The introductory chapter positions the volume in relation to the discussion of historical knowledge building from different perspectives, including the philosophy of history, history education, and knowledge structures from a sociological perspective. The chapter explains the usefulness of studying knowledge building in history from a functional linguistic perspective and provides an overview of the Systemic Functional Linguistics initiatives since the 1980s. It concludes with a preview of the contributory chapters in this collection.

‘What do they know of cricket who only cricket know?’ In using this phrase (a reappropriation of one written by Kipling), the pioneering postcolonial historian C. L. R. James synthesised his interpretation of the vital significance of cricket for the growing West Indian nationalism of the twentieth century (James, 1963). Yet for those not familiar with this work, the phrase likely gives little of this meaning or reveals any of its significance. This chapter explores how particular terminology, ways of speaking, and phrases such as this come to be imbued with deep uncommon-sense and values-based meaning in history. Through analysis using a developing model of tenor in Systemic Functional Linguistics, the chapter argues that such axiologically charged rhetoric functions in the humanities in ways like that of technicality in science. Using texts from James’ memoir Beyond a Boundary, it explores how a range of rhetorical strategies draw on the discourse semantic resources of CONNEXION that links stretches of text and APPRAISAL that evaluates and positions meanings in order to synthesise meaning and help transport it to other texts across contexts.

In this chapter, a case is made for the inclusion of computational approaches to linguistics within the theoretical fold. Computational models aimed at application are a special case of predictive models. The status quo in the philosophy of linguistics is that explanation is scientifically prior to prediction. This is a mistake. Once corrected, the theoretical place of prediction is restored and, with it, computational models of language. The chapter first describes the history behind the emergence of explanation over prediction views in the general philosophy of science. It’s then suggested that this post-positivist intellectual milieu influenced the rejection of computational linguistics in the philosophy of theoretical linguistics. A case study of the predictive power already embedded in contemporary linguistic theory is presented through some work on negative polarity items. The discussion moves to the competence–performance divide informed by the so-called Galilean style in linguistics that retains the explanatory over prediction ideal. In the final sections of the chapter, continuous methods, such as probabilistic linguistics, are used to showcase the explanatory and predictive possibilities of nondiscrete approaches, before a discussion of the contemporary field of deep learning in natural language processing (NLP), where these predictive possibilities are further amplified.

In this chapter, the remit of theoretical linguistics is located within the background of a set of theoretical questions. These questions pertain to issues of ontology, methodology, acquisition, communication, and evolution. The overarching field is distinguished from other pursuits within applied linguistics that have a more practical focus but are argued to subsume certain experimental approaches. The first part of the chapter discusses the role of grammaticality and formal grammars in linguistic theory. Here, the issue of whether the rules of language have normative force is introduced as well as whether the target of scientific linguistics is individual languages or some universal core of human language generally. The question of what a grammar is, a theory, model, or some other device, is presented based on a brief literature review on the topic with a nudge towards a certain scientific instrumentalism about these matters. Next, the chapter asks whether linguistics is best viewed as an empirical social or cognitive science. Arguments are presented on both sides. Naturalism and normativity figure prominently in this debate. Finally, an outline of each chapter of the book is provided with an aim to either precisify or reflect on the philosophical issues presented in this opening chapter.

In this final chapter, we take on an issue that perhaps precedes all the others: how and why did language evolve? Linguistic theory has recently pivoted to amass considerable research on these questions. As we’ve seen over and over in the book, simpler structures have been posited across frameworks to account for the need to explain how language evolved. However, in this book, we’ve seen many distinct approaches to understand human language. A view of language evolution that permits the pluralism of the book would be consistent with the broad approach of this work. Therefore, in this chapter, I want to turn the minimalist research agenda on its head with an alternative thesis: natural language is a complex system and its emergence is likely to have been prompted by multiple interacting factors. First, we assess the current state of the art in biolinguistics and the strong saltation claim that goes with it. Then, we challenge the assumptions that’ve resulted in the saltation picture of language evolution on evolutionary grounds. Lastly, a radical approach to language evolution in terms of complexity science is proffered based on a unique connection with systems biology.

