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Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are crucial in promoting economic growth through their project finance activities. Meanwhile, to address negative effects arising from their development projects, MDBs increasingly have focused their attention on the environmental and social impacts of their supported projects in recent decades. This article analyzes the relationship between the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) adopted by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). It argues that better compliance with MEAs by the AIIB and its borrowers in implementing AIIB-supported development projects will be achieved only if its independent accountability mechanism (IAM) can actively examine project compliance with the ESF in the light of MEAs. The AIIB has an opportunity to provide leadership in promoting the fulfilment of MEA obligations in development finance. However, this is contingent on ensuring effective oversight by its newly established IAM moving forward.
At first blush, normative arguments justifying representation of future generations and nature appear to rest on contradictory values. This article argues, however, that there are strong synergies between these discourses. Arguments for institutions for future generations based on human rights are compared with justifications for proxy representation of nature based on ecological justice, Indigenous ecological justice and socio-ecological justice. Case studies involving the Welsh Commissioner for Future Generations, the Aotearoa New Zealand Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, and ascribing legal personality to rivers in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand, are presented to demonstrate that representing future generations and nature reflect mutually supporting values. Building on these synergies is vital for reform efforts.
This paper documents changes in infant mortality (IM) rates in São Paulo, Brazil, between 2003 and 2013 and examines the association among neighborhood characteristics and IM. We investigate the extent to which increased use of health care services and improvements in economic and social conditions are associated with reductions in IM. Using data from the Brazilian Census and the São Paulo Secretaria Municipal da Saúde/SMS, we conducted a longitudinal analysis of panel data in all 96 districts of São Paulo for every year between 2003 and 2013. Our regression model includes district level measures that reflect economic, health care and social determinants of IM. We find that investments in health care have contributed to lower IM rates in the city, but the direct effect of increased spending is most evident for people living in São Paulo's middle- and high-income neighborhoods. Improvements in social conditions were more strongly associated with IM declines than increases in the use of health care among São Paulo's low-income neighborhoods. To reduce health inequalities, policies should target benefits to lower-income neighborhoods. Subsequent research should document the consequences of recent changes in Brazil's economic capacity and commitment to public health spending for population health.
The 2016 amendments to the Constitution of Zambia 1991 have transformed Zambia's constitutional order in many respects. Among other transformative provisions, the Constitution now requires everyone seeking elective public office to have, as a minimum qualification, a grade twelve certificate or its equivalent. This article examines the rationale for this requirement, as judicially interpreted, through the lens of the right to run for election. The article's core argument is twofold. First, that the requirement is an unwarranted restriction on the right to run for election and cannot be justified when considered in its relevant context. Secondly, that the Constitutional Court of Zambia's recent interpretation of the requirement further limits the right to run for election and in turn narrows the field of candidates from which voters may choose, potentially depriving the country of resourceful political leadership. The article concludes with a call for reform.
The American Legal Realists offered several hypotheses about alternative drivers of official decision-making (i.e., considerations other than the rules on the books). This article identifies a tension between two of those hypotheses: the ‘extra-legal’ factors and ‘working’ rules. This tension gets exacerbated in Frederick Schauer’s account of Legal Realism, one which places his Dislocated Determinacy thesis—about working rules constituting an additional ground for the existence of ‘easy’ cases and determinacy across a legal system—into doubt.
In the 36 years since Francis Mann published Foreign Affairs in English Courts, the engagement of the United Kingdom courts with issues of international law has greatly increased. This article addresses the reasons underlying this trend and identifies four key developments: first, the nature of international law has evolved to embrace individuals as subjects; second, the Human Rights Act 1998 has had a profound influence, often requiring domestic courts to rule on matters of international law in order to give effect to the European Convention on Human Rights; third, in recent decades there has been a growing willingness on the part of courts in the United Kingdom to address and investigate the conduct of foreign States and issues of public international law; and fourth, these developments have been accompanied by a shift in attitudes to the relationship between customary international law and the common law.
Examining what we call “crimmigrating narratives,” we show that US immigration court criminalizes non-citizens, cements forms of social control, and dispenses punishment in a non-punitive legal setting. Building on theories of crimmigration and a sociology of narrative, we code, categorize, and describe third-party observations of detained immigration court hearings conducted in Fort Snelling, Minnesota, from July 2018 to June 2019. We identify and investigate structural factors of three key crimmigrating narratives in the courtroom: one based on threats (stories of the non-citizen’s criminal history and perceived danger to society), a second involving deservingness (stories of the non-citizen’s social ties, hardship, and belonging in the United States), and a third pertaining to their status as “impossible subjects” (stories rendering non-citizens “illegal,” categorically excludable, and contradictory to the law). Findings demonstrate that the courts’ prioritization of these three narratives disconnects detainees from their own socially organized experience and prevents them from fully engaging in the immigration court process. In closing, we discuss the potential implications of crimmigrating narratives for the US immigration legal system and non-citizen status.
