This chapter focuses on work exploring the influence of ideology on judicial decision-making. It explores the nature of indeterminacy as developed by the Legal Realists and the Critical Legal Studies movement, the latter of whom regarded judicial decision-making as thoroughly political. It then takes up work, conducted largely by political scientists, that imagines judges as political actors in the same way that legislators are, and surveys both refinements to and critiques of that work.

This chapter introduces and unpacks the standard model of judging, which imagines a system in which independent judges apply pre-existing legal rules to determine the winner following an adversarial proceeding. It thus explores the concept of judicial independence and the ideal of the rule of law, revealing both to be more complex and contingent than first meets the eye. Judicial independence exists in relation to the actors and forces we want judges to be independent from and is necessarily tied to judicial accountability. The rule of law is necessarily an incompletely realizable ideal because lawmakers cannot perfectly anticipate the future and because the law is often motivated by conflicting values. Indeterminacy is the result. The idealized adversarial process is likewise only imperfectly realized, often by design.

This chapter argues that because judging inevitably requires the exercise of judgment, one of our most critical concerns should be ensuring that the people we select as judges have good judgment. It explores what good judgment might mean and draws on work in both law and philosophy exploring the nature of judicial character. It further explores two components of judicial character, specifically practical wisdom and intellectual humility, and in the case of the latter, surveys a growing body of work in philosophy and psychology that investigates humility’s nature and benefits. It briefly outlines ways in which a renewed emphasis on judicial character might be implemented.

Introduces the book through a discussion of two cases. The first is Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which overturned Roe v. Wade, and in which the dissenting justices suggested that the majority’s decision to do so was unwise. The second is Rucho v. Common Cause, in which the Court concluded that courts lack the capacity to resolve claims concerning excessive partisanship in gerrymandering. Together, the cases help illustrate the book’s themes: the inescapable role of judgment in judicial decision-making and the accumulation of ways in which changes in courts, the legal profession, and the culture more broadly have come to undermine judgment’s role.

This chapter focuses on additional mechanisms for channeling judicial behavior that can be regarded as products of the developments surveyed in the Chapters 4, 5, and 6. One is judicial specialization. The other is the rise of algorithmic-seeming interpretive methodologies, specifically textualism and originalism. The chapter critiques the methods and emphasizes that, despite some proponents’ efforts to portray them otherwise, neither succeeds at eliminating judgment from its central role in judging.

This chapter continues the task of considering what, beyond law as it is often imagined, accounts for judicial decision-making. It explores work investigating the influence of motivated reasoning on judges’ behavior, including that which emphasizes the influence of judges’ desire to satisfy the expectations of groups such as their professional peers. It examines the celebrity culture that has arisen around many Supreme Court justices as providing an avenue for the influence of motivated cognition. It also explores other research into the influence of psychological phenomena, such as heuristics and biases, on judges’ decision-making and finally considers the significance of our tendency to notice bias more readily in others than in ourselves.

Homeowner self-governance constitutes a form of basic democracy, which means collective self-government without committing to conventional liberal values, and poses a tricky dilemma for the party-state. On the one hand, it can relieve the party-state of the burden of trying to govern hundreds of thousands of complex neighborhood problems that, if badly handled, could undermine the party’s legitimacy simply through incompetence. On the other hand, independent civic organizations may threaten the party leadership both within and beyond residential neighborhoods.

Homeowners in China do go beyond their neighborhoods and demand the right to participate in broader urban governance and the right of homeowners’ associations (“HoAs”) to associate with other HoAs citywide and even nationwide. Moreover, some homeowner activists even demand democratization in other arenas that are not directly related to property rights. I divide homeowners’ associational activities along two dimensions: physical boundaries of neighborhoods and virtual boundaries of property rights as an arena. The Chinese state is grudgingly willing to accommodate associational activities beyond the physical boundaries of neighborhoods but within the virtual boundaries of property rights. By contrast, the state is quite hostile to associational activities beyond the virtual boundaries of property rights and in more political arenas.