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This paper reexamines the issue of common stock market risk stationarity by applying a newly available exact test for random-walk regression coefficients. For each eight-year subperiod tested in the 1951–1974 interval, betas for individual New York Stock Exchange-listed stocks appeared to be nonstationary. The statistical powers of the exact test and of locally most powerful tests are compared to the power of the test employed previously by Sunder. These power considerations are cited to explain the differences between test results obtained here and those reported by Sunder.
In a recent paper, Johnson [7] has given an analytic approximation to the American put price that delivers values that are very close to numerical solutions. The limitation to the Johnson approximation is that it is only applicable to put options on stocks without cash dividends. This study modifies the Johnson approximation to value options on stocks that have one exdividend date prior to the option expiration date, and these approximation values are compared to the analytic solutions provided by the Geske and Johnson [6] American put option pricing model. The approximation values are generally very close to the analytic solutions.
When a firm's management needs to raise external capital in order to finance an investment project, it is likely to have better information about the project's future return than do potential investors. In such a case, as has been shown in the literature, management may be able to signal its information through the use of certain financial variables. However, the possibility that management may be able to use the level of investment in the project itself to signal their information has not been considered. The purpose of this paper is to examine this possibility. It is shown here that the level of capital investment may be able to perfectly reveal management's information, with a higher input level signalling more favorable information. It is further demonstrated that even in this equilibrium, financial variables still play an important role. Among other results, it is shown, in contrast to a conclusion of a study by Leland and Pyle, that in this setting the number of shares held by management may be negatively correlated with the favorableness of their information.
A fundamental statistical test of serial independence is developed and applied to daily stock returns. Let xt be the deviation of the daily return on a stock from its sample mean after any autocorrelation present has been removed. If xt is serially independent, then the cumulative sum of xt over time is the position of a one-dimensional random walk on a line. The empirical distribution of step lengths over a large sample allows the distribution of the largest absolute excursion in a T-step walk to be calculated by repeated simulation. The observed maximal excursions are found to be significantly smaller than one would expect, based on serial independence and the observed distribution of step lengths. It is concluded that these daily stock returns are not serially independent and that the market value of the corporations studied has a tendency to return to an interval around the trend value.
In the last several years, there has been increased theoretical emphasis on the agent-principal problem as it applies to corporate finance. This paper is an attempt to empirically test for the presence of the agency costs and their relation to the debt policy of corporations. We find that firms with higher insider ownership have greater debt ratios than firms with lower insider ownership, which may be explained by the agency costs of debt and/or the agency costs of equity. Other regression results tend to confirm the theoretically optimal relationships put forth by Myers. We find that high-growth firms use less debt rather than more debt, high-operating-risk firms use more debt rather than less debt, and firm size appears to be uncorrelated to the level of debt.
This note shows that, appearances to the contrary, the lower bounds on the price of a call option obtained by Levy and by Ritchken are identical, and that this common bound is never inferior to the lower bound obtained by Perrakis and Ryan.
The process should be one of continual experiment, with those innovations that prove most generally acceptable and fitted to employees' needs, gaining ground at the expense of less satisfactory systems. It is in its capacity for continual adaptation to changing circumstances that the strength of the occupational pension movement is most evident …
National Association of Pension Funds, The Future Relationship of State and Occupational Pension Funds, 1968, p. 24
The narrative of the growth of occupational pensions in the previous five chapters has shown the twentieth-century development of the system to be driven by three powerful forces: the desire for old age saving, becoming more insistent with increased longevity and greatly reinforced in recent decades by the tax advantages of pension saving; the political drive for adequate pensioning, defined originally in terms of poverty relief but ending with comprehensive income replacement objectives; and the evolving nature of the employment relationship in large bureaucratic enterprises. The latter was a major factor in the early growth of pension schemes, but the tax benefits of pension saving and the conditions for contracting out of the state pension scheme have more recently made the advantages of schemes less exclusive to large employers (and in some respects less attractive to any employer) than they were in earlier decades. The focus of the first part of this book has been on the interplay of these three forces and their impact on the growing coverage of occupational pension schemes, particularly in the private sector.
The practice of viewing the aged as a separate class is modern …
G. R. Porter and F. W. Hirst, The Progress of the Nation, 1912, p. 76
Behind contemporary man's age-old fears of personal ageing, behind the anger of social critics at our treatment of the old, or behind the sociologist's analysis of the decay of family mutuality, there often lies a mental image of the golden age past. In this picture, much favoured by politicians and the media, the old were revered; their wisdom and experience were shared with youth; family hearths extended generous welcomes to grandmothers and grandfathers; and, in rural society, especially, family support and household production enabled the old to adapt to increasing infirmity with dignity and at their own pace. In recent years, historians have been able to show that such rose-coloured views of old age in the world we have lost are largely myth. Over twentieth-century lifetimes, our typical experience of old age and our ideas about retirement have both undergone profound changes, and they are not uniformly happy innovations. If we are to analyse them, it will be as well to start off with an understanding of the social and economic experience of old age in the society which gave birth to them, rather than with myths of lost joys and innocence.
