Organising is politics made durable. From co-operatives to corporations, Occupy to Meta, states and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), organisations shape our lives. They shape the possible futures of governance, policy making and social change, and hence are central to understanding how human beings can deal with the challenges that face us, whether that be pandemics, populism or climate change. This book series publishes work that explores how politics happens within and because of organisations and organising. We want to explore how activism is organised and how activists change organisations. We are also interested in the forms of resistance to activism, in the ways that powerful interests contest and reframe demands for change. These are questions of huge relevance to scholars in sociology, politics, geography, management and beyond, and are becoming ever more important as demands for impact and engagement change the way that academics imagine their work. They are also important to anyone who wants to understand more about the theory and practice of organising, not just the abstracted ideologies of capitalism taught in business schools.

Our books offer critical examinations of organisations as sites of or targets for activism; and we will also assume that our authors, and hopefully our readers, are themselves agents of change. Titles may focus on specific industries or fields, or they may be arranged around particular themes or challenges. Our topics might include the alternative economy; surveillance, whistleblowing and human rights; digital politics; religious groups; social movements; NGOs; feminism and anarchist organisation; action research and co-production; activism and the neo-liberal university, and any other subjects that are relevant and topical.

‘Organisations and Activism’ is also a multidisciplinary series. Contributions from all and any relevant academic fields will be welcomed. The series is international in outlook, and proposals from outside the English-speaking global north are particularly welcome.

This book, the fourth in our series so far, speaks directly to a concern with how ‘social change organisations’ and ‘social change makers’ can incubate and solidify new forms of social relations. The authors generously define social change organisations as a ‘broad range of organisations that work to bring about or resist social change through any combination of service provision, advocacy and protest.’

INTRODUCTION

Although the notion of measuring the performance of news stories is not a new phenomenon, the advent of online analytic tools has redefined the whole terrain of the sociology of online news production and distribution. This chapter, which draws from an ongoing cross-national comparative study of Zimbabwean, Kenyan, and South African newsrooms, focuses on the use and role of analytics in news production and distribution. It investigates how analytics tools are used in editorial decision-making and advertising negotiations. Based on structured and unstructured interviews with editors and journalists working for selected newsrooms in East and Southern Africa, the chapter examines how the use of analytics is reshaping the evaluation of the impact, reach, and relevance of news stories and the performance of individual journalists. Our study shows that the deployment of analytics tools has altered how news organisations in different parts of Africa monitor, track, engage in digital listening, and interact with their audiences, thereby spawning a new phenomenon we call ‘analytics-driven journalism.’ We argue that newsrooms in different parts of the continent are, to varying degrees, now more concerned about newsroom metrics and engagement rates at the expense of the broader public interest dimension of journalism

Literature suggests that the mass permeation of new digital technologies has significantly shaped news production, distribution, and consumption practices across the globe (see, for instance, Moyo 2009; Mare 2014; Mavhungu and Mabweazara 2014; Cherubini and Nielsen 2016; Beer 2016; Graves, Kelly, and Gluck 2010; Bunce 2015). These changes have facilitated the gathering of new forms of information about media audiences. At the level of news production, news has been transformed into an industrialised and measured product (Carlson 2017).

INTRODUCTION

There are differing schools of thought on the impact of technological revolution on employment, and work(ers). Campa (2019) identifies two main schools of thought. On the one hand there are those who emphasise the propensity of new technologies, especially automation, to generate technological unemployment. On the other, there are those who deny or minimise technological unemployment. The case in point, in the latter category, is the ‘World Development Report 2019: The Changing Nature of Work’ by the World Bank (2019). The report argues that workers must adapt and acquire new skills, and social protection must be extended to all. If the tide comes in, the report seems to be saying, you must learn to swim.

We would agree with Anner, Pons-Vignon and Rani (2019) in their critique of the World Bank's report when they argue that how technology is used is shaped by power relations. If workers are given a voice and government actively supports workers’ engagement, technology has the potential to play a positive role in the future of work. The authors challenge the idea that technology is an exogenous factor and reject technological determinism.

