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Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) reveal a mismatch between the EU’s individual-centric data protection shell and automated systems’ ability to affect entire groups of people, sealed within that shell. AI routinely processes data about groups, while the GDPR still allocates rights and remedies to identifiable individuals. This design produces a structural collective redress gap where injunctions may be obtained without individual mandates (GDPR Art. 80(2), RAD Art. 8), but compensation remains tied to identifiability. Here, I show how the GDPR’s model (consent, data subjects’ rights, Art. 80) fits in and why it fails against AI’s capacity to de-anonymise and infer traits about persons whose data were never collected or volunteered. I then examine the AI Act 2024/1689. Although it repeatedly refers to “groups of persons,” trilogue negotiations removed the Parliament’s key collective remedy tools, leaving only ex‑ante risk and transparency duties. The example of online behavioural advertising or affinity profiling illustrates how AI‑designed groups fall outside the scope of meaningful GDPR or AI Act remedies. I argue for a right to group protection and propose four main revisions: a definition of groups, a mechanism for a group complaint and redress, group-level impact assessment requirements and group data protection by design.
Since the baseline for the case studies is the international legal framework that applies to large carnivore conservation in southern Africa, it is important to first draw this baseline firmly. To do so, in this part, I concisely describe the legal framework and identify the policy instruments contained therein. Firstly, the multilateral treaties whose scope extends to large carnivore conservation in southern Africa are identified and the instruments they contain are outlined. I then go on to do the same for the treaties concerning transfrontier conservation areas in the region. This will serve as a basis to analyse in the case studies how and to what extent these instruments get picked up in implementation.
In chapter II, I identify the international and (sub)regional treaties that are directly relevant to large carnivore conservation and management in southern Africa, as well as the policy instruments used in those treaties. When analysing these different treaties, I pay particular attention to (i) their objectives, (ii) the policy instruments used to achieve those objectives, and (iii) the mechanisms for monitoring implementation.
Simon Franz Ewers, in the pages of this journal, has recently undertaken a critique of my philosophical account of the holding of claim-rights. In this short response to Ewers, I defend that account against some significant misrepresentations or misapprehensions in Ewers’s article.
Article 292 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes a procedure of limited jurisdiction, directed at securing the prompt release of detained vessels and crews upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other security. The jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has nevertheless repeatedly invoked ‘considerations of humanity’ and ‘international standards of due process of law’ in applying that procedure. This article examines the role and content of due process within the law of prompt release. It argues that due process is a necessary implication of the prompt release regime itself, arising from the object of the regime and operating within the strict limits of Article 292. Through an analysis of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, informed by principles of international human rights law, the article identifies three domains in which due process is engaged: the timing of release, the fixing of a reasonable bond and the process by which confiscation is effected. It contends that attention to procedural fairness in these contexts neither enlarges the Tribunal’s jurisdiction nor entails review of the merits of domestic enforcement action. Rather, it gives effect to the balance struck by UNCLOS between coastal State enforcement powers and the protection of navigational freedoms.
The Amazon rainforest is a vital carbon reservoir and climate regulator, and yet global demands on its natural resources are leading to irreversible environmental damage, impacting the planet's water cycle, climate, and food security. How to balance the interests of the eight Amazon basin states with these global environmental concerns, and the ancestral rights of the over 400 indigenous peoples that live there? Building on fieldwork in Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador, this book provides a novel multi-scalar and multi-sectoral analysis of the Amazon. In doing so, it argues that the current governance of the Amazon exhibits the policy failures of polycentricity, with different authorities developing localised environmental initiatives with weak coordination. It sets out a policy paradigm shift to plurinational governance, that incorporates indigenous peoples and conservation scientists in international decision-making. This book will interest academics of environmental law, politics and governance, and policymakers and practitioners involved in global environmental governance in general and international commons and the Amazonian region in particular.
This chapter focuses on the expressive functions of tears, the face and the body on the early modern stage, to probe the deep relation between drama and the law, including their entwined but distinct investments in natural self-evidence and the rhetoric of presence. Through an interdiscursive approach, it shows how drama mines the complexities of hypokrisis through an engagement with the radical performativity at the core of law, and offers the provocation that law’s disknowledges are turned into a poetic condition of theatrical knowledge, and a forging of subjecthood and inwardness that complicates the distinction between the fiction of theatre and the reality of the law court. It ends with the suggestion that the theatre looks at, as well as beyond, the vivid invisibilities of judicial encounters to unpack the epistemic, affective and ethical impulses structuring the ‘scene’ of law.
Legal foundations of Islamic maritime principles and regulations were and remain largely rooted in customary practices. Whereas the legal principles of Islamic merchant law were laid down by merchants and their proxies, the regulations governing the carriage of goods by water, employment of crews, personal behavior during maritime ventures, and other nautical issues were generally derived from the legal traditions and customary practices of experienced shipowners, shipmasters, captains, seamen, merchants, and sea travellers.
