This article explores the development of a group of free-standing companies in Colombia in the first decades of the twentieth century. The article illustrates how the British investor Shirley Jenks, who closely matches the description of the “gentlemanly capitalist” social class, leveraged “free-standing companies” as an investment vehicle to construct interconnected strategic business interests. The article illustrates the versatility offered by “free-standing companies” and how, in combination with “collaborating elites,” the mechanisms of the London capital market could be used to construct and administer a significant business empire in the periphery with little local presence or direct influence.

The automotive lobby’s voluntary commitment to reducing CO2 emissions in 1998 was widely perceived as evidence of the influence of multinationals on European decision-making. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) denounced the lack of transparency. Interviewing negotiators or quoting published reports, scholars focused on the disappointing effects of this agreement. Pending the opening of the public archives, this study is based on primary industry archives, which shed light on the highly confidential negotiation phase. Exchanges within the industry and meetings with the European Commission reveal the limits of the automotive lobby’s power, which had to face internal divisions and seemed to suffer more than choose the agreement. It was the result of Directorate-General (DG) III’s maneuvering. The companies “voluntarily” accepted it as the lesser evil, as it was more advantageous than a directive. The idea of standards being co-constructed by public and private stakeholders needs to be qualified: the balance of power was unbalanced. With these soft regulations, it was above all the Commission that strengthened its position in the decision-making process, to the detriment of other stakeholders such as the European Parliament.

Just before World War I, the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) geographically expanded its trade in the Canadian Arctic to derive profits from Arctic fox fur and secure its position in a global value chain (GVC) delivering fur to metropolitan consumers. The “problem of nature” challenged the company’s business venture. Furthermore, “nature” was made and remade by the HBC’s own capital investments. The fox trade itself changed human ecology. Technology transfers to Inuit modified their hunting regimes to increase the company’s returns of polar bear skins. Though these skins had high potential market value, modes of production introduced by the HBC to the Arctic precluded the company from sending high-quality products to metropolitan dressers. Within a changing Arctic human ecology, the HBC produced one highly valued commodity for the market while producing another from which it could derive only modest profit. The HBC’s fox and polar bear trade at the onset of the last century suggests ways that business empires can set off complex and unanticipated changes in human ecologies and, therefore, the dynamics of nature and business at their very peripheries.

This article explores the development of the Safari Rally in the context of intertwined trends in mobility, sports, and consumerism at local, global and intermediate levels. The first section briefly presents the Safari Rally. The second section discusses the significance and development of the sport of rallying in the context of global automobility and changes in the motor industry, highlighting in particular the professionalisation of sport and the forces driving it. The third section analyses why the Safari became relevant to so many stakeholders in Africa and across the globe, and how these shaped its development from its colonial origins through decolonisation and beyond. Highlighting the factors accounting for the rise, and decline, of the Safari as a sporting event of global significance contributes to understanding how mobility, sports, and consumerism were interlinked across continents in the second half of the 20th century.

DNA databases are useful tools for improving public safety. While past research examines the effects of national- or state-level databases, little is known about the distinct benefits of a local, District Attorney-run DNA database. Two key advantages of a local database are that (i) more local criminals submit a sample as part of a plea agreement (submission is not restricted to certain crimes and mandatory) and (ii) response times for identifying reoffenders from DNA evidence are shorter. This report performs a retrospective benefit–cost analysis on the Orange County District Attorney’s DNA database. The analysis is run on administrative records that provide costs, entries into the DNA database, and matches that occur between samples taken from a crime scene and individual profiles in the database. We also estimate the deterrence effect of entry into the database with defendant-case-level data. We find that, for every dollar spent on operating the database over the last 10 years, $1.71 is saved due to the estimated reduction in future offenses.

We examine whether the heterogeneity of expectations is associated with idiosyncratic variations in experience. Combining household survey data and administrative data from the Netherlands, we find that given market development, households’ expectations about house price changes vary with their individual experience. This association is related to the use of information conveyed by experience, which varies in terms of informativeness, recency, and household sophistication. Finally, we find that individual experience also explains how far house price expectations deviate from realized house prices and that it may affect household behavior. Our findings elucidate the role that individual experience plays in expectation formation.