Argument

Throughout the nineteenth century, French alienists reflected on the nature of idiocy, on its causes and possible treatments. Central to this reflection was the question of education. Was it possible to teach a child idiot to develop physically, intellectually, and morally? Schools were established, wards were rearranged, and educational methods were suggested. The extent to which all of this succeeded is hard to assess. The optimistic tone of educational treatises was never reflected in the life in the asylum. By the end of the century, the dichotomy between theoretical ideals and practical reality came to a halt as both methodological treatises on education and pleas for funding ceased. Soon, idiots left the wards and their schools for new classes within the common school system. While the former practice had proved successful in improving the patients' abilities, it was claimed that it had failed to bring about the social integration for which alienists had once hoped. This final period marked a rupture in the treatment of idiocy, both in terms of space and organization from asylums to schools and from alienists to psychologists.

Argument

This paper investigates the conceptual treatment and mathematical modeling of force in Newton's Principia. It argues that, contrary to currently dominant views, Newton's concept of force is best understood as a physico-mathematical construct with theoretical underpinnings rather than a “mathematical construct” or an ontologically “neutral” concept. It uses various philosophical and historical frameworks to clarify interdisciplinary issues in the history of science and draws upon the distinction between axiomatic systems in mathematics and physics, as well as discovery patterns in science. It also dwells on Newton's “philosophy” of mathematics, described here in terms of mathematical naturalism. This philosophy considers mathematical quantities to be physically significant quantities whose motions are best mapped by geometry. It then shows that to understand the epistemic status of force in the Principia, it is important to scrutinize both Newton's mathematical justificatory strategies and his background assumptions about force – without constructing, however, an overarching metaphysical framework for his science. Finally, the paper studies scientific attempts to redefine or eliminate force from science during the period between Newton and Laplace. From a philosophical standpoint, the paper implicitly suggests that questions about the reality of force be distinguished from questions about the validity of force, and that both sets of questions be distinguished from questions about the utility of the concept of force in science.

Argument

This paper explores the connection between the epistemic and the “political” dimensions of the metaphor of information during the early days of the study of Molecular Evolution. While preserving some of the meanings already documented in the history of molecular biology, the metaphor acquired a new, powerful use as a substitute for “history.” A rhetorical analysis of Emilé Zuckerkandl's paper, “Molecules as Documents of Evolutionary History,” highlights the ways in which epistemic claims on the validity and superiority of molecular evidence for evolution were intimately connected with authority issues in evolutionary biology. The debate is situated within the framework of the battle for resources between traditional evolutionists and molecular biologists at the beginning of the 1960s. The architects of evolutionary synthesis questioned the idea that molecular characters constitute “cleaner” and “more direct” evidence of evolution. Nevertheless, the information discourse constituted a productive space for the development of a new research program that, paradoxically, has made explicit the limitations of the information metaphor in reconstructing life's history.

Argument

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Muséum d'Histoire naturelle was both workplace and home to functionalist Georges Cuvier and morphologist Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, whose doctrinal differences became enmeshed with political dialogues regarding social reform. Surprisingly, the public not only viewed the arrangement of the collections in terms of the social platforms they were understood to be supporting, but critiqued the Muséum's buildings as expressions of their anatomical dispute. The Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 pushed these critiques forward, suggesting to some observers that true reform of the natural sciences would begin by reforming the Muséum's architectural program, thereby placing the goals of Comparative Anatomy in correct relationship to human progress.

Argument

In Italy, only 2 per cent of the population consider scientists and experts to be society's leading personalities (Censis 2006). Scientists are classified among the “weak social groups” and more precisely as those who have little influence either because they lack representation in the media (the faculty), or because they lack resources. (Young researchers face the lowest percentage of GDP invested in research among the G8 countries.) This article contributes to the current debate on science policies in Europe and addresses the question of why science has such a low reputation in Italy. How did this situation emerge and what methods should be taken to tackle it beyond merely increasing financial resources? An historical overview of how Marcello Carapezza and Alberto Monroy created leading research centers in geochemistry and developmental biology in Palermo offers insight into the opportunities and threats posed by Italy's academic system. This brief analysis of the Italian academic system should interest international readers who want their country to evolve from a closed, corporative, centralized system into a country that can compete at an international level to attract talented students and resources and achieve a higher scientific reputation.