giving effective counsel or participating effectively in physical conflict. Peleus subverts this dichotomy by denying the fact of his age throughout, an action which allows him to employ the skill in speaking gained by his old age as a dramatic substitute for direct physical confrontation and to occupy the social role of a younger man in the Greek household.
Concentrating on Propertius 3.21 in particular, this article identifies a previously unnoticed network of allusions by three Roman poets (Catullus, Propertius and Ovid) to one another and to Book 1 of Apollonius Rhodius’ Argonautica. It shows that these intertextual links are pivoted on the three poets’ common use of the verse-ending lintea malo in scenes of departure by sea, and on their common interest in framing other aspects of the nautical context (especially the naval equipment involved and the presence of a favourable wind) in specific ways. Highlighting the presence in all three cases of departing male lovers with traditionally compromised or otherwise dubious claims to heroism, the article argues that each of the three instances shows the poet in question interacting competitively and self-consciously with the usages of his predecessor(s) (and with those usages’ immediate contexts) and exploiting the choices made by them to serve his new context and to advertise his personal skill in the creative deployment of revered poetic models.
This article explores the intertextual connection between Eteocles’ dream in Statius’ Thebaid Book 2 and the brief reference to his ambiguous dream at Aesch. Sept. 710−11. In Aeschylus’ play, Eteocles understands the true meaning of the dream belatedly, as he is about to enter into a duel with his brother Polynices. The article argues that the ambiguous character of the Aeschylean dream forms the basis of the dream in Statius, and that the poet develops the scene further through elements of epic dream sequences that align his narrative with the epic tradition. However, Statius emphasizes even more the ambiguity of Eteocles’ dream to highlight the tragic nature of his character. Following ancient dream theorists, the discussion shows next that the obscurity of the dream in the Thebaid can be understood as the product of the fusion of different dream classes, which are evoked in the description of the dream in Statius. The proposed interpretation suggests that, on the basis of their personal experience of dreams and their familiarity with popular dream theories, Statius’ readers would have been able to perceive the irony between Laius’ message and Jupiter's true intentions, all of which enhance Eteocles’ tragic character.
The article argues that the genuine first name of Philo of Larissa was in fact ‘Philio’. This claim is based on two new readings ‘Philio’ in our earliest (certain) source for the name, Philodemus’ Index Academicorum, which put other early evidence into perspective. Three other essentially independent and reliable witnesses have the reading ‘Philio’ too. Furthermore, several Cicero manuscripts preserve various examples of the alternative reading ‘Philio’. The reading ‘Philo’ in some other sources might be a mistake or a kind of nickname.
In the Commentary on the Cratylus, Proclus puts forward an original but largely ignored interpretation of Circe as weaving life in τῷ τετραστοίχῳ. This paper argues that τὸ τετράστοιχον refers not to the four genera but to the four elements. Thus what the enchantress weaves are the elemental garments that weigh the soul down to the earthly realm of mortals.
A close reading of the contexts of several Homeric passages reveals that Homer often uses εἰδώς with ironic force. This realization sheds light on several passages discussed herein, including: 1) Homer's description of the location of Ithaca, which is shown to be Odysseus’ strategic lie that directs the Phaeacians to the local stronghold (nearby Dulichium), and 2) the manuscript reading of Parmenides B1.3, which is shown to harbour no internal conflict even if its εἰδότα φῶτα (‘one who knows’) is in a state of confusion (ἄτῃ), because εἰδότα can signal incomplete or confused knowledge, or even a lack of it. Other literary clues in Parmenides B1 are shown to support this reading.
These four textual notes attempt (1) to demonstrate that OT 420 as transmitted is unlikely to impossible, and to show the desirability of Blaydes's conjecture ποῖοϲ οὐκ ἔϲται ᾿λικών, that is, Ἑλικών; (2) to argue for the necessity of reading ἄν for εἰ at line 121 and of making the line a complete sentence; (3) to argue for a lacuna before line 530; and (4) to propose τίϲ ἄταιϲ μᾶλλον ἢ τίϲ ἀγρίαι ξύνοικοϲ ἁλλαγᾶι βίου; in lines 1205–6.
Columella's poem on horticulture, which forms Book 10 of his prose treatise De re rustica, has predominantly been edited by experts in agricultural writings rather than in Latin poetry, leaving many textual problems unsolved or even unrecognized. This article discusses a number of passages and proposes some thirty emendations.
This paper presents a graffito written after firing on a Samian-ware bowl dated to the turn of the first and second centuries c.e., which seems to contain part of a hexameter included in the well-known anthology Carmina XII sapientum, the composition of which has recently been attributed to the Christian author Lactantius.
I argue that letter 98 of Book 10 of Pliny's Letters (= Epistulae) was deliberately moved from its original position in the sequence of letters in order to serve as a metaphor for the solution to the problem of Christians in Bithynia and Pontus. This solves a chronological problem in Pliny's Letters and is evidence of the hand of an active editor.
