In the digital era, short videos have become a significant form of digital copyright, yet the debate over whether stronger copyright protection enhances their creation continues. To contribute to this discourse, we conducted an analysis based on a representative sample of short videos on a prominent Chinese short video platform, Douyin. Capitalizing on an external regulatory intervention, specifically the Campaign against Online Infringement and Piracy (COIP) implemented by the Chinese government, we employed the difference-in-differences (DID) method to assess the impact of reinforced copyright protection on the originality of short videos. Our findings reveal that strengthened copyright protection leads to a significant increase in the originality of short videos. Further research on creator heterogeneity shows that influencers exhibit a significantly more positive response to strengthened copyright protection than amateur creators. Finally, we present evidence explaining how external regulation works by enhancing intra-platform regulation. These results have rich implications for intellectual property protection, digital innovation management, and platform regulation.

This piece outlines the engagement of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights with the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on business and human rights in light of the Advisory Opinion requested by Mexico on the obligations of the firearms industry. It outlines how the Court has relied on the distinction between positive and negative human rights duties, which has led it to constantly find states responsible for omissions (failing to ensure rights) instead of actions (carried out by private actors, including corporations). For the Court, such a distinction translates into the possibility that corporations can violate human rights directly.

International equity funds attain superior subsequent performance by actively changing their country asset allocations, which we capture through a new measure of active country rotation intensity. Across funds, those that rotate country allocations with the greatest intensity on average have the highest value added. We offer evidence that a fund’s change of holdings in a country is associated with future outperformance in those specific holdings. Outperformance is concentrated on the downside when funds sell down country holdings before subsequent poor country market returns. Overall, our findings affirm that active international mutual funds have country market timing abilities.

We show that investors price short-term stock market outcomes very different from outcomes that occur further into the future. To this end, we introduce the expected forward pricing kernel and decompose long-term pricing kernels into short-term and expected forward pricing kernels. Using index options, we find that kernels with maturities of up to 12 months are U-shaped and show that this results from the shape of the 1-month pricing kernel. Once we remove the impact of the 1-month kernel, the expected forward kernels are in line with standard long-run risk models in terms of their shape, level, and time-series variation.

We investigate whether compensation consultants recommend excessive pay to earn repeat business by studying consultant changes. Our results show consultants’ interests are aligned with shareholders’ to appropriately pay the CEO. Boards dismiss consultants making large pay recommendation errors, particularly positive ones. However, powerful or poorly monitored CEOs interfere with such disciplinary turnover, weakening the relation. Peer groups are more likely to change with new consultant appointments. New consultants are less likely to include highly paid executives in the compensation peer group and CEO pay falls following the change. Directors earn higher votes in annual elections when they replace compensation advisors.

We study the role of competition in customers’ reactions to litigation against firms, using anonymized mobile phone location data. A class action lawsuit filing is followed by a 4% average reduction in customer visits to target firms’ outlets in the following months. The effect strongly depends on competition. Outlets facing more competition experience significantly larger negative effects. Closer competition matters more, both in terms of geographic and industry proximity. Announcement returns and quarterly accounting revenues around lawsuit filings also strongly depend on competition. Our results suggest that competition is an important component in customers’ ability to discipline firms for misbehavior.

This article presents a New Keynesian model to capture the linkages between macro fundamentals and the nominal yield curve. The model explains bond yields with a low level of news in expected inflation and plausible term premia. This implies that the slope of the yield curve predicts future bond yields and that risk-adjusted historical bond yields satisfy the expectations hypothesis. The model also explains the spanning puzzle, matches key moments for real bond yields, captures the evolution of the price-dividend ratio, and implies that the slope of the yield curve and the price-dividend ratio forecast excess equity returns.

Filing agents—intermediaries used by 80% of U.S. firms—are associated with leakage of information that affects stock prices. Prior to the public release of a securities filing, most firms outsource the final processing and submission of the filing to a third-party filing agent. We find leakage is higher when firms use filing agents than when firms self-file, particularly pre-2018. Leakage is greater when the private information is more valuable and decreases when firms switch to self-filing. Our research suggests filing agents, and a firm’s choice to use them, are an important, understudied channel for the leakage of private information.

