This study aims to explore the dynamics of leadership reconfiguration within emergent state-owned enterprises (SOEs), i.e., privately owned enterprises (POEs) that have been acquired by SOEs. From an institutional logic perspective, we argue that the emergence of these SOEs reflects a process in which POEs, previously dominated by market logic, incorporate state logic and transition to a hybrid form. However, this process presents a paradox for emergent SOEs: while a greater extent of reconfiguration of leadership helps them gain greater legitimacy in front of state-related institutional referents, it also results in greater conflicts between members adhering to different logics. To address this paradox, we theorize on the differences in the reconfigurations of the board and top management team (TMT) by respectively connecting their functions to institutional control and agency, two typical forms of institutional power. Our analysis reveals that emergent SOEs tend to experience reconfiguration more in the board while less in TMT. Furthermore, we find that these main effects are moderated by the industrial state-ownership density and acquirees' preacquisition political connections. Our study contributes to the SOE and M&A literature by highlighting the uniqueness of emergent SOEs arising from POE-to-SOE acquisitions. Additionally, we propose a strategy to reconcile legitimation and internal stabilizations during logic hybridizations, thereby contributing to the institutional logic literature.

Despite the important role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in government policy implementation, there is a lack of research on how SOEs owned by different government entities differ. We draw on an attention-based view (ABV) to understand how central government-owned (called central SOEs) and local government-owned enterprises (called local SOEs) differ in their response to digitalization, a major state objective in China in recent years. The two types of SOEs differ in the foundational feature of attention structure – the rules of the game (as embodied in their different goals, identities, and evaluation of top executives) – as well as important features such as governance structures and resources. These features can trigger more attention in central SOEs to digitalization. Given the interdependence of these features in shaping the structural distribution of attention, we further propose how governance structures and resources can influence strategic attention differently in SOEs with different rules of the game. The arguments are tested using data from all Chinese-listed manufacturing SOEs between 2009 and 2020. The study reveals different responses to national strategy between central and local SOEs due to their distinct attention structures designed by the state. It also extends the ABV and research on corporate digital transformation.

While environmental concerns are increasingly driving firms’ strategic decisions, insights into why firms make heterogeneous environmental investments are limited. Taking an institutional view, we explore the effect of institutional complexity resulting from multiple but incongruent institutional logics within an organization on firms’ environmental investments. Using China's mixed-ownership reform as a research context, we identify a unique condition in which institutional complexity arises as the privatization process results in two coexisting but incongruent institutional logics – namely, state and financial logic. We further propose that privatization plays both enabling and constraining roles in state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs’) strategic decisions about environmental investments, depending on the relative dominance of each institutional logic, resulting in an inverted U-shaped relationship between privatization and environmental investments. Moreover, we examine the moderating effects of CEO background characteristics and firms’ external environmental context to uncover how these factors influence the relative dominance of state or financial logic in privatized SOEs, thereby reshaping SOEs’ environmental investments. Analyses of multisource panel data from Chinese listed SOEs from 2013 to 2020 support our theoretical propositions. The findings contribute to the literature on how institutional factors affect firm environmental practices and provide new insights to better understand the influence of institutional complexity on firm strategic actions.

In 1989, British Petroleum (BP) made the largest onshore investment in the company’s 72-year history in Scotland by expanding its Grangemouth petrochemical complex. Construction and operation were promised to generate between 1,200 and 1,500 jobs, but upon the project’s completion, over 1,000 industrial jobs were lost in the town, and employment never increased. This research explains this outcome by embedding it within a history of post-World War II deindustrialization and engaging with E.P. Thompson’s moral economy and the concept of “noxious deindustrialization”: expanding environmentally destructive capacity and shrinking industrial employment. It illuminates what the buildup and later transgression of moral economy promises looked like for a town experiencing rapid but fragile expansion on the back of petrochemicals, a modern, highly toxic, and land-intensive industry. Using oral history and archive study, the research establishes the presence of noxiousness in Grangemouth from the mid-twentieth century onward. Between 1951 and 1970, industrialization, urban expansion, and paternalistic corporate practices shaped customary notions that embedded the petrochemical sector into the community, justifying concerns about pollution, smells, and the industry’s intensive requirements on land. Between 1970 and 1989, the moral economy was transgressed as the planning system was dismantled and BP’s welfarist responsibility to Grangemouth lessened under economic liberalization. Amid growing environmental concerns globally, noxiousness became intolerable. Noxious deindustrialization accelerated with changes in energy prices, consolidation of private power, and discovery of North Sea oil, leading to company restructuring and job cuts in BP Chemicals. Consequently, the link between employment, population growth, and economic security broke down.

In this paper, I argue that there is an inconsistency between the content of some of the labour-related human rights articulated in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the obligations ascribed to various actors regarding those rights in the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), in particular those ascribed to corporations. Recognizing the inconsistency, I claim, can help us see some of the moral limitations of both familiar public responses to exploitative labour practices and influential philosophical accounts of the wrong of exploitation. In light of these limitations, I argue that there are reasons to accept a more expansive account of the human rights-related obligations of corporations than that found in the UNGPs, and in particular that we should accept that corporations have obligations to actively contribute to lifting people out of poverty.

Corporate political activity (CPA) scholarship has long held the notion that firms can improve their performance by combining CPA and market activities, the so-called nonmarket integrated strategy model (NISM). Yet, the relationships embedded in the NISM have not been subjected to thorough empirical investigation beyond a handful of case studies or analyses limited to regulated firms. We step into this void and empirically evaluate whether the performance benefits of integration ever manifest. Our comprehensive analysis of over 2,200 publicly traded firms from 1998 to 2018 convincingly shows that the firms combining their CPA and market activities do not outperform their counterparts not using this combined strategy. Instead, the overall pattern of findings provides a nuanced picture of firms’ abilities to benefit financially from integration. We offer four interpretations of these novel findings, related to strategic control limitations, policy opportunity windows, visibility via market activities, and limited integration mimicry, advancing our theoretical knowledge of nonmarket integrated strategy.

Algorithmic human resource management (AHRM), the automation or augmentation of human resources-related decision-making with the use of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled algorithms, can increase recruitment efficiency but also lead to discriminatory results and systematic disadvantages for marginalized groups in society. In this paper, we address the issue of equal treatment of workers and their fundamental rights when dealing with these AI recruitment systems. We analyse how and to what extent algorithmic biases can manifest and investigate how they affect workers’ fundamental rights, specifically (1) the right to equality, equity, and non-discrimination; (2) the right to privacy; and, finally, (3) the right to work. We recommend crucial ethical safeguards to support these fundamental rights and advance forms of responsible AI governance in HR-related decisions and activities.

Whether China can avoid the middle-income trap has been the subject of extensive research. Currently classified as an upper middle-income country, China increasingly exhibits similar characteristics as countries currently experiencing the middle-income trap. However, using evidence from China’s coastal manufacturing city of Dongguan, this article shows how China’s approach to global value chain (GVC) participation created conditions for avoiding the middle-income trap: 1) agglomeration and manufacturing scale at multiple stages of production, 2) a mix of foreign and domestic enterprises, 3) participation in GVCs for multiple industries, 4) development of domestic demand, and 5) continuously reconfiguring government industrial policies. With these characteristics, China’s economy is likely to continue to grow, suggesting that GVC participation can facilitate a path around the middle-income trap.