Professor Cuff casts a critically dissenting eye at one of American history's most cherished myths: Bernard Baruch's role in United States' mobilization during World War I.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, a number of American states prohibited the establishment of banks of issue within their borders. In theory, these states seemingly opted for the slow economic development associated with an inelastic currency supply. In the case of Iowa, however, the people's demand for an elastic currency was met by the creation of substitute financial institutions — land agency-banks — that functioned as de facto banks of issue.

The question “What's in a bond rating?” has been asked at least since 1909 when such ratings were started in the United States. Informed persons who answer this question typically admit that ratings depend in part on readily available statistics on a firm's operations and financial condition. Examples of such statistics are earnings coverage, leverage ratios, and profit rates.

Many students of business finance subsume the risks associated with