This chapter demonstrates that cyber-espionage is neither prohibited, nor promoted by the UN Charter. According to a traditional ‘instrumental’ interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51, the use of force and armed attacks must involve a specific means: weapons. However, cyber-espionage devices do not qualify as such. Alternative interpretations were proposed by experts, and the consequentialist approach is part of them. According to this view, a cyber-operation qualifies as use of force (or an armed attack) when its effects are similar to a non-cyber operation rising to the level of a use of force. If this approach is progressively gaining acceptance among States, it does not result in a prohibition of cyber-espionage either, as it fails to cause destruction. This lack of prohibition does not mean, however, that cyber-espionage is authorised. In fact, it results in significant tensions and is not endorsed by the UN Charter. Most States also acknowledge the development of intelligence programs, but without claiming a right to do so.

This chapter covers the subjects of international law and considers the concept of international legal personality and the forms it can take, how it relates to states, how it connects to recognition of intergovernmental organisations and liberation movements, and more recent forms of international legal personality.

This chapter addresses global international organisations other than the UN. First, it compares the UN with other international organisations before examining the International Labour Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Maritime Organization.

Opinio juris ‘means that the practice in question must be undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation’. If legislation pertaining to intelligence collection is certainly established with ‘a sense of legal right’, this chapter doubts that the implementation of this legislation – i.e., by carrying out espionage or cyber-espionage activities – is carried out with the same ‘sense of legal right’. It means that the existence of opinio juris – whether in terms of authorisation or prohibition – cannot be proved in that respect.

The conclusion explains that, for a long time, espionage was only indirectly constrained by international law – and States were satisfied with this. This regime was however destabilised by the digitalisation of espionage. Hence, cyber-espionage is neither authorised nor prohibited: it is not unlawful, but States do not want to create a right to spy. As a matter of fact – and for the time being – regulation of cyber-espionage is mainly achieved through domestic laws. The conclusion also focuses on the managerialist approach to international law, and explains how a need to fill a so-called legal vacuum emerged in doctrine.

Despite it often being said that few governments were as prepared for office as the 1970–-74 Conservative one, this chapter argues that once elected Heath and his ministers favoured haste at the expense of detailed strategic planning. This fixed several contradictions into the eventual Act. The chapter illustrates how the government was captured by unrealistic expectations. It isolated key representatives of major interest groups – the TUC and CBI – when, despite protestations from trade unionists, employers and Department of Employment officials, ministers refused to meaningfully consult and stampeded the Act towards the statute book in August 1971. Drawing on newly released archival material, the chapter shows how this major miscalculation led to the solidification of TUC opposition in the form of its ‘non-cooperation’ policy. The chapter analyses the sense of urgency that dominated the policy-making process, before demonstrating how this risked undermining any ‘depoliticising’ effect before the Act had even reached the statute book. The government gambled that it could overcome short-term tensions, viewing the resulting discord as a necessary evil to achieve its longer-term goals.

This chapter defines the main notions in the book – i.e. ‘cyber-espionage’ and ‘cyber-space’ – and highlights their characteristics. In particular, cyber-espionage is distinguished from cyber-sabotage and from other intelligence-related activities, while cyber-space is often described as the ‘fifth domain’ – and hence, different from land, sea, airspace and outer-space. This difference has consequences in terms of regulation by international law, which are highlighted here.

This chapter introduces the foundations of international law. It covers the definition of public international law, the legal nature of public international law, historical developments, natural law and positivism, alternative approaches, sub-areas of international law, adjacent legal fields, and the nation state and international law.

This chapter demonstrates that cyber-espionage does not breach sovereignty. First, it argues that digital intrusions are not similar to physical trespass and – as espionage per se is not an international wrongful act – cyber-espionage does not breach international law either. Second, it disagrees with a view which gained support over the last years, and according to which damage should be taken into account to determine whether a breach of sovereignty occurred. In fact, damage is irrelevant in assessing whether a breach of sovereignty occurred, and the contrary view does not find satisfactory support in State practice. Even if this view was valid, cyber-espionage would not breach sovereignty, as it results in minimal effects. Several case studies are included.

This chapter addresses regional intergovernmental organisations. It covers, the Organisation of American States, the European Union, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and other regional intergovernmental organisations.

This chapter provides a novel, multi-dimensional framework to study the failure of the Industrial Relations Act 1971. It synthesises several literatures and conceptual debates to provide four recurrent analytical themes that underpin the book’s overarching argument. The chapter argues that taken together these ‘themes’ are prerequisites for understanding the government’s strategic flaws and the Act’s ultimate failure. In outlining the complex socio-political landscape that the Heath government inherited, the chapter unpacks how the complex and often fractious relationship between trade unions and the law, the internal dynamics of trade unions themselves and fragile corporatist structures created a fraught and highly politicised governing context. More significantly, the chapter illustrates how politicians often turn to ‘depoliticised’ governing in an attempt to externalise accountability for the reform of problematic policy areas, creating a shift in perceptions about ultimate responsibility and if successful by recalibrating societal expectations. In a novel contribution, the chapter builds on existing literature on (de)politicisation to move away from thinking about the Act as a simple transition from ‘politicised’ to ‘depoliticised’ governing, instead acknowledging a more complex and messy process as the two aspects interact as part of the same strategy to shape the wider publics perceptions about ownership of industrial relations as a political problem.

These preliminary words briefly explore the history of espionage and the emergence of cyber-espionage. The main challenges are mentioned – i.e. the possibility to evade arrest and attribution, the cheap cost and the special nature of cyber-space.

This chapter focuses on international economic law. It covers the development of international economic law, the World Trade Organization, the International Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, international monetary organisations, regional economic organisations and agreements, and development cooperation.