The key argument in this chapter is that technology is a product of human labour and if well-organised and strong enough, labour can shape its direction, impact and results. Thus, this chapter adopts an approach similar to Anner, Pons-Vignon and Rani (2019), but uses the automotive manufacturing sector in South Africa as an empirical case to highlight the contradictions of technological revolution in production on employment/work(ers). Paus (2018) outlines important contributions using the same line of reasoning by challenging the deterministic dismissal or trivialisation of the impact of technological change on employment/work(ers) on the one hand, and the dystopic, technological unemployment future on the other.

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the digital era, knowledge society and 4IR, the possibilities provided by digital technologies in the arena of education and skills development are very broad, and one of its key attributes is its potential to overcome time and resource constraints through flexible and shorter learning pathways (The Global Commission on the Future of Work, 2019). The opportunities now include access to wide-reaching quality education that is affected by teachers who have the relevant skills and digital learning competencies and lastly, whose competencies, proficiencies and mentorship cannot be replaced by education technologies (The Global Commission on the Future of Work, 2019).

For ages, the term ‘digital divide’ had been used in academic environments to articulate the social inequality that existed between people who have access and those who lack access to information and communications technology (ICT) (Ritzhaupt et al., 2013). Ritzhaupt et al, (2013) documented that numerous components are interrelated to the digital divide. Over the years, it has become multifaceted and some of these dimensions include an individual's access to computers, their computer usage, and related skill. Their research further declared that the term ‘digital divide’ is no longer only relevant to physical access to technology and digital tools, but also includes whether people have the necessary information and communications technology (ICT) skills (Ritzhaupt et al., 2013). In a study conducted by Kajee and Balfour (2011), the authors marked the digital divide as a legacy of South Africa's past as a result of the apartheid system, however, South Africa can be seen as one of the most information-integrated societies within sub-Saharan Africa (Bornman, 2015).

INTRODUCTION

South Africa is a country characterised by a growing digital divide in the 4IR caused by legacy issues of apartheid, and this has an impact on the future of the residents in terms of the future of work in this digital economy (UNDP, 2019). High poverty at 40% and 29% unemployment (Stats SA, 2020) illustrates the constraints currently faced by South Africa within a spiralling rate of change of technology in the global context which makes it a much more complex exercise to ensure that the necessary measures are in place to upskill citizens to participate meaningfully in the new digital economy (UNDP, 2019; Stone, 2020).

A Los Angeles-based author, Brian Merchant, published a book on the activities of Foxconn, a Chinese company that assembles Apple's iPhones in Shenzhen. Workers in the plant in which highly sophisticated iPhones are produced were so unhappy about their working and living conditions that in 2010, incidents of suicide began to be widespread (Merchant, 2017). Last year, in Durban, an engineering plant shop steward was taken to a warehouse and shown brand-new robots. The manager pointed at the robots and said mockingly:

Human stories like these tend to be ignored when scholars present grand narratives about the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) at conferences and in seminars and workshops. As an attempt to catch up with the 4IR, in April 2019, the South African government launched the WEF-supported Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution—an institution for conducting and coordinating research on artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, the Internet of Things (IoT), blockchain, distribution ledge technology, and precision medicine (Campbell, 16 April 2019, Engineering News).

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine the extent to which current developments in the South African banking industry, driven primarily but not solely by the collection of technological developments commonly referred to as the 4IR, are indicative of a just transition. It will then explore the systemic conditions which would need to be in place to ensure that as new technologies are adopted on an ever-broader scale, labour benefits from technological innovation. This can be contrasted with a scenario, becoming ever more likely and in certain instances being realised, where labour bears the brunt of the cost associated with the adoption and application of new technologies in banking as well as other industries. The case for avoiding such a state of affairs and instead proactively working towards what can be termed an ‘accelerated just transition’ is indeed compelling. Not only due to the potential benefits, which could accrue to labour due to the application of new technologies (such as increased productivity, reduced working hours and improved working conditions) but also in light of the already high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality in South Africa.

