INTRODUCTION

Mining has been—and remains—a major contributor to the national economies of Southern African countries and African countries. Specific to South Africa, despite being surpassed by the service and manufacturing sectors, mining still contributes above 8 percent to the country's economy (FSE, 2018) and still employs almost 500 000 people. Linked to the colonial history of the region, there has been a lingering debate on whether Southern African countries and the African continent at large, have been getting commensurate benefits from the mining sector.

The business power dynamics in the sector have often been skewed in favour of the private actors rather than government, given the structural setup of the sector in most countries. In South Africa, for example, the sector is dominated by big multinational companies such as Anglo American, De Beers, and Rio Tinto, with influential powers to decide what happens in the sector.

Given the massive influence that these private companies hold in the mining sector, any contribution has to be negotiated or forced through legislation. Under the MPRDA and Mining Charters emanating from the Act, the South African government has forced the hand of private actors in the mining sector to allow more people to benefit from mineral resources. In the mining Charter, government stipulated mining license requirements linked to Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA), Skills, Health & Safety, Employment Equity (EE), Human Resource Development (HRD) and ESOPs and Labour laws such as the Labour Relations Act (LRA) among others (Makgetla, 2016).

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the question of the institutional promotion of cultural and creative industries (CCI) in South Africa, arguing for formal, systematic CCI clusters. Firstly, it examines the revived international emphasis on industrial clusters in economic and industrial development strategies. The chapter suggests that the growing interest in cluster approaches is linked, in part, to the increased acknowledgement of institutional and social factors in new economic and planning theory and policy. Secondly, the more specific application of such cluster approaches to the CCIs and the creative economy is inspected. This includes the integration of CCI clusters within smart specialisation and place-based approaches to economic and industrial development. Thirdly, the chapter examines the case for formal CCI cluster interventions in South Africa. The uneven, and predominantly technical application of industrial cluster analysis and policy in the post-1994 era, is analysed. The need for systematic incorporation of industrial clusters in contemporary South African industrial policy is considered. The merits of the case for the establishment of formal CCI clusters are then examined alongside select CCI clustering trends. While CCI clustering appears to have increased in recent years, these developments tend to be more organic and/or modest with little articulation within policy and institutional structures. Finally, the chapter outlines potential policy measures. A formal CCI cluster initiative is proposed, on a multi-agency and public-private partnership basis, with the South African Departments of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC) and Sports, Arts and Culture (DSAC as central players. The initiative will look to reinforce international trade and leverage existing and new incentives.

INTRODUCTION

Platform-based work is disrupting the traditional arrangements of formal employment and the relationships between employers and employees, introducing a broader spectrum of informality to the world of work. However, the platform as a medium may also provide opportunities to reach excluded portions of the economy, particularly those in the informal sector. Platforms also offer an opportunity to represent groups of people or organisations collectively, by gaining insights into their behaviours through the data the platform collects. Data is crucial in helping to form suitable products and services which appeal to the needs of those subscribed to the platform. The Vuleka Platform in South Africa recognises that opportunities exist in the informal sector and is using technology to support the collective needs of spaza-shop owners in townships across the Gauteng province. By initially returning savings to shop owners through bulk purchasing, the platform is building a subscriber base that connects shop owners to consumers and local manufacturers. The next phase of their business model involves developing partnerships to provide affordable and well-designed social services that are reflective of the needs of spaza-shop owners.

In South Africa, the informal sector continues to grow due to the inability of the state to reduce unemployment. As Fourie (2018) argues, the informal sector is viewed as lacking aspiration and the means to contribute to economic growth. Fourie believes this view is flawed, given that the informal sector is diverse and contributes to multiple industries. The danger of the digital divide in South Africa is that technological advances accelerate the effects of existing extreme inequalities. Those able to take advantage of access to technology and the skills to operate and apply the technology are more likely to benefit from new technologies, while those without access (including the informal sector) are left behind.

The overview section of the publication seeks to provide a global and national context on various 4IR policy platforms, initiatives, and networks that mainstream institutions have taken.

Discourses in economic and social policies in South Africa is a feature of the politicaleconomy, and democratic transition of the 1990s, with divergent debates signifying deep rifts and intense contestation between the proponents of the developmental state like RDP and GEAR debates of the 1990s, to the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030.

These contested dynamics on national economic and social policy straddle differing visions and values on pathways the new 4IR should take. For instance, the DTI and Department of Employment and Labour are moving towards a Digital Industrialisation model. The social sector partners of civil society, trade unions and progressives are opting for an inclusive model, along the lines proposed by the ILO's Global Commission on Future of Work, which was incidentally co-chaired by President Ramaphosa. Meanwhile, in South Africa, organised big business and leading corporates and multinational tech companies who comprise the bulk of the Presidential 4IR Commission are pushing for liberalised market approaches led by consulting firms such as Accenture.

It is against this dynamic and shifting contours and context that this publication was produced. Written by a variety of researchers, academics, and practitioners across South Africa, with diverse expertise, it seeks to engage with some of the central policy and philosophical debates. It also looks at the direct impact of the 4IR on specific sectors in the South African economy. Indeed, the 4IR, Big Data and robotics will have differentiated and diverse impacts on each sub-sector.

