Much has been written about late-nineteenth-century multinationals and their relationship to the transnational firms of the present, but both historians and economists have largely discounted the relevance of the earlier chartered trading companies to this discussion. In an article emphasizing transaction cost analysis and the theory of the firm, Professors Carlos and Nicholas argue that the trading companies did meet the criteria of the modern MNE—the growth of a managerial hierarchy necessitated by a large volume of transactions and of systems to control those managers over space and time.

In the following essay, Dr. Schröter examines a specific case, German multinational activity in Scandinavia between the wars, and uses that information to raise more general questions about the nature of multinational enterprise. Before 1914, patterns of German foreign direct investment resembled those of the nation's competitors. After the First World War, however, having lost almost all their overseas holdings and suffering from a severe shortage of capital, German industries tried to replace foreign direct investment with other financial tools, principally cartels and long–term contracts. Using extensive German archival materials, Dr. Schröter describes the forces motivating these businesses.

The history of mining enterprise has recently become an important growth industry in both African and British Commonwealth business history. A number of important multinational mining corporations have in recent years opened their archives on assimilated or restructured parent companies active in overseas enterprise in the first half of this century. In the following essay, Professor Dumett surveys the extensive holdings of the leading British gold mining company in West Africa, the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation.

General equilibrium in the classical two-period mean-variance capital asset pricing model is not unique. Corresponding to one single set of expectations, utility functions, and an initial wealth distribution, there may be several equilibria, and an asset may have different prices, expected rates of return, and betas in different equilibria. However, any equilibrium portfolio is sustained by a unique price system, and if investors have decreasing risk aversion, then any equilibrium allocation of the risky assets is sustained by a unique price system.

Livingston contends that short futures/long cash traders can eliminate the potential costs of the quality option through use of a dynamic trading strategy. It is proposed here that if this is possible then futures prices will never reach a stable equilibrium. Alternatively, if Livingston's argument is flawed, then no risk-free arbitrage opportunities are likely to be available to either short cash/long futures or long cash/short futures traders. Under such conditions, futures prices will reach an equilibrium when the expected return and risk of each type position are equally attractive.

This study provides evidence on joint characteristics of hourly common stock trading volume and returns on the New York Stock Exchange. Average volume traded shows significant differences across trading hours of the day and across days of the week. Average returns differ across hours of the day, and, to some extent, across days of the week. There is a strong contemporaneous relation between trading volume and returns and also a relation between trading volume and returns lagged up to four hours. Furthermore, the trading volume-returns relation is steeper for positive returns than for nonpositive returns.

Mechanical trading rules seem to have more potential than previous tests found. Fama and Blume (1966), looking at the Dow 30 of the late 1950s, found no profits for the best (½-percent) rule after adjusting for transactions costs. Fifteen of these stocks looked profitable in their sample, however; for the same rule, the surviving fourteen show statistically significant profits for 1970–1982 for transactions costs obtainable by floor traders. The test used here assumes constant risk premia, or more generally, that risk premia are on average approximately the same on days “in” as for the total period.

A number of futures contracts conveys to the short position various delivery options regarding the quality and exact timing of delivery. Moreover, the compensation to the long position is not solely determined by the market value of the delivered asset at the time of delivery. Sometimes, the long position can hedge this delivery risk by holding an appropriate portfolio of the underlying asset. It often has been stated that whenever the long position can form a dynamic hedge against the delivery risk, the delivery option has a zero value. This paper demonstrates the implication of such erroneous intuition to the pricing of options. It is shown that the root of the issue is the property of diffusion processes whereas, within a given time interval, a random variable either will never cross a given boundary or else, cross it an infinite number of times.