This chapter provides a basic introduction to jurisdiction. To do so, it provides a definition of jurisdiction before it moves on to cover territorial jurisdiction, functional jurisdiction, areas outside national jurisdiction, demarcation of boundaries, personal jurisdiction, principles of criminal jurisdiction, national jurisdiction, extradition, and domestic nationality law.

If human rights treaties are concerned with the protection of privacy, this chapter argues that extraterritorial espionage usually escapes such regulation. In fact, the current understanding of jurisdiction remains physical, and it is only where physical access to the infrastructure is secured that State jurisdiction is relevant. It means that the right to privacy must only be secured where data is intercepted by national authorities as it crosses the border, or where a State requests another actor based on its territory – like an internet or cloud-service provider – to deliver pieces of data, even if information is stored abroad. This is due to the fact that this actor is indeed based on the territory of a Member State, and subject to its jurisdiction. However, this is not the case where data is directly and remotely accessed by intelligence services. Then, and even where the right to privacy applies, it does not set burdensome requirements. If human rights bodies are quite strict regarding the application of the legality principle, most cyber-espionage activities may actually find a lawful justification (whether in terms of national security, preservation of economic well-being or the prevention and repression of crimes). If the requirement of proportionality would typically require Member States to favour the least intrusive solution, it does not outlaw bulk interceptions per se.

The methods used in the book – including the approaches to treaty interpretation and the approach to sources (customary international law and general principles of law) – are explained here. Then, the concept which constitutes the bedrock of this book (i.e. ‘normative avoidance’) is explained, as well as its characteristics and consequences (i.e. the absence of prohibition or authorisation, as a result of State will).

This chapter focuses on international organisations. It covers the development of international organisations, the classification of international organisations, the membership of international organisations, the structure of international organisations, the powers of international organisations, the decision-making procedures of international organisations, the rules of procedure of international organisations, the budgetary affairs of international organisations, the immunities and privileges of international organisations, and the responsibility of international organisations.

This chapter addresses the enforcement of international law. It covers the characteristics of the enforcement of international law, retorsion, reprisals, and collective measures.

This chapter focuses on international human rights. It covers the recognition and development of implementation and enforcement mechanisms in international human rights treaties, monitoring mechanisms, and regional human rights instruments.

This chapter highlights the varying nature of relationships which exist between international law and national (domestic) law. It covers direct effect, monism and dualism, monism and dualism in practice, rules of international law having direct or indirect effect, and national government bodies and international law.

This chapter is conceived as a first step in the identification of specific customary rules on cyber-espionage. In fact, the ILC made clear that ‘legislative acts’ and ‘executive conduct’ had to be considered as part of State practice in this context. It explores the national laws that exist in the field of espionage and cyber-espionage, and underlines that States usually prohibit espionage against their own interests, but authorise their own espionage activities abroad. It also analyses the grounds allowing intelligence collection, and notes that – more often than not – they are not limited to the protection of national security, but also include the economic well-being of a country. Then, a challenge to executive conduct – i.e., spying activities themselves – resides in the fact that they are usually performed in secret. It is however admitted that practice must be public (or at least known to the ‘victim State’), which means that clandestine examples of executive conduct cannot be taken into account in the assessment of customary international law. The admissible examples of State practice then exclusively reside in legislative acts, which were analysed in the previous chapter. This means that only the normative power of States – i.e., the possibility to adopt laws that authorise intelligence activities abroad, but prohibit espionage directed at their own interests – may count as State practice. In contrast, the clandestine implementation of these laws – which is materialised into executive conduct and espionage activities – is not admissible.

This chapter addresses immunities. To do so, it covers limitation of territorial jurisdiction, state immunity, derived immunities, and diplomatic immunities.

The book’s conclusion makes two primary contributions. It first reassesses the policy fiasco of the Industrial Relations Act to argue that, on both material and perceptual measures, it was a disaster that failed to achieve its aims and objectives. Specifically, the government failed to shape the perception of disengagement and was thus held directly responsible for the numerous debacles that followed. In a hyper-politicised context, the Act proved to be too blunt an instrument, incapable of responding to – and depoliticising – a complex and multi-faceted public policy challenge. The chapter builds on these insights to explore the legacy of the Act in relation to the Conservative Party’s approach to industrial relations reform and British trade unions generally. It traces the process of policy learning to detail the numerous step-by-step legislative interventions that followed in the 1980s. It argues that Conservative Party reformers successfully emasculated the trade unions and individualised employment relations. Industrial relations were largely shifted out of the political arena and no longer a site of societal deliberation and contestation. They were, in effect, depoliticised.