INTRODUCTION

At the time of writing this chapter, the rapid global spread of the COVID-19 pandemic placed capitalism in intensive care (Morozov, 2020). Within a few months, the rapid spread of the novel coronavirus led to unprecedented economic and education disruption, involving 192 school closures countrywide, representing 95 percent of the global total of enrolled learners (UNESCO, 2020b). The ILO (2020) reported that the escalation of job losses catalysed by COVID-19 places nearly half of the global workforce at risk of losing their livelihoods, particularly in the informal economy (1.6 billion workers) and 436 million small and medium enterprises.

While pre-COVID-19 conversations and plans, including dominant, uncritical notions about building a capable 4IR army (SA News, 2019), were eclipsed by focused mass attention on curtailing the pandemic, they also opened the way for big-tech solutions to the pandemic. Pre-COVID-19 conversations on the 4IR were initially catalysed by the publication of Schwab's (2016) influential book which led to the 4IR concept gaining rapid currency in education policy and practice circles in South Africa. Strategies on ICT in education, eLearning, digital learning, and mobile learning shifted dramatic gear, giving way to emergent language focused on the 4IR in education and the need to create ‘4IR learners’. A host of interventions followed. These include conferences and seminars on Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Education (UNESCO, 2019b) and AI for Good (ITU, 2019; 2018); the production of global and regional AI4D frameworks (IDRC, 2019). Government AI-readiness indices were developed (Oxford Insights and the International Development Research Centre, 2019; and global declarations were adopted (UNESCO, 2019a). Numerous coding and robotics training workshops for children, youth and teachers in schools mushroomed, such as those hosted by the Afrika Teen Geeks and Nunnovation.

The current post-COVID pandemic world order is a complex one with multi-dimensional challenges that have hampered the realisation of the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Africa's Agenda 2063. Such challenges have included lack of access to vaccines, unfair trade practices, the re-arranging of global and regional supply chains, lack of technology transfer, worsening climate change, as well as challenges posed by the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR).

The 4IR has introduced intelligent machines, robotics and artificial intelligence humanmachine interaction for efficiencies in production and distribution. It has, however, also brought about digital connections between people and machines that can fuel innovation and new product development. This will spur the development of new skills and training which can be used for development purposes.

South Africa's national system of innovation and industrial policies have seen increasing investment in research and development, with a view to creating institutions with a strong focus on science and technology. Vaccine nationalism during the COVID pandemic was a painful reminder that Africans and the Global South need to co-operate using their own technology platforms and intellectual property.

In 2019, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) released its ground-breaking Commission on the Future of Work (2019) and put forward its core recommendations for a developmental role for the state, as well as for the inclusion and protection of workers and unions despite the global context of 4IR technocentricism. President Cyril Ramaphosa co-chaired the ILO's Commission on the Future of Work, whose ground-breaking work is now being implemented at national levels.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter seeks to provide an alternative to financialisation and precarious labour in the platform economy. In a world driven by the mentality of market fundamentalism, casino capitalism has become a strong determinant of how the 4IR is developing globally. Technology start-ups and the companies driving the surge of innovation in the 4IR are attracting a great deal of attention from venture capitalists, as the potential of digital platforms and their network effects fuel extremely high market valuations in the futures market. This flood of investment alongside a surge of innovation has resulted in the technology sector, which once played a supporting role in the economy, now emerging as a dominant force in the mainstream economy, notably in the form of platform capitalism, with dire consequences for inclusive economic development.

Perez (2003) describes the impact of new technology on society, as a “surge of development” that “propagates across the economy, leading to structural changes in production, distribution, communication and consumption, as well as to profound and qualitative changes in society”.

Similarly, in our new industrial era, as the economy rapidly digitalises, the manner in which technology develops, its purpose and execution, are becoming vitally important for understanding how economies are evolving and what the consequences are for society. Platform capitalism, far from fostering a kinder mode of capitalism espoused by the socalled sharing economy, sadly, is displaying some of the worst excesses of 21st century neoliberalism in the form of hyperglobalisation and extreme monopolisation exemplified by the planetary scale network effects of tech giants such as Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple commonly referred to as the GAFAs (Ciriani & Lebourges, 2018). This is fuelling market failure, for example, through platforms such as Airbnb, causing distortions in the housing market and dismantling workers’ rights on platforms such as Uber, introducing the ‘uberisation’ of work (Kaine, Logue & Josserand, 2016; Nurvala, 2015), as a new symbol of labour exploitation.

INTRODUCTION

As the ILO enters its hundredth year, a considerable amount of attention is being placed on what the coming decades might look like for workers in the global economy. Most observers seem to agree that technological advances will play an important role in this future, but there remains an important debate regarding how technology will impact work. The World Bank (2018b) made a notable contribution to this discussion when it released the World Development Report 2019: The Changing Nature of Work (hereafter the Report or WDR). Opposing doom-and-gloom claims that jobs are about to be destroyed on a large scale, the Report presents a notably optimistic view of the future, emphasising how fears about automation and digitalisation are unfounded and that technology will bring new opportunities to society by helping to create jobs, increase productivity, and deliver effective public services. The key for such positive outcomes to materialise, according to the WDR, lies in adapting to the changes brought about by technological change, in particular through investment in education (for workers) and a transformation of social policy that would see governments provide ‘universal’ coverage in order to relieve corporations from the burden of financing social protection.

This chapter presents a different interpretation of the potential impact of technology on work, one that is considerably more nuanced and leads to recommendations that go beyond adaptation, stressing instead the need to influence, and probably challenge, the direction of technological change. It is argued here that the technology used, how it is used, and to what end (e.g., its distributional consequences) are shaped by power relations in society.