The cost borne by labour should therefore be minimised, completely negated, or ideally labour and capital should both benefit in equal measure from the so-called 4IR. There are, however, reasons to doubt, especially considering the historical trajectory of the South African banking industry, whether this second scenario where labour and capital equally benefit from the 4IR, is likely to materialise in the foreseeable future. One of the central premises of this chapter is however, simply, that we cannot determine an uncertain and complex future.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the driving forces for new jobs and skills for the future. The chapter also outlines the contribution of TVET knowledge and skills to digital literacy from basics to advanced levels. The implication of digital literacy for the 4IR is highlighted. The empirical part of this chapter presents results based on the investigation done at the vocational education and training practices at three TVET colleges in one province in South Africa. The study focused on vocational pedagogic and didactic practices; workshop material and equipment for practical training; work-integrated learning, and integration of theory and practice in vocational subjects. This investigation is a case study to gauge the extent of readiness of some TVET colleges for the 4IR. The methodology of collecting data included questionnaires, interviews, and observation. The participants of the study were students and lecturers. Based on this data, the paper determines the extent of the readiness of TVET as well as CET colleges in the country. This chapter recommends measures to position the TVET and CET colleges for the 4IR.

It is no secret that South African youth are facing massive challenges in terms of their education, employment, and career growth. In the third quarter of 2019, the South African unemployment rate had increased to 29 percent as compared to 26.5 percent in the first quarter of 2017. Youth unemployment has been inordinately high for many years in South Africa and is one of the country's major socio-economic challenges (Plagerson, Patel, Hochfeld & Ulriksen 2018). International comparisons regularly affirm that South Africa's unemployment rate is among the highest in the world. In 2013, the youth unemployment rate was 63 percent of the youth labour force (3.2 million individuals).

INTRODUCTION

The world appears to be overcome with a new wave of what Harvey termed ‘capital accumulation by dispossession,’ this time under the auspices of the 4IR embodied in modernity's rhetoric of ‘progress’ and new opportunities for capitalist economic growth. In this frenzy, the implications of social relations for both human nature and nature from the first industrial revolution are once again overlooked in the political agendas of those seeking ongoing forms of capital accumulation.

Harvey (2004) reminds us that Marx's dialectical methods throughout the history of capitalism revealed that market liberalisation and capitalism's innovation, in order to maintain itself, produce greater levels of social inequality. According to Harvey, imperialism has always found new ways of capital accumulation through dispossession because if over-accumulated capital does not or cannot move, then it stands to be devalued directly. He offers the following summary:

This chapter on 4IR and energy transitions serves to interrogate the assumptions and claims of current renewable energy transitions to mitigate climate change, create more energy efficiency, and improve the socio-economic well-being in the quest for a ‘low-carbon society.’

INTRODUCTION

The current systems for the regulation of higher education serve to constrain rather than liberate institutions in the development of programmes that will meet the needs of the 4IR. With the 2020 advent of COVID-19, the necessity to reframe higher education frameworks and policies to meet the needs of the 21st century has become rather more sharply focused and urgent than it was before. Globally, and in South Africa, universities and other teaching institutions are making concerted efforts to transition from a traditional contact mode of delivery to remote teaching and learning. These steps have been taken to avoid the loss of the academic year. It remains to be seen how effectively the universities will be able to make this transition, and to what extent their students will be able to manage these new technological demands as well as the challenges of higher education curricula. What is clear, however, is that now more than ever, the restrictive constraints and definitions provided by the existing regulatory frameworks in SA may serve to inhibit the radical changes needed.

It is now moot that we are experiencing a paradigm shift in our way of thinking and doing things, and that if we are to keep up, we need to rapidly respond. The 4IR resulted in high levels of activity in 2018 and 2019 as higher education institutions in South Africa took steps to keep up with the rapid disruptions in society and the economy. We do not yet know just how it (4IR) will unfold, but one thing is clear: the response to it must be integrated and comprehensive, involving all stakeholders of the global polity, from the public and private sectors to academia and civil society (Schwab, 2016).

