Structural reforms of a fundamental nature now under way in Wall Street have been proclaimed so often of late as to become commonplace. The fact that many of these changes are not welcomed by established and influential persons who make their living in or around Wall Street is not news. What may be news, however, is that neither of these facts is particularly new.

While a substantial body of evidence exists indicating that the distribution of price changes in speculative markets is not normally distributed, there is some question about which theoretical distribution best describes price changes. This paper derives and tests an alternative distribution based on the incorporation of vectors of information bits into prices. The resultant distribution uses two parameters, u and β, to measure the response of price lags to given information vectors and can be interpreted as measures of risk.

It has been suggested that information has the three following uses:

1. Information can be employed to earn trading profits.

2. Information can improve the operating decisions of a firm or group of firms and thereby increase the stock price.

3. Information can reduce the risk of a firm or group of firms and thereby increase the stock price.

In the linear market-index model of the return-generating process, return on security j is given by

where αj and βj are constants characteristic of company j, is return on a market index, and is the company-specific component of return such that and . The coefficient βj is given by . It is known as market responsiveness, volatility, systematic risk, and, more commonly, simply as “beta.” It has been widely accepted as a measure of nondiversifiable risk and incorporated in popular performance measures. Many stock information services now provide estimates of beta.

Capital adequacy is an important and controversial issue in banking. Bank regulators consider the evaluation of capital adequacy one of their major responsibilities and place special attention on the role of capital in preventing bank failures.

The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that three financial performance variables, namely, growth, profitability, and risk, are determinants of corporate debt ratios in the manufacturing sector in industrialized countries. In particular, a linear model is hypothesized and Ordinary Least Squares is used to estimate the coefficients for the relationship. The sample used contains 816 firms in four selected industries in five industrialized countries during the period 1966–72.

In this paper a model is presented to explain the structure of systematic risk. The starting point is the expression for the total dollar return to investors who hold the securities from period t - 1 to t assuming no new securities have been issued in the interim:

where Xt is earnings before interest, preferred dividends, and taxes; T is the corporate tax rate; Dd,t is the interest paid on debt in year t; Dp,t is the dividend paid to preferred shareholders in year t; Dc,t is the dividend (total) paid to equity shares-holders in year t; ΔPt · Nt-1 is the aggregate capital gains for the Nt-1 shares of common stock outstanding as of t-1 and ΔGt is the change in the capitalized value of future growth opportunities. The hypothesis is that the risk associated with the left-hand side variables, the market determined systematic risk, is derived from the corporate variables on the right-hand side of the equation. The market determined level of systematic risk is a linear function of the sensitivity of percent changes in revenues of the firm to percent changes in GNF (asset betas), financial leverage, and changes in growth potential.

The current operating procedure of the Federal Reserve, as described by Richard Davis and interpreted by me, entails picking long-term growth rates (meaning six months and longer) for monetary aggregates, while simultaneously specifying short-run conditions for the federal funds rates and monetary aggregates which are felt to be consistent with long-term goals. But, he also states, because of “shorter term developments,” that the specified shorter term growth rates for monetary aggregates might not be equivalent to the desired long-term growth rate. This operating procedure disturbs me for two reasons. First, there is evidence demonstrating that different growth rates in the money stock which last as long as six months result in different levels of economic activity; thus six months should be the maximum control period not the minimum. Secondly, I don't see what meaning a long-term growth path for monetary aggregates can have if the Federal Reserve lets “shorter term” development define the short-term growth paths for money in a way which is inconsistent with the longer term goals.

This paper examines the problem of including intertemporally dependent cash flows in capital budgeting models under uncertainty, including review of previous efforts to resolve this problem. The difficulty involved in estimating autocorrelation coefficients and the magnitude of the error introduced by assuming independence are discussed.