The forces of history have weighed on the Framers’ constitutional design. Their extended republic has grown geographically but shrunk in terms of transportation and communication. Representation as a filter of popular passions and the extended republic as a protection against majority faction have been less effective than the Framers anticipated. Significant changes to the Framers’ design by amendment, interpretation, and practice have also created openings for the influence of political factions.
Chapter 6 analyses how legal procedures were included in the Paris Peace Treaties in order to solve one of the most sensitive and politically controversial questions of the post-war order: the payment of reparations from former Central Power governments or individuals to Allied individuals. In accordance with the peace treaties, 39 Mixed Arbitral Tribunals were established after 1920 to decide on private Allied claims for damages that had occurred during the war due to acts by former Central Power governments or individuals. The fact that an international court system permitted private individuals to raise claims against foreign governments was seen as a radical novelty; and even more so since tens of thousands of claimants throughout Europe and beyond attempted to receive compensation for claimed losses. From an Allied point of view, these new tribunals served justice, deemed to be at the core of the Paris Peace Treaties system. Yet, for the former Central Power governments, their legal advisers, and scholars, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals were nothing but elaborate examples of victor’s justice characterized by unclear competences and applicable law.
While every law student must study torts, not every torts student has the same experience. More than 30 universities in Australia offer this subject, in courses of different lengths, focusing on different torts delivered by different methods, and assessed in different ways. The most common assessment is the open-book exam, which requires students to answer hypothetical problem-solving questions and discuss essay-type questions. No matter how these courses are designed and delivered, every student’s journey has common aspects, and this chapter aims to help you to navigate through your course by focusing on the issues that concern all students. This book is written primarily for students who may not yet have developed the full range of study techniques that lead to success in their legal studies. Torts is a fascinating subject of study but, because it is frequently taught in the first year of law, students sometimes struggle – not because they cannot understand the law or because they are not interested in the law, but because they do not know how to study the law effectively. This chapter explains how to organise your study so that you can achieve the results that you deserve.
Edited by
Monika Zalnieriute, Law Institute of the Lithuanian Centre for Social Sciences,Agne Limante, Law Institute of the Lithuanian Centre for Social Sciences
Americans of all political stripes are becoming increasingly frustrated with the partisanship of present-day politics. Democrats and Republicans alike claim mandates on narrow margins of victory and are quick to condemn their opponents as enemies of the public good. The Framers of the Constitution understood that such divisions are rooted in the political factions inherent in democracy. Their solutions were federalism, the separation of powers, bicameralism, judicial review, and other structural constraints on majority rule. Over the course of US history, some of those constraints have been eroded, as American politics have become more democratic and less respectful of the liberties and freedoms the Framers sought to protect. American Factions advocates for a renewed understanding of the problem of political factions and a restoration of the Constitution’s limits to revive a politics of compromise and bipartisanship.
Edited by
Monika Zalnieriute, Law Institute of the Lithuanian Centre for Social Sciences,Agne Limante, Law Institute of the Lithuanian Centre for Social Sciences
Failure to deliver a fair trial within a reasonable time is the most common violation found by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as almost half of all its judgments include a violation of Article 6. If the ECtHR were subject to its own jurisdiction, however, it, too, would be in violation of Article 6 in a sizable portion of its judgments. Therefore, both reports by the Court itself and academic literature have urged the Court to increase digitalisation and employ new technologies, including AI, in its procedures. Historically, the Court has employed an ambivalent approach to new technology, incorporating it in its caseload management, but insisting on the use of fax and physical mail in its communications with applicants. There are indicators, such as allowing electronic applications from Ukraine due to the suspension of physical mail during the war with Russia, that the Court may be abandoning this ambivalence. This chapter accounts for the current and potential use of AI at the ECtHR in each of the steps in its adjudication, evaluating the potential of existing AI technologies and the risks involved, considering the procedures and divisions of labour at the ECtHR.
Edited by
Monika Zalnieriute, Law Institute of the Lithuanian Centre for Social Sciences,Agne Limante, Law Institute of the Lithuanian Centre for Social Sciences
By 2024, collaboration between Japan’s government and the private sector had deepened to promote IT integration into the judiciary. In civil litigation, legal reforms have driven progress, and AI-supported legal tech is streamlining time-consuming tasks. Academia is also developing AI-based legal reasoning tools. However, criminal trials remain largely untouched by AI, due to Japan’s conservative legal culture and the judges’ reliance on precedent. Public expectations for fairness coexist with concerns over AI’s lack of empathy. The issue is especially sensitive in the context of Japan’s death penalty system. Japan now faces a critical juncture in balancing innovation and tradition in its judicial use of AI.