This article traces the evolution of Italian strategies for imperial expansion from the decades after unification—when many came to believe that imperial conquest would more advantageously position Italy in the liberal capitalist global economy—to the height of the fascist colonial project in the Horn of Africa—when the fascists tried to break with the liberal global economy and construct a new, radical mercantilist and corporatist empire. Taking inspiration from their predecessors, the fascist regime extracted capital, resources, and labor from Africans and Italians to finance its war against the Ethiopian empire and its colonization of the Horn. While the war temporarily stimulated Italian industry, employed hundreds of thousands of work-hungry Italians, and consolidated the regime’s many corporatist institutions, it drained Italy’s reserves and alarmed the Duce’s allies among Italy’s industrial and financial elite. The regime, thus, shifted strategies, focusing on reducing the cost of the empire by exploiting African workers, eliminating inefficient small enterprises, and creating vast concessions for Italian industrialists. Conquering new territories and markets, acquiring a variety of primary resources, and empowering industry, Mussolini and the radical mercantilist-corporatists aimed to resolve Italy’s perceived under-development, by placing Italy at the center of a great fascist Eurafrican empire that could dictate the terms of its engagement with the rest of the world.

The history of political economy is tormented by beasts. The most famous is the Leviathan, the giant serpentine monster that figures in Hobbes’s masterpiece of modern political theory. Robert Fredona and Sophus Reinert spotlight another sea monster, the Kraken, that giant octopus or squid with a particular morphology (i.e., its tentacles) that so fittingly describes the grip of multinational corporations, stateless financial capital, social media, and tech giants today. But there are still other monsters in the bestiary of political economy. In this essay, I highlight the Behemoth, a land monster that captures another critical dimension of political economy: the willful and intentional deployment of chaos and disorder as a way of governing. Franz Neumann, political and legal theorist and lawyer, Columbia University professor, and member of the Frankfurt School in exile, placed the Behemoth at the heart—and in the title—of his analysis of Germany’s political economy under the Nazi regime. Alongside the Leviathan surveillance state and the many tentacular grips of multinational, social media, and tech Krakens, the Behemoth remains a key model to better understand current forms of capitalism.

The credit default swap (CDS) Big Bang introduced 2 standard coupons for CDS trading. We exploit the setting of the 2 standard coupons as a natural experiment to quantify the components of the bid–ask spreads in over-the-counter markets. We find that a significant portion of the difference in the bid–ask spread between the 2 coupons is explained by the difference in funding costs. Furthermore, search intensity also explains the variation in the difference in bid–ask spread. The liquidity typically concentrates on one of the standard coupons and can suddenly switch to the other coupon. Using the sudden switch of the primary coupon, we provide further evidence to support the predictions of search-based liquidity models.

We examine compensation for endowment Chief Investment Officers (CIOs) overseeing portfolios with significant allocations to alternatives. We find widespread use of bonuses and that large endowments with high alternative allocations hire CIOs with stronger backgrounds, pay them more, and have higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. We find weak evidence of a relationship between compensation and future performance. Our results align with contract theory predictions but differ from empirical findings on pension funds. Endowments pay CIOs more, rely more on bonuses, attract more experienced professionals, and have lower turnover than pensions. This suggests more effective talent management compared to politically influenced public pensions.

Capitalism has taken many forms over the last 500 years. This short essay asks whether rediscovering the idea that corporations have a moral duty to contribute to the social good might help create a form of capitalism capable of addressing the massive problems that we face. I argue that the property view of the corporation, or the idea that the sole goal of the corporation should be to maximize investor returns, might once have been appropriate, but is currently causing enormous damage. I suggest that the entity view of the corporation, or the view that the primary purpose of the corporation is to serve the common good, has a long history, and is currently remerging in ways that have the potential to help reform capitalism in powerful ways.

This paper examines the transformation of Venetian commerce across the twelfth century, arguing that the strategies of Venetian merchants are best described using two distinct models. One was locally integrated and geographically decentralized, typical of merchants who settled abroad and became part of local societies, sometimes retaining few clear links to Venice. The other was far more centralized, characterized by short-term, profit-focused ventures originating in Venice that precluded deep entanglements in foreign economies. Both models were facilitated by the unstructured nature of Venetian overseas administration, which accommodated a degree of autonomy for expatriates while providing the infrastructure necessary for transient commerce. The decline of the integrated model began with the imperial sanctions of 1171 and culminated with the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204), after which the centralized model came to dominate. The subsequent importance of the “sedentary merchant” in Venetian trade was shaped as much by political as by economic factors.