This study examines the historic security market performance of REIT shares during the six-year period 1968–1973. Performance measures suggested by Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen were calculated for a sample of 30 larger and older REITs on both a pre- and post-tax basis. Principal conclusions are: 1) The average mortgage trust sampled had “outperformed” the S&P 500 while equity and hybrid trusts have fared poorer than the S&P 500. 2) The differences in performance levels are due principally to return levels and not risk differentials. 3) A substantial portion of the risk inherent in an REIT is diversifiable risk. This together with other evidence suggests that most REITs have not diversified risk exposure to the extent they indicated they would and were able to. 4) Performance rankings using before- and after-tax returns were identical, suggesting that certain espoused tax advantages unique to REITs have been virtually meaningless on a practical level.

Edward Kane alleges that the Federal Reserve System recently has taken a turn for the worse, with respect to monetary policy, in that Chairman Burns has re-politicized the System beyond prudent bounds. It is interesting to note that Kane changed the title of his paper from “The Politicization of the Fed” in his first draft (and before he had heard my comments at the meeting) to “The Re-Politicization of the Fed” in his second draft (after he had heard my comments). In my view, Kane's latest title is closer to the truth–though still somewhat misleading–in that, over time, the Fed has necessarily factored political and social considerations into the formulation of economic and monetary policy. But so what, and what else is new? The examples cited by Kane to “document” his case can best be characterized as allegations that illustrate a certain behavioral pattern over time, but these examples fail to support his case that–because of the repoliticization of the Fed–recent monetary policy has been at times counterproductive to the public interest. Perhaps a more legitimate conclusion that Kane could have reached from his observations of public policy in recent years is that the appointment of Dr. Burns as Chairman of the Committee on Interest and Dividends tended to formalize the quasipolitical nature of the position of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.

Among the topics that have been subjected to intensive research by businessschool scholars over the past two decades, few have received more attention than those which collectively comprise the field of investments. What is more important, even fewer have witnessed the plethora of important research findings that has been forthcoming in the investments field. Indeed, it seems reasonable to argue that in recent years no other business field's research accomplishments have been either as impressive or as generally reinforcing.

Municipal bond credit ratings are currently being created and distributed by two main rating agencies. Controversy has urrounded these ratings and their effects on interest costs to municipalities. This paper summarizes these controversies and presents a methodology which would enable a more objective appraisal of municipal credit quality.

Various studies reported in the literature overwhelmingly reach the conclusion that the mutual funds in general have not outperformed the market. This result seems at variance with the tremendous growth the mutual fund industry has experienced over the past two decades. If the market efficiency hypothesis is valid, and there is considerable evidence in its support, then a mutual fund may not be able to consistently outperform the market. However, while an average mutual fund does not outperform the market, the mutual fund industry as a whole may be able to do so.

The thoughts presented in this paper were developed during the first stage of an ongoing research project. This project is designed to shed light on the management of the size and exchange composition of financial assets and liabilities in the U.S. multinational companies (MNCs). The study also intends to analyze the impact of these policies on the international and national financial markets.

Bernell Stone's paper extends the single-factor market model to a two-factor model to “better” explain the stochastic process that generates security returns. The inductive search for new models (of which his paper is one) presumably is predicated upon some unsatisfactory results of joint tests of the single-index market model and the capital asset pricing model. It is well known that there are other components of systematic or covariance risk that are not explained by the single-market factor. In the most general sense then, one would conclude that the truth of the return generating process is a multiple factor model, given that the process is indeed linear in the factors. Professor Stone chooses a two-factor (or index) model, in which the known factors are: (1) the return on an equity index, and (2) the return on a bond index. To this extent his interesting work is a special case of the more general work of others.

The central theme of the paper by Professor Phillips is the effects of technological change on the way financial institutions operate and the implications for regulation. His analysis is an excellent combination of both sound economics and political economy. Increasingly, shifts are made between noninterest-bearing demand deposits and interestbearing savings deposits. The increased use of negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts represents a step toward permitting interest on demand deposits. The implications of the increased use of “electronic funds transfer system” (EFTS) are even greater. Professor Phillips indicates the EFTS could make all marketable and negotiable assets “money,” and that the turnover of deposits could approach “infinity.”

The paper reports three findings regarding equity investors' common stock perceptions which are an important part of their security decision process. These results are based on demographic and perceptual data collected from investment professors, portfolio managers, and individual round-lot investors.