The history of the notion of “war crimes” spans at least ten centuries. As far as the Western hemisphere is concerned, it starts some time in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, absorbs normative content during the following centuries, appears as a phrase in the eighteenth century, takes juridical shape and becomes an accepted notion in the nineteenth century, and starts being enforced as a category of criminalized violations of the laws of war with greater regularity in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Today, war crimes constitute one of the “core” categories of recognized international crimes. During that long process of normative development, a core set of rules and prohibitions crystallized to form a body of law first referred to as the laws and customs of war and later as international humanitarian law (IHL) when those laws and customs came to be accepted as truly international. Various means of enforcement – reprisals, hostage-taking, reparations – would be tried over time to give this body of law and its prohibitions a degree of coercive power and deterrence. Slowly, the idea that individual criminal responsibility should attach to the violation of some of the most important prohibitions of IHL came to be accepted as an alternative to what had proven to be ineffective means of enforcement. The notion of “war crimes” grew out of this process, and the list of conduct coming under that umbrella expanded significantly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries under the combined pressures of violent historical events and the prosecutorial and codificatory efforts that resulted from those events. The twentieth century witnessed the general acceptance of the notion of war crimes, their recognition as norms of customary international law, their frequent domestic and international enforcement, the refinement of their legal contours, their expansion into new territories including non-international armed conflicts, and the creation of institutions, jurisdictional principles and mechanisms geared towards the effective enforcement of those offences and prohibitions.

Across multiple jurisdictions, Indigenous and ethnic communities have sought recognition and protection of the legal rights of rivers as part of broader activist agendas seeking greater legal and political control over their lands and resources. Yet the legal scholarship tracing these cases of ‘river rights’ has often ignored the role of activism in driving and shaping river rights frameworks, as well as the broader implications of these frameworks for community activist agendas. In this article, we examine two legal cases in which Indigenous and Afrodescendent peoples have used legal and extralegal strategies to secure protection for the rights of rivers: for the Piatúa River in Ecuador and the Atrato River in Colombia. In both cases, we find that communities are strategically leveraging river rights frameworks, alongside constitutional and human rights protections, to assert and enhance their territorial autonomy. While the project of recuperating territorial autonomy is incomplete in both cases, our comparative analysis confirms that these cases should be seen as incremental steps in a broader project of transforming community relationships with government institutions, local authorities, and the courts, enabling more pluralist territorial governance to emerge over time.

President Trump and his administration have repeatedly threatened to invoke insurrection powers and unleash US military and National Guard members in American cities in response to civil uprisings and alleged interferences with immigration officials’ actions. In so doing, they raise a specter of significant constitutional clashes over the use of these antiquated emergency authorities. To the extent Congress is unwilling to constrain presidential discretion, the US Supreme Court may be called on to clarify the scope and limits of Insurrection Act powers.

An involuntary commitment is a rights-restrictive procedure that is rarely afforded visibility through useful data. Pennsylvania is a nationally relevant case study on the promises, perils, and misconceptions surrounding involuntary commitment data. In this study, we survey the minimal available Pennsylvania data and then contextualize our results within state laws and norms by (1) framing involuntary commitment data within the state’s gun control agenda, (2) implementing the language of undone science, agnotology, and visibility, and (3) discussing the rights and social obligations surrounding privacy, confidentiality, and dangerousness. We find that sensitive administrative data is collected at several points during the involuntary commitment process but is rarely available in a useful, de-identified form. Improved access to useful data about the commitment population would close a major gap in state and national healthcare delivery, policy, and accountability.

Ethical thinking can be pragmatically framed as striving for impact in improving the world, without relying on traditional moral language. Consciousness or sentience is central to anything mattering, but only suffering has an inherent urgency to be addressed. This call to action applies regardless of species or physical substrate. From a perspective on personal identity that recognizes separateness as an illusion, the most extreme suffering can be considered intolerable per se, not just for the physical being experiencing it. Prioritizing the prevention of such suffering is therefore rational. Strong, potentially competing intuitions, including the desire to thrive, must also be accommodated for an ethical framework to be viable, without the creation of happiness formally balancing out intense suffering that exists elsewhere. A framework termed “xNU+” captures these considerations. Suffering metrics such as Years Lived with Severe Suffering (YLSS) and Days Lived with Extreme Suffering (DLES), used alongside existing health and well-being metrics, would better track what matters, in humans and, using different methodologies, in other species and potential artificial sentient entities. The rapid, potentially irreversible, technology-driven transformations now occurring on our planet make it urgent that we embed a suffering-focused ethical framework in our governance and policy-making.