The focus of this article is on a curious episode at the end of the first book of Tacitus’ Annals. It is argued that Tacitus here is at his most metaphoric and allusive, allowing a senatorial debate on the possibly prophetic meaning of an inundation of the Tiber to become a debate about the overwhelming power of the river's namesake Tiberius. Parallels from Dio (and perhaps also from Livy) indicate that inundations of the Tiber by the end of the Republic had become prophetic warnings of the rise of the dynasts undermining the stability of the Republic. In Tacitus, procedural anomalies and suggestive wordplay bring to the fore the religious and constitutional issues that in the Senate's handling of this Tiberine prodigium reflect its submission to the ever more oppressive power of Tiberius.
In Aristophanes’ Clouds, Socrates vents his frustration at his new pupil Strepsiades’ inability to see the eponymous chorus with the line ‘You would see them unless you have drops of rheum in your eyes as big as gourds (κολοκύνταις).’ This line is problematic, because gourds relate to eyesight in no obvious way. However, Aristophanes might have ended the verse by referring to Socrates’ initiation of Strepsiades sixty-five lines earlier by a liberal sprinkling of barley, and written ‘or you're blear-eyed with barley-groats (οὐλοχύταισι)’. If some reader added κρομ(μ)ύοις ‘with onions’ to his text as a more universally valid explanation for an eye-affliction, a later scribe might have thought this an attempted correction, and substituted κολοκύνταις, which is both metrically correct and palaeographically closer to οὐλοχύταισι than is κρομ(μ)ύοις.
This article explores the propensity of Iliadic landscape similes to encourage reflections on human fragility. Landscape in the similes is usually interpreted as a medium which conveys a consistent symbolic value (for example storms as the hostility of nature); however, landscape is often a more flexible medium. By offering close readings of three Iliadic similes (winter torrents at 4.452–6, snowfall at 12.279–89 and clear night at 8.555–9), this article argues that landscape allowed the poet to frame the main narrative in various ways, both helping the listener to imagine described events and interrupting the listener's immersion in the main narrative. While many have analysed how similes offer analogies to the main narrative, the ways in which the same simile can also disrupt and reframe the narrative are less understood. This article observes that shifts in narrative space and time played a key role in changing the perspective of the listener. Taking a broadly phenomenological approach, it proposes that embodied descriptions of space, which recreate the experience of the moving body in landscape, invite the listener to consider the temporal scale of the natural world. By looking at how landscape in select similes shifts the listener's spatial and temporal experience, this article argues that landscape contributes to the wider Iliadic theme of human fragility. In particular, it identifies the potential for landscape similes to minimize the scale of human experience, question the possibility of human agency, and reveal the limitations of human perspectives and knowledge.
Our extant texts never give a fully comprehensive or representative impression of classical literature. Fragments are valuable because they tell—or hint at—a different story. They represent vestigial traces of a counterfactual alternative version of literary history, and they offer tantalizing glimpses of voices or varieties of human experience that were (accidentally or deliberately) excluded from the classical canon. To ‘think fragmentarily’ is to think beyond the canon and to question traditionally dominant modes of thought. This article uses a neglected fragment of Damoxenus (fr. 3 PCG) as a case study for ‘fragmentary thinking’. This extraordinary fragment reveals that Damoxenus’ comedy dramatized a homosexual love story, in sharp contrast to the familiar heteronormative marriage plots of Menander and other Greek and Roman comic playwrights. Careful examination of a single fragment can prompt us to re-examine conventional scholarly narratives of sexuality in New Comedy.
This article argues for an alternative interpretation of the ekphrasis of Pelops and Myrtilos among Adrastus’ parade of ancestral images in lines 6.283–5 of Statius’ Thebaid. The majority of scholarly readings believe that the scene described in these lines alludes to the mythical chariot-race between Pelops and Oenomaus. Using a combination of visual, intertextual and intratextual evidence, this article suggests that these lines more likely refer to a later part of the myth—Pelops’ murder of Myrtilos, as the former hurls the latter into the Myrtoan sea from a flying chariot. This paper concludes by exploring what implications this alternative reading has for our understanding of Statius’ use of ekphrasis as a narrative technique and, more specifically, its significance on our reading of the ekphrasis of Adrastus’ ancestral images.
This note addresses briefly the difficulties associated with the personalities named in the epigram Anth. Lat. 109.8 ShB and their roles before suggesting that tibi should be read rather than mihi in line 8.
De fato 35 is part of Cicero's argument against the Stoic theory of causation. He claims in general that the Stoic chain of causes consists of antecedent but not efficient causes. To the examples cited in the previous chapter he adds verses from the opening of Ennius’ Medea exul (lines 208–11 Jocelyn = FRL 2 and TRF 89.1–4) containing the Nurse's lamentation over the origins of the Argonautic expedition that led, ultimately, to Medea's current mental distress. Then follows the question quorsum haec praeterita? and the answer quia sequitur illud, ‘nam numquam era errans mea domo ecferret pedem | Medea, animo aegro, amore saeuo saucia’, non ut eae res causam adferrent amoris, citing Ennius, Medea exul 215–16 Jocelyn = FRL 2 and TRF 89.8–9. Editors and commentators have struggled to explain the relation of the answer to the question. Here it is argued that the relation becomes clear if one adopts non<ne> for non and punctuates with a query after amoris. The sense will be: ‘Why have these past events been cited? In view of the sequel … was it not so that they bring on the cause of love?’ In other words, the Nurse, like the Stoics in Cicero's view, cites antecedent events as if they were efficient causes.