Phonology has generally been neglected as a nexus of philosophical interest despite certain debates within the field both inviting and needing philosophical reflection. Yet, the few who have attempted such inquiry have noted something special about the field and its target. On the one hand, it shares formal and structural aspects with syntax. On the other, it seems to require more literal interpretation in terms of components such as hierarchy and sequential ordering. In this chapter, the nature of the phoneme, the theoretical centrepiece of traditional phonology, comes under scrutiny. The notion, as well as the field itself, is extended to other modalities, such as sign, in accordance with the contemporary trajectory of the field. This extension, and the connections with language and gesture in general, open up the possibility of a philosophical action theory with phonology as its basis. Motor and action theory have been proffered recently in connection with syntax, with little success. However, it’s argued that phonology serves as a better point of comparison. The chapter discusses a range of issues from autosegmental phonology, feature grammar, and sign language, to gestural grammar, motor cognition, and recent 4E approaches to cognition.

In this chapter, the central philosophical pursuit of theoretical linguistics is recentred around the issue of what makes a language a possibly human or natural one. Thus, instead of discussing the old immovable debates concerning the ontology of language in terms of nominalism, mentalism, and platonism, we move the discussion to modal metaphysics. However, this isn’t an exercise in abstract a priori reasoning. The space of possibilities are deeply constrained by current linguistic theory. Besides proffering a novel conception of language and linguistic possibility, the concepts of ‘naturalness’ in philosophy, ‘learnability’ in generative linguistics, and ‘communication’ in the philosophy of language are discussed. The idea is that linguistic possibility or possible languages, like possible worlds, can be defined in terms of accessibility relations from actual languages based on their learnability, use as communicative devices, and a number of other possible constraints. Lastly, the chapter critiques some influential experimental work in neurolinguistics on the notion of impossible languages, which rely more heavily on generative biolinguistics. These experiments, although interesting, don’t show what they intend to. Linguistic impossibility is best derived from its possibility through the method presented in the chapter.

Linguistic pragmatics is one of the fastest growing fields in contemporary theoretical linguistics. It grew from the influential work of philosophers such as Grice, Austin, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others on context and communicative inferences. It engages directly with general rationality, theory of mind, and systems of intention. One of the major debates in pragmatics has been where to precisely draw the line between semantic phenomena and pragmatic phenomena. In this chapter, three classical and influential ideas on the nature of pragmatics, courtesy of Grice (1975), Stalnaker (1978), and Lewis (1979), are discussed. This discussion leads to three further general philosophical frameworks for separating semantic from pragmatic processes and analyses that have roots in the aforementioned triumvirate: (P1) the indexical conception, (P2) the cognitivist conception, and (P3) social-inferential conception. Each option offers a different demarcation. Finally, three linguistic theories of pragmatics are selected as candidate representations of the contemporary state of the art: (L1) optimality-theoretic pragmatics, (L2) game-theoretic pragmatics, and (L3) Bayesian pragmatics. It’s shown that each of these prominent frameworks exploit the philosophical demarcations (P1–P3) presented to different degrees.

Syntax is perhaps one of the most successful projects in the history of theoretical linguistics. It’s also garnered the most philosophical attention. Thus, this chapter focuses on syntactic metatheory. It surveys a number of prominent frameworks from minimalism to construction grammar, dependency grammar, lexical functional grammar and head-driven phrase structure grammar.The main aim is to find a common argument structure and strategy across diverse theoretical positions. In the tradition of recent work on scientific modelling in the philosophy of science, the approach that’s adopted in this chapter works from a bottom-up review of the cross-framework literature. I’ll make a case for a general explanatory strategy or scientific project at the core of linguistic syntax. The core idea is that this general scientific strategy is relatively stable across syntactic frameworks. In other words, the chapter aims to address the question of what minimalism, dependency grammar, radical construction grammar, head-driven phrase structure grammar, and lexical functional grammar have in common. The answer is a general formal strategy that focuses on rules in creating structural units, captures recursive phenomena, and, most importantly, treats syntactic information as explanatorily autonomous from other systems.