National IHL committees (NIHLCs) have been repeatedly recognized as one of the most effective tools for strengthening implementation of international humanitarian law (IHL). This article traces the evolution of Australia’s NIHLC since its establishment in 1977, describes recent reforms to its mandate, composition and goals, and provides examples of its work at a local, regional and global level. In doing so, the article seeks to provide an example of how a long-standing NIHLC can strengthen and reaffirm IHL implementation and foster greater collaboration between a government and a National Red Cross and Red Crescent Society.

This paper argues that to liberal authoritarianism – defined here as a liberal technique of government fusing authoritarianism with liberalism for the purpose of the ‘free market’, following Hermann Heller – corresponds a form of dual constitutionalism or fragmented legality. Dual constitutionalism, originally a colonial technique of governance, relies on a liberal constitution enshrining a state of exception which suspends it on specific matters, territories, and during certain times. It can be either military – called in France the ‘state of siege’, the continental version of the British Martial Law – or civilian – the ‘state of emergency’. In the case of France, liberal authoritarianism has witnessed several declinations since the French Revolution, flourishing in the liberal colonialism of the late 19th century, then the full-fledged liberal authoritarianism of the interwar period, and eventually in the neoliberal authoritarianism of the 4th and 5th republic. Focusing on the relationship between France and its Algerian colony during the Third Republic (1870–1940), one of the most liberal periods ever in French history, it documents how the State of Exception was used to establish a legalised state of dictatorship where all executive, legislative and judicial powers were vested in the hands of a governor, in order to force the creation of markets by breaking down collective land ownership and use and other non-liberal economic customs of the local population, using, in particular, the legal tool of the ‘sequestre’ which allowed the State to forcibly expropriate land and seize assets of the local population without compensation, forced labour and internment camps – all in order to incentivise ‘free enterprise’ by the colonisers. Many of these legal tools and techniques migrated back to the metropolis when the Third Republic officially dissolved into a Nazi State in 1940, through legal means and in accordance with the constitutional procedures of the Third Republic.

Private investment in residential long-term care has surged around the world. Growing evidence shows that this is changing the institutional logic and the inner workings of the sector, prioritising the financial interests of asset holders above those of other stakeholders (eg. clients, care professionals and regulators). We know little about how policy makers and regulators are responding to private investment and profit-making in the long-term care sector. This paper addresses that gap by analysing policies prompting the growth of private investment and profit-making in residential long-term care, the emerging power struggles in some cases between asset holders and other stakeholders in long-term care, the controversies that have arisen and the concomitant responses of regulators and policy makers in Ontario (Canada), Lombardy (Italy), the Netherlands and England (United Kingdom). We show that the institutional context (eg. legal frameworks, policies and regulations) shapes controversies concerning quality, accessibility and affordability of care, and argue that regulators and policymakers in the constituencies we studied are responding reactively to such controversies rather than proactively anticipating and preventing unwanted effects. Our analysis provides policymakers with valuable insights regarding the regulation and governance of private investment and profit-making in the residential long-term care sector.

Chile’s pension privatization represents one of the most radical neoliberal experiments in social security reform, reshaping welfare from a collective right into a market-driven, property-based entitlement. This Article examines how the constitutionalization of pension privatization entrenched inequalities, shielding the system from democratic contestation and embedding a logic of over-propertization, where private property rights supersede social rights. Drawing on a Law and Political Economy (LPE) approach, explicitly concerned with the distributional consequences of legal design, this study traces how, during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–90), Chile’s 1980 Constitution, and Decree Law 3500 institutionalized financialization and individual responsibility, transforming social security into an asset class managed by private pension fund administrators (AFPs). By legally structuring private capitalization accounts as financial assets with attributes such as ownership, transferability, and enforceability, these frameworks granted private actors control over investment management and risk distribution. The analysis highlights challenges to reversing this model, as judicial claims, pension fund withdrawals during COVID-19, and two failed constitution-making processes reveal legal and political constraints on reform. It examines legislative efforts, judicial interpretations, and collective mobilizations—such as the No+AFP campaign—seeking to restore solidarity. It also explores legitimation strategies, including the discourse of “popular capitalism” and the institutional entrenchment of AFPs within Chile’s political economy. By framing pension privatization as a constitutional and legal project rather than mere economic policy, this Article underscores the global consequences of over-propertization and the urgency of reimagining social rights. In doing so, it contributes to a growing body of LPE scholarship that treats constitutions as terrains of economic power, exposing how legal frameworks both encode and contest neoliberal orders.

Joint clinical assessments (JCAs) under the European Union (EU) Regulation 2021/2282 on health technology assessment (HTA-R) and its implementing regulations have been linked to various implementation challenges. However, legal implications of practically relevant issues have mostly remained unexplored. This study investigated potential legal implications of disparities regarding patient population, intervention, comparator, and outcomes (PICOs) in JCAs from respective member states (MSs), and of managing conflicts of interest (CoIs) of experts involved in a JCA. Moreover, we discussed potential consequences for patient access. JCA reports are not legally binding for MS; PICO disparities can underpin the required justification for their non-consideration at national level. Legal action against negative reimbursement decisions due to unjustified non-consideration falls under national jurisdiction. Furthermore, too strict CoI management might leave perspectives of MSs with fewer experts and thus a higher chance of CoI occurrence unheard, requiring corresponding expert elicitation at national level. These implications might lead to an increased workload for health technology developers and national HTA bodies, potentially fostering marketing strategies and access delays. Thorough scoping processes and prioritising the need for a JCA’s scientific excellence could facilitate more streamlined national HTA procedures and accelerated patient access.

This article outlines the Italian experience with the offence of abuse of office as a lens through which to analyse broader questions of accountability and discretion in public governance informed by the rule of law. While rooted in domestic legal history, the long-standing controversies surrounding this offence illuminate the political and legal sensitivities that have recently emerged in response to the proposed European directive on corruption, particularly the resistance voiced by several founding Member States. Beyond this contingent trigger, the contribution advances a more general claim: criminal misconduct in office lies at the core of the problem of holding public officials – both national and European – accountable in accordance with rule of law standards. The article argues that abuse of office occupies a distinctive position at the intersection of political discretion, administrative decision-making, and judicial review. Alongside acknowledging that the formulation of such an offence faces concerns relating to legality, fair trial guarantees, and the subsidiary role of criminal law, the article underlines that behaviour amounting to abuse carries a specific and serious wrongfulness that may justify criminalisation. Finally, drawing upon authoritative legal scholarship and interdisciplinary insights, the article offers an unorthodox account of abuse of office, suggesting that – even more than bribery – it undermines not only the legality but the very legitimacy of public power, thereby occupying a prominent position within the broader constellation of corruption-related crimes.

Amid growing interest in the integration of health and social care to improve outcomes, communities across the United States have explored development of Community Information Exchanges (CIEs). A CIE is a community governed infrastructure that enables critical health and social information to be responsibly shared among partner organizations in support of holistic coordination of care. The development and use of a CIE give rise to a host of legal and policy challenges. Use and disclosure of data through a CIE are governed by a patchwork of different legal requirements, at times distinct and at times overlapping. Development of a legal framework for a CIE requires attention to clearly articulated data flows, detailed use cases, strong legal agreements and policy considerations. CIEs typically rely on an individual’s express consent to share their information, requiring careful evaluation of applicable laws and regulations and promotion of community trust and equity. And because many participants in a CIE are HIPAA covered entities, functions of the CIE must fit within HIPAA’s regulatory framework. This article examines in depth two components of a sound legal framework—consent models and HIPAA compliance—identifying considerations and lessons learned to support lawful and ethical information sharing through a CIE.