We document an increase in market power for politically active firms during times of heightened policy uncertainty, when their information and influence advantage is greater. The effect is long-lasting and stronger for large politically active firms. We show that relatively large investments during high uncertainty periods serve as a potential mechanism for gains in market power. Industries populated with politically active firms experience lower business dynamism and import penetration, consistent with active firms leveraging investment timing to restrict competition. Results suggest that political activism is a likely contributing factor to the dominance of large firms over the last two decades.

Stablecoins are a new form of private money. They are fragile but largely trade at par. How? We present a model and empirical work to examine a novel source of demand for stablecoins. Stablecoin owners are indirectly compensated for run risk by lending their coins to crypto speculators. The stablecoin can then support its $1 peg, but this arrangement links crypto speculation to traditional financial markets where stablecoins invest their reserves.

This study investigates how political patronage influences local firms’ investment decisions in China, focusing on changes in patronage ties resulting from provincial leadership turnover. By examining prefectural officials with connections to their provincial superiors, we find that firms in these regions experience increased investment expenditures, albeit with reduced efficiency. This effect is primarily driven by stronger promotion incentives for local officials, bolstered by favoritism from provincial patrons. While political patronage helps address agency problems within political hierarchies, our findings highlight its adverse economic impact due to misaligned interests between politicians and the public.

This article explores the dynamics of court practice with regard to mercantile preinsolvency in later nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Belgium. In 1883, the Belgian legislature introduced the proceeding of concordat préventif, making it possible for insolvent entrepreneurs to remain outside the liquidation-oriented procedure of faillite. Instead, they could declare their financial problems and propose a scheme of payment to their creditors. Despite this goal, however, the 1883 law, along with subsequent laws of 1885 and 1887, imposed high majority voting requirements. Accordingly, in the Antwerp commercial court, the shortcomings of the legislation were amended to ameliorate its procedural and judicial practice. The new practices of the court resulted in higher rates of acceptance of applications. However, these success ratios were not evenly distributed among the groups of debtors who applied. Perceptions shared by both creditors and judges may have advantaged merchants, brokers, and entrepreneurs who belonged to the higher strata of the city’s business world.

Healthcare technologies are often appraised under considerable ambiguity over the size of incremental benefits and costs, and thus how decision-makers combine unclear information to make recommendations is of considerable public interest. This paper provides a conceptual foundation for such decision-making under ambiguity, formalizing and differentiating the decision problems of a representative policy-maker reviewing the results from an economic evaluation. A primary result is that presenting information to regulators in an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio or cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) format instead of a net monetary benefit or cost–benefit analysis (CBA) framework may induce errors in decision-making when there exists ambiguity in incremental benefits and decision-makers use well-known decision rules to combine information. Ambiguity in incremental costs or the value of the cost-effectiveness threshold does not distort decision-making under these rules. In reasonable contexts, I show that the CEA framing may result in the approval of fewer technologies relative to CBA framing. I interpret these results as predictions on how the presentation of information from economic evaluations to regulators may frame and distort recommendations. All the results extend to non-healthcare contexts.

In this article, I argue that leaders of the U.S. Department of War and U.S. Army developed the organizational form and management practices of the modern corporation, decades before the advent of the railroads. Following Mark R. Wilson’s call to “bring the military in” to organizational analysis, I show how leaders of the U.S. military developed modern management practices and organizational structures as a way of maintaining control over officers, soldiers, and workers over long distances, as they provided the organized violence necessary for domestic imperialist expansion. By the time that elite merchants and real estate interests in the Atlantic port cities of the U.S. became interested in building railroads, in the late 1820s and 1830s, the U.S. Army already evidenced the key characteristics of modern business enterprise as defined by Alfred Chandler: a multi-unit organization coordinated by a hierarchy of professional, salaried, career-oriented middle and top managers. All the characteristic coordination mechanisms of the corporation: staff and line hierarchies, divisional and departmental structure, and bureaucratic systems of information gathering, surveillance, and control, were developed by the state in the course of building a continental empire.