More than 17 million people volunteer and work in the Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement.1 With more than 130 active armed conflicts in at least fifty countries, it can be estimated that at least 4 million RCRC volunteers and staff live and work in armed conflict settings;2 most volunteers and staff work in their own countries, delivering essential humanitarian assistance to their communities. In 2025, twenty-seven RCRC volunteers and staff lost their lives in the line of duty, with additional fatalities occurring off-duty.3 Extreme working conditions and constant exposure to suffering often cause long-term psychological consequences, and the mental health and psychosocial impacts occur in a wider context that can lead staff and volunteers to question their fundamental moral values.

This qualitative study seeks to explore the mental health and psychosocial4 experiences of national volunteers and staff by amplifying their voices and acknowledging the hardships that they go through. Through a lens of moral injury and trauma-informed approaches, the findings of the study shed light on the lived experiences of national staff and volunteers working and living in armed conflict contexts. Key themes that emerged from the study include a strong commitment to the RCRC Movement, exposure to harm, mental health impacts, and the need for support systems for staff and volunteers. These insights underscore the urgency of embedding trauma-informed approaches in Movement-wide policies and support systems to strengthen protection and well-being for staff and volunteers.

This paper examines how the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA) understands platform addiction and, specifically, how it conceptualises its causative phenomenology: namely, the processes through which addiction is thought to arise. It begins by analysing the Act’s architecture and contends that the DSA operates with a largely mechanical, linear view: addiction is treated as the outcome of particular interface features that trigger or drive harmful behaviour. The paper then sets out four dominant models for understanding platform addiction and, drawing on Karen Barad’s concepts of intra-action and diffraction, argues that addiction is better approached as an emergent phenomenon produced through entangled human, social, and technical relations. On that basis, the paper’s central claim is not simply that the DSA simplifies; it is that the way it simplifies does not stand outside the phenomenon it regulates. By fixing predicates, thresholds, and evidential tests, the Act makes agential cuts that shape what counts as harm, when intervention is permitted, and how risk is distributed. These cuts are not neutral. They have distributional effects and could be drawn differently (through alternative predicates or thresholds) to produce other evidential routes and earlier intervention points, with different consequences for how risks and harms are allocated and managed.

Legislative intervention to regulate family businesses has been rare globally. This article assesses recent legislative developments in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where the first law of its kind governing family businesses was recently introduced. It explores and analyses the new law's special dispute resolution mechanisms and provisions on the internal governance of family businesses. The article also identifies recent legal developments in Saudi Arabia, which are seen as the beginning of a new regulatory framework for family businesses. To advance the field, the article proposes an optimal regulatory framework for family businesses that takes into account their unique nature and characteristics. Specifically, this article proposes an opt-out model for governing family businesses instead of the opt-in model introduced in the UAE. The proposed model would ensure a more effective regulatory framework for family businesses.

Since their publication in the 1950s and 1980s respectively, the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 have become a major reference for the application and interpretation of those treaties. The International Committee of the Red Cross, together with a team of renowned experts, is currently updating these Commentaries in order to document developments and provide up-to-date interpretations of the treaty texts. This article provides an introduction to the updated Commentary on Geneva Convention IV (GC IV), published online in 2025. It describes the methodology behind the updated Commentaries before explaining the historical background of bringing civilian protection into the framework of the Geneva Conventions. It then discusses how the structure of GC IV impacts its application and explains GC IV’s personal, geographic and temporal scope of application. The article summarizes key substantive protections provided in the Convention for civilians and their property during armed conflicts, including in situations of occupation, and points to where these are addressed in the updated Commentary.

Mutual recognition is a cornerstone of European integration. Famously associated with the Court of Justice’s ruling in Cassis de Dijon, it has expanded beyond the free movement of goods into fields such as criminal justice, services, and risk regulation, enabling regulatory diversity. While often characterised as a general principle of Union law, this account has been questioned in the literature. This contribution reframes mutual recognition not as a free-standing legal principle guiding legal reasoning, but as a judicially developed mode of governance arising from the application of Union rules and principles. The paper traces mutual recognition’s judicial development in the case law of the Court of Justice, and then examines its advancement by the Union’s political institutions and its operationalisation in secondary legislation, with services law as a key case study. The article next links these judicial and legislative strands through their shared doctrinal foundations. Finally, it develops a governance-based account, drawing on political science and EU governance literature, to reconceptualise mutual recognition as a mechanism through which law structures and coordinates public power across the Union.