The UK's relationship with the European Union (EU) is now embodied in two principal legal instruments: the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which formally entered into force on 1 May 2021; and the Withdrawal Agreement, with its Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, which continues to apply. Using a ‘building blocks’ framework for analysis of national health systems derived from the World Health Organisation, this article examines the likely impacts in the UK of this legal settlement on the National Health Service (NHS), health and social care. Specifically, we determine the extent to which the trade, cooperation and regulatory aspects of those legal measures support positive impacts for the NHS and social care. We show that, as there is clear support for positive health and care outcomes in only one of the 17 NHS ‘building blocks’, unless mitigating action is taken, the likely outcomes will be detrimental. However, as the legal settlement gives the UK a great deal of regulatory freedom, especially in Great Britain, we argue that it is crucial to track the effects of proposed new health and social care-related policy choices in the months and years ahead.
In protecting the marine environment from vessel-source oil pollution, compensation for victims of damage is of great importance. International conventions regarding compensation for such damage have been adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization. This article analyses the extent to which South Africa has implemented the provisions of these international conventions into its domestic laws and identifies issues that remain in the South African legal system. The article reveals that, although South Africa has improved its legal system for compensation for damage from vessel-source oil pollution, claimants in respect of damage from large vessel-source persistent oil pollution and vessel-source bunker oil pollution are still not adequately compensated. This article finds that acceding to the 1996 Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, the 2001 Bunker Convention and the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol would be of great interest and benefit to South Africa.
For the past several decades, jurists have invested significant efforts in developing the law in general—and private law in particular—in terms of pluralism. However, the conceptualization of corporate law and governance according to pluralist principles rarely exists. This Essay is the first in the legal literature to address this deficiency by providing a unique pluralist theory of corporate governance regimes. It distinguishes between the plurality of corporate law’s sources, values, and principles, and discusses the implications for governance. Moreover, based on the social systems’ thinking and the framework of complexity, this Essay provides theoretical grounds for skepticism about any policies or structures applicable to all times and contexts. Therefore, rather than perceiving corporate governance as being identically applicable to all corporations, the law must meet the challenge of complexity by designing governance arrangements following a firm-specific perspective. Furthermore, I argue that in conditions of complexity, corporate governance eco-systems should be designed with a firm-specific view that incorporates the effect of the corporation participants’ heterogeneity, the heterogeneity of its internal power relations, and the heterogeneity of industries and markets. These novel arguments have profound implications for redesigning fundamental legal doctrines—such as fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders, regulation of related party transactions, the officers’ duty of care, and the company purpose.
This article examines global vaccine inequity during the COVID-19 pandemic. We critique intellectual property (IP) law under the 1994 WTO TRIPS Agreement, and specifically, the role that IP has played in enabling the inequities of production, distribution and pricing in the COVID-19 vaccine context. Given the failure of international response mechanisms, including COVAX and C-TAP, to address vaccine inequity, we argue the TRIPS waiver proposal should be viewed as offering a necessary and proportionate legal measure for clearing IP barriers that cannot be achieved by existing TRIPS flexibilities. Finally, we reflect on the waiver debate in the wider context of TRIPS and the need to boost global pandemic preparedness.
In this editorial article, we aim to map out the central features of algorithmic regulation and its conceptual basis – seeking to bring together different strands of the literature relating to the topic that have often remained apart. We then reflect on the ways through which algorithmic law could evolve to address the challenges of artificial intelligence in the legal domain, particularly by examining the potential of applying a “prudential” test in order to determine whether automated decision-making systems are suitable to adequately support legal decision-making.
This article develops a theory of just contractual relationships for a liberal society. As a liberal theory, our account is premised on liberalism's canonical commitments to self-determination and substantive equality. As a theory of contract law, it focuses on the parties’ interpersonal interactions rather than on the justice (or welfare) of the social order as a whole.
Normatively, the article claims that the rules governing cases where one party experiences harsh circumstances or vulnerability during the bargaining process or operates under significant informational disadvantage must be guided by the commitment to relational justice, that is, to reciprocal respect for self-determination and substantive equality. Jurisprudentially, the article studies the systemic difficulties hindering the translation of these normative prescriptions into legal language and analyzes how they affect the form assumed by the law of precontractual justice and its institutional pedigree.
Rivka Weill claims that in the nineteenth century the foundation of the UK constitution changed from parliamentary sovereignty to popular sovereignty, originally as a matter of constitutional convention but today as a matter of law. I argue, to the contrary, that parliamentary sovereignty as a legal principle and popular sovereignty as a political principle are perfectly compatible. Constitutional conventions are essentially political not legal requirements. Therefore, a constitutional convention requiring popular approval of constitutional change, if it ever existed, would not have violated parliamentary sovereignty. But if it did exist, it was displaced by the Parliament Act 1911 and has not been revived since. Moreover, there is no evidence that courts today have legal authority to enforce any requirement, conventional or legal, requiring such approval.