In the beginning, there was Dava Sobel and Longitude: The True Story of a Lone Genius Who Solved the Greatest Scientific Problem of His Time (1998). Others followed, in a veritable flood which D. P. Miller recently dubbed the ‘Sobel Effect’. Academic historians of science have been concerned by this flood, partly because people other than them are (presumably) making money out of ‘their’ subject, but also because of the ways it might affect the public perception of the history of science. Like the scientists they study, historians fear that popularizers will distort in the process of simplifying. But, knowing how difficult it has been for scientists to control the popularization of their subject, historians may not expect a great deal more success.

The Marxist history of science has played an enormous role in the development of the history of science. Whether through the appreciation of its insights or the construction of a political fortress to prevent infusion, its presence is felt. From 1931 the work of Marxists played an integral part in the international development of the history of science, though rarely have the connections between them or their own biographies been explored. These networks convey a distinct history, alongside political, methodological and personal implications, impressing on us a greater understanding of the possibilities that were present and were lost in the most turbulent of decades. Two of the most notable were Boris Hessen, a founder of Marxist history of science, and J. G. Crowther, one of its most prolific exponents. My examination explores aspects of the dialogue between these controversial figures, starting with brief biographical sketches. Their lives became briefly entwined following the Second International Congress of the History of Science and Technology in 1931, demonstrated with reference to the meeting and the correspondence between them until Hessen's death. In doing so, some new facts and old controversies surface, though most importantly the nature of the correspondence carries implications for the Marxist history of science and for the wider movement of which it is part. The Russian delegation to the congress declared that science was at a crossroads. The history of science was at a similar crossroads in the 1930s.

This paper focuses on the defection of nuclear physicist Bruno Pontecorvo from Britain to the USSR in 1950 in an attempt to understand how government and intelligence services assess threats deriving from the unwanted spread of secret scientific information. It questions whether contingent agendas play a role in these assessments, as new evidence suggests that this is exactly what happened in the Pontecorvo case. British diplomatic personnel involved in negotiations with their US counterparts considered playing down the case. Meanwhile, the press decided to play it up, claiming that Pontecorvo was an atom spy. Finally, the British secret services had evidence showing that this was a fabrication, but they did not disclose it. If all these manipulations served various purposes, then they certainly were not aimed at assessing if there was a threat and what this threat really was.

Argument

During the early modern period, European naturalists were confronted with a rapidly growing body of new objects due to the recent geographic discoveries. According to Bruno Latour's model of “action at a distance” naturalists managed this situation by mobilizing and stabilizing specimens and inscriptions at the periphery of the known world, as well as accumulating, reshuffling, and processing that material in “centers of calculation.” This paper tries to resolve an ambiguity that lies in this model: While the work of naturalists was clearly dependent on local institutions, collections, and botanical gardens in particular, they nevertheless claimed universality for the interpretations of the natural world they propounded. Analysis will be based on a case study: In the 1730s Carl Linnaeus produced a series of manuscripts and printed books that allow us to reconstruct the sequence of translations which led from the first encounter with a “new” plant at the periphery of the known world (in the case of Linnaeus, Lapland, which he visited in 1732) to a major botanical center (the botanical garden of George Clifford, former director of the Dutch East India Company, who employed Linnaeus in 1736 and 1737 to catalog his collection). I will argue generally that the abstraction process that was constitutive of Linnaeus' universal plant taxonomy – the separation of “constant” species and genera from local “varieties”- did not take place exclusively in the centers of knowledge production. This abstraction process was rather coextensive with the global network of translation and exchange that connected such centers with each other and with their peripheries. The “map” of the plant world outlined by Linnaeus did not represent “things drawn together,” but rather “things being exchanged,” and the global circulation of specimens and inscriptions was the foundation on which its claim to universality rested.

Argument

This article attempts to show that the cultural-historical psychological theory of Aleksandr R. Luria (Luriya)When the spelling of Russian names diverges from the transliteration system used by Science in Context, the transliteration is given in parentheses on the first occurrence. See editors' note in the Summer 2002 issue. and his colleagues is based on the philosophical foundations of historical materialism. It argues in particular that Luria's psychology, neuropsychology, and brain theory are integrated in the same scientific research program and are based on the same philosophical premises, and that his theories must be interpreted in the Marxist context in which they are embedded. Luria's research program asserts that the development of higher mental functions depends on the appropriation of cultural means, particularly language, within social practice. Moreover, the brain structures underlying mental functions are also dependent on the appropriation of cultural means. Luria's clinical diagnosis and his program for rehabilitation of patients with brain lesions are based on his psychological theory and brain theory. The following analysis of Luria's comprehensive program will show that a socio-cultural non-reductive explanation of mental functions and their underlying brain structures may have implications for the philosophical discussion of the mind-brain problem.

Between 1867 and 1869 Michel Chasles presented a series of manuscripts to the Académie des sciences, which suggested that Isaac Newton's claims to original discovery were unfounded. It quickly became apparent to the majority of the academicians that the manuscripts were forgeries, but Chasles was repeatedly allowed to state his case. This essay focuses on the responses to the affair from four British men of science: David Brewster, Augustus De Morgan, Robert Grant and Thomas Archer Hirst. It asks why they felt it necessary to add their voices to this debate and examines their various strategies for refuting Chasles's evidence.