To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
In this wide-ranging article, Professor Yonekawa identifies and examines in detail the burst of cotton spinning company formation that occurred in the late nineteenth century among the major cotton-producing nations of the world. His comparative approach allows him to focus on key local factors responsible for the company flotation booms in the areas discussed. He is also able to compare the effects of more general circumstances in the industry, such as trends in the price of raw cotton and the disruption during the American Civil War, on the various locations. Finally, his multinational approach brings to light many intriguing questions and illuminates areas for productive future research.
In this article Professor Perkins reexamines President Andrew Jackson's objections to the bill to recharter the Second Bank of the United States, as expressed in his famous veto message of 1832. He observes that, in addition to its exaggerated rhetoric, the veto message discusses at length a number of alleged deficiencies in the existing charter provisions. Professor Perkins's systematic analysis of the probable ramifications of a series of judicious alterations reveals that a compromise bill reformulated to meet most of the president's stated objections would not have seriously undermined the institution's position in American financial markets. Although several opportunities for sensible compromise arose, Nicholas Biddle and other members of the probank faction disregarded them. Perkins argues that the failure of bank supporters to consider comparatively modest modifications in the terms of recharter was a major blunder that ultimately doomed the Second Bank.
This paper explores the effects of mergers on the investment incentives of the levered firm and on levered firm value. Under a fairly broad set of assumptions, it is shown that most firm combinations “improve” investment incentives, bringing about a reduction in the agency costs of underinvestment associated with risky debt. The effect of the merger on debt and equity claim values is also explored. If not properly anticipated, the merger may create a wealth transfer from equity holders to bondholders. Such a wealth transfer includes, but is not limited to, the “coinsurance effect.”
Three alternative characterizations of corporate debt management policy, which have had wide currency in the literature, are examined. They are shown to give rise to substantial differences in their predictions of total-firm value. This study concludes that, of the three, the one that assumes that management periodically rebalances the firm's debt levels in response to evolving new information on expected future operating cash flows is the most logically consistent. On that basis, a reinterpretation of the available empirical evidence on the “tax effect” of debt is indicated.