Pessimism about old age is not, of course, new. As long ago as 1776, Adam Smith was bemoaning the decline in respect for the old and observing that advanced nations treated their aged citizens badly.
We knew how to make our predecessors retire. When it comes to forcing our own retirement, our successors must find some method of their own.
C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's Law, 1958, p. 122
In the 1980s, the return of mass unemployment on a level not experienced since the 1930s, and the radicalization of politics on both right and left, have changed the focus of the pension debate. Many employees once in pension schemes have been thrown out of both schemes and jobs, with early retirement on pension sometimes used as a means of alleviating the resulting hardship. Between 1979 and 1983, membership of occupational pension schemes declined from 11.8 million to 10.9 million: roughly in line with the fall in employment. The percentage coverage among those full-time employees retaining jobs has remained roughly constant. The coverage of full-time women employees has increased to the same level as that for men, and the coverage of the ‘core’ work force has shown no signs of receding. More than three-quarters of males over the age of twenty-five are now in occupational pension schemes. Moreover, with improved vesting of pension rights, those who did not maintain stable employment patterns will still accumulate pension rights. Whereas barely a third of retirees drew occupational pensions before compulsory vesting, this proportion is rapidly rising to two-thirds and over. Moreover, women, who form the majority of the old, are now increasingly benefiting from their husbands' schemes through the spread of widows' pensions.
Old age provision is no longer a thing which is regarded by the worker on the one hand as beyond his price, and by the employer on the other as lying outside his duty. There is no doubt that in this country the demand for pensions is increasing at a remarkable rate …
Sir Joseph Burn, Foreword to Bernard Robertson and H. Samuels, Pension and Superannuation Funds, 1928, p. v.
The friendly societies and trade unions had been reconciled to the insurance legislation of 1911, which provided protection against unemployment and sickness, by being designated ‘approved societies’, authorized to receive and channel contributions from members to achieve the protection designated by the Act. They had generally welcomed the earlier non-contributory pensions as lightening the burden of old age sickness and unemployment payments they had to make. However, in 1925, when contributory national insurance was extended to cover old age, the trade unions and friendly societies did not actively seek a role as a channel, and it was not offered to them. They had effectively accepted that the provision of a minimum income in old age was the business of the state. Their members now readily acquiesced in this, looking to these traditional working-class savings institutions less and less for basic protection in old age. For many decades, small numbers of the old continued to retire with benefits from trade unions and friendly societies, but it was more and more difficult for these institutions to persuade their members to subscribe for these purposes.
what the market really wants is not the traditional guarantees of an insurance contract so much as a combination of technical advice, efficient investment of pension funds and a good administrative service …
Ron Peet, Legal & General manager, staff Annual Conference, privately printed, 1971, p. 15
Government policy has, understandably, been a major preoccupation of the pensions interests in the post-war decades. Both the tax regime and contracting-out provisions for the earnings-related state pensions had profound effects on the coverage and shape of occupational pension schemes in that period. But the pensions institutions and the market for old age savings also had a dynamic of their own. Changes in the employment relationship, with further growth of large-scale, bureaucratic organizations and labour shortages under full employment conditions, increased the demand for pensions from both employers and employees. In the 1960s and 1970s more than a million employees were transferred from the private to the public sector, where employees were more likely to demand and get pension coverage. In private industry, too, a wave of mergers created substantially larger organizations, and this usually resulted in the adoption of pensioning in parts of the organization where it had not existed before. As the size of the pensions market expanded, other financial institutions joined the insurance companies, competing for what was becoming a rapidly growing sector of the market for personal savings.
The fundamental question is whether we are to regard the State as partner or competitor. For my part I still cling to my original opinion that this package of legislation provided and continues to provide a springboard for new business.
Legal & General manager, staff Annual Conference, privately printed, 1963, p. 73
Until the twentieth century was well advanced, British government departments knew very little (and, in general, did not want to know more) about occupational pension schemes. Early proposals to undertake a survey of private sector pension schemes were for nearly three decades shunted from ministry to ministry until finally the Ministry of Labour undertook the first comprehensive survey in 1936. The concerns of the Government Actuary's Department (established in 1919) were mainly confined to national insurance matters and public sector pensions. Pension schemes were, of course, affected by legislation, but its impact for the first four decades of the century had been slight. The 1927 Validation Act, for example, brought several hundred funds into the purview of the Registrar of Friendly Societies, when they wished exemption from the law against perpetuities. Parliament laid down certain minimal conditions for such approval: for example, that registered pension funds could not invest in the employing firm unless the loan were properly secured and the firm had a good dividend record. Most funds did not, however, bother to register, and lawyers devised other, simpler means of avoiding the law against perpetuities, advising that by the time any disadvantages emerged, the law would be changed.