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Increasing emphasis on performance by the investment community has stimulated many innovations for accomplishing capital gains. Attention has been refocused on an established medium for this growth — investing in the new issue. Historically in and out of favor with security buyers, this particular type of investment has recently been enjoying unprecedented popularity.
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of how multi-agency American and British investigative teams unravelled the highly intricate web of illicit activities created by James Guerin since the 1970s. By the time that the Grand Jury (in Philadelphia) was charged with investigating the criminal counts, there was an enormous amount of evidence implicating Guerin and his key executives. This finally resulted in a series of trials, consequent upon which Guerin was given a 15-year prison sentence and his co-conspirators a range of smaller sentences. At the same time, Ferranti also pursued compensation through the British courts, but in the end was obliged to accept a small sum from Peat Marwick Mitchell as ISC’s auditors.
This chapter is concerned with male identity. It opens by looking at the gospel of work, as preached by Thomas Carlyle and many others. It contrasts this vision of the benefits of work by exploring the reality of work in the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Shorter hours of work were achieved at the cost of intensification of work, the spread of piece work, de-skilling and a high rate of accidents. On the other hand, work gave many men a sense of self-worth. Leisure, primarily commercial in provision, was seen by many commentators as a problem, Yet it also, in sport, spectatorship, competitions, in the pub, gave men an identity. The conclusion is that many working-class men by 1970 had achieved a work-leisure balance.
In retrospect, writing about “risk and valuation” is somewhat akin to killing Hydra, the mythical, many-headed creature which would grow two heads whenever one was cut off. It is only fair to admit at the outset that I cannot lay claim to have slain the beast. As a matter of fact, by the time the reader finishes the article, he may have concluded that the beast has more heads than ever!
This article has two goals. The first is to contrast two widely used definitions of risk aversion. The second is to establish the feasibility of plunging behavior, in the sense that a possibly large number of risk averse investors will not be diversifiers.
This article examines some aspects of the portfolio selection problem when the “no-easy-money-condition” holds and the investor is constrained to stay solvent. The possible presence of a non-capital income is also taken into consideration.
Not all racetrack bettors want to handicap. Some prefer to buy expert opinion on the winners of each race and on the day's best bet. Investors are not very different. Many like to avoid the analysis required to choose among investment funds and so seek some summary measure that will rank funds relative to one another and indicate which one is the best bet. Two measures suggested in work by John Lintner [2], William Sharpe [6], Jack Treynor[7], and Henry Latané and Donald Tuttle [1] rank investment funds considering both return and risk. These measures not only can be taken to provide an indication of the best bet among investment fund managements but also offer a guide to building a portfolio.
Risk continues to be a widely discussed topic within the field of finance. Academicians add risk variables to their quantitative models, while financial practitioners include risk considerations in their qualitative deliberations. In both contexts, risk — together with some measure of profit or return — generally comprise a dual or composite criteria for investment decision-making purposes. Whereas the decisionmaking situation can be described as ex ante, this article deals with risk in an ex post context. In particular, it reports an investigation of alternative risk-return measures which are designed to rank and evaluate the ex post performance of investment portfolios. Section I reviews three composite measures of performance and examines their interrelationships. A fourth alternative measure is also suggested. In Section II, the measures are used to rank the portfolio performance of a sample of mutual funds. Some difficulties in making performance comparisons of these funds against the market are discussed in Section III. The final section briefly explores the implications of the study and suggests areas for subsequent research.
In this article, we shall discuss several of the alternative definitions of risk that have been proposed from time to time. We shall show that one definition — risk is the probability of loss — leads to a formulation of the investment decision problem as a chance constrained problem. Three different strategies are then proposed by which an investor can reduce risk. It is our belief that professional investors utilize all three strategies and that risk, in many such cases, is not a substantial constraint on investor behavior.
The vector of equilibrium aggregate market values (or per share prices) of a given set of risk assets trading in purely competitive markets of individually risk-averse investors has been derived in earlier work under certain simplifying assumptions, including the absence of taxes and transactions costs and a single (uniform) holding period for the assessment of uncertain outcomes (See [8], [9], [10], [15], and [12]). The other critical assumptions in these studies were (a) the existence of a riskless asset available for holding or borrowing at a fixed, exogenously determined interest rate, (b) an assumption that all investors act in terms of identical joint probability distributions over end-of-period outcomes, and (c) the acceptance of a mean-variance criterion for portfolio decisions.