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Continuing a long tradition, the government of New York attempted to aid domestic manufacturing in various ways during the troubled period of the Embargo, the War of 1812, and the war's aftermath. Among the most important legislative actions was the state's general incorporation law for manufacturing, passed in 1811 on a temporary basis and enacted without time limit in 1821.
Professor Miner recounts the complex story of the loss of Cherokee control of mineral development on tribal lands in what later became Oklahoma. These events constitute a chapter in the long history of the loss of Indian sovereignty in the wake of the expansion of the white man's civilization across the continent.
Elliott's basic proposition is praiseworthy. Nevertheless, I have a number of serious reservations about the implications of his model and the reliability of its predictions. Some of my reservations relate to the theoretical foundation of the model itself, while others are concerned with his methodology and estimation techniques.
Considering Professors Monroe's and Trieschmann's own analysis and methodology, it seems that their conclusion and implications of the results are considerably reduced in scope from those presented in their paper. I would like to discuss this new approach within the broader scope of their work. I will conclude with several points which closely relate to their work but which are not, by their choice, a part of the present paper.
Results of the analysis imply that rates of return on the property-liability portfolios included in this study are less than rates of return on either the investment company portfolios or the Standard and Poor's industrials. However, it appears that these differences are likely due to different investment objectives of the different portfolios.
The federal deposit insurance system of the United States was instituted as a result of severe financial crises in the United States and was intended to prevent the recurrence of some of the evils of such crises, specifically those resulting from bank deposit losses. Since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established in 1934, the United States has not experienced banking panics or harmful effects on the economy due to widespread destruction of bank deposits. As a result, there is a fairly widespread feeling that the present deposit insurance system has been a success. If prevention of panics and large-scale deposit destruction are the only criteria for success, this judgment may be justified, although, if the insurance system uses resources, it must be proved that panics and deposit losses would be unacceptably frequent or large in its absence.
I am going to consider three questions. First, what have been the trends in the institutionalization of savings and, as a consequence, in the evolving role of institutions in the equity markets? Second, what have been the effects of these trends on the securities industry, narrowly defined; that is, on the securities broker-dealers. And, third, what have been the effects of these trends on the financial markets and the economy as a whole?