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Chapter 10 provides an overview of the role and functions of private enforcement within regulatory regimes and the availability of redress. It draws attention to different ‘models of legal responsibility’ upon which regulatory regimes rely in allocating and distributing legal rights and duties between those who are subject to regulation and those whom regulation is intended to protect (‘regulatory beneficiaries’). This chapter is the most legally focused chapter in the volume, selectively highlighting several features of the institutional and enforcement context in which regulation occurs. Examples are private litigation, collective redress mechanisms, the role of courts as authoritative and final interpreters of the law and ‘alternative’ avenues for redress.
Chapter 12 discusses accountability in regulation. Accountability is part of a family of concepts that relate to the exercise of power and its abuses. It construes the relationship between regulators and regulatees according to principal-agent theory and explains how accountability can be an important mechanism for requiring answerability, ensuring that agents (regulators) do not drift from the interests of regulatees. The chapter explains that accountability consists of four elements: (i) a duty to explain; (ii) exposure to scrutiny; (iii) a potential ‘sanction’ or a consequence of some kind; and (iv) the possibility of being subject to independent review.
There are many different types of regulatory instruments and tools. Chapter 6 classifies and examines regulatory tools according to their underlying technique or ‘modality’ of control or source of influence, examining five such modalities in turn: command, competition, communication, consensus and code (or ‘architecture’). This chapter also considers algorithmic regulation and the role of reputation as a form of regulation.
This chapter offers responses to the question ‘why regulate?’ and ‘why do regulatory regimes emerge in a particular form?’ by examining ‘theories of regulation’. While chapter 1 introduced the readers to the economic justifications of regulation, this chapter delves into the different theories that explain why we need regulation and how public and private actors interact to shape the content of regulation. These theories refer to a set of propositions or hypotheses about why regulation emerges, which actors contribute to that emergence, and typical patterns of interaction between regulatory actors. It discusses theories from several disciplinary approaches, classifying these theories into four kinds: public interest, private interest theories, systems and institutionalist approaches and ‘hybrid’ theories.
This chapter examines ‘Regulatory Policy’ by addressing various questions that arise in considering ‘whether’ and ‘how’ to regulate. Regulatory policy includes a range of methodologies such as cost-benefit analysis and regulatory impact assessment. This chapter focuses on the methodologies used by public regulators. This chapter discusses the methods that help regulators assess who will be impacted by regulation, whether a regulation is effective, and what its costs and benefits will be. The chapter discusses the history of regulatory policy and delves into cost-benefit analysis, regulatory impact assessment, and consultations. The chapter includes a brief analysis of better regulation policies.
The Conclusion provides a very brief recap of the issues discussed in the preceding chapters. It reflects on the larger context of regulatory change, and touches upon contemporary challenges of regulation such as the role of gender, race, sustainability, and future generations in the regulatory process.
This chapter offers an introduction to the book. It defines regulation, distinguishing it from other concepts such as governance. We define regulation as ‘intentional, organised attempts to manage or control risk or the behaviours of a different party through the exercise of authority, usually through the use of mechanisms of standard-setting, monitoring and information-gathering and behaviour modification to address a collective tension or problem’. The Introduction reflects upon the most important changes in regulation in the last two decades and the growing relevance of regulation in society. The chapter explains significant changes in the practice and context of regulation that have occurred since the first editions was published.
Chapter 8 examines regulatory rules, beginning with an examination of written rules. It underlines the inescapability of interpretive uncertainty and considers ways in which that uncertainty can be addressed, including varying the precision of rules, how they are specified, the publication of interpretive ‘guidance’ (sometimes called ‘soft law’) and the delegation of detailed standard-setting to ‘technical experts’.
Economics is a central science to the understanding of regulation. Regulatory economics focuses on economic concepts that are relevant in regulatory contexts. Chapter 1 introduces key concepts of economics and regulatory economics, referring to a branch of social sciences concerned with how society chooses to employ its scarce resources to produce goods and services. This chapter offers a brief discussion of economic concepts that have shaped regulation (e.g., monopoly, market failures). It also discusses behavioral economics, the commons, and principal-agent theory.