Themes:

Critical discourse on 4IR, World of Work, Globalisation, Innovation for development.

INTRODUCTION

The global COVID-19 pandemic crisis is one of the gravest global disasters of this century. A combination of rapid globalisation, inequalities of the trade system, offshoring, outsourcing, rapid urbanisation, a borderless world of travel and commerce, and lack of investment in health systems ensured a ‘warp-like’ spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. Humanity was presented with a unique opportunity to co-operate with the United Nations (UN) around a common crisis. Sadly, leading powers and nation states rapidly descended into the most rabid nationalistic forms of COVID-19 vaccine nationalism and selfishness, especially with regard to the COVID-19 vaccine development and distribution, further entrenching geopolitical divides.

In his speech at the WEF 2021 virtual conference on 27 January 2021, President Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa made a heartfelt appeal to wealthy nations not to hoard COVID-19 vaccines and to free them up for the Developing South. For a leader of the AU, and South Africa as a member of the G20 and BRICS, to plead in this manner shows emphatically the stark unequal power relations of the rich developed world visa-à-vis the precarious position of the Developing South. Despite appeals for patent exceptions in this global health emergency, pharmaceutical corporations’ profiteering intensified, and even while receiving mega subsidies worth billions of dollars, the bulk of COVID-19 vaccines were produced and hoarded for nations of the North, while the Global South was denied any technology transfer, leaving the majority of the world's population unvaccinated.

Can compassion, that sense of goodness, that feeling of the sacredness of life, which we spoke about the last time we met, be brought into being through compulsion? Surely, when there is compulsion in any form when there is propaganda or moralising, there is no compassion, nor is there compassion when change is brought about merely through seeing the necessity of meeting the technological challenge in such a way that human beings will remain human beings and not become machines. So, there must be a change without any causation. A change that is brought about through causation is not compassion; it is merely a thing of the marketplace, so that is one problem.

Another problem is, if I change, how will it affect society? Or am I not concerned with that at all because the majority of people are not interested in what we are talking about, nor are you if you listen out of curiosity or some kind of impulse and pass by. The machines are progressing so rapidly that most human beings are merely pushed along and are not capable of meeting life with the enrichment of love, with compassion, and with deep thought. And if I change, how will it affect society, which is my relationship with you? Society is not some extraordinary mythical entity; it is our relationship with each other, and if two or three of us change, how will it affect the rest of the world? Or is there a way of affecting the total mind of man?

That is, is there a process by which the individual who is changed can touch the unconscious mind of mankind?

INTRODUCTION

In South Africa, as in other parts of the world, there is widespread debate about the future of work in the context of developments in technology, globalisation, climate change and demographic changes. Much of the debate focuses on the implications of the 4IR for living, working, and learning. This chapter explores some of these debates with specific reference to call/contact centres and Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) in the context of South Africa.

Call centres are archetypal organisations of the new work order associated with globalisation and digital capitalism. Their growth has been enabled by dramatic advances in telecommunications and information and communications technologies and ongoing corporate restructuring strategies. The rapid changes in technology and work organisation in these organisations suggest that in this sector there are continuities and discontinuities, rather than a dramatic rupture between the third and fourth industrial revolutions.

Call centres and BPO have high visibility in national policies in South Africa. They have been identified since at least 2005 as priority sectors which have the potential to attract foreign direct investment, generate employment, particularly for disadvantaged youth, and create opportunities for growth and development in peri-urban and rural areas of South Africa. While the sector has had some success, it is unclear to what extent national policy goals relating to youth employment creation and development of areas outside large metropolitan areas have been achieved.

In the context of high unemployment and growing structural inequality, further questions arise about the potential of the 4IR and current government policies to meet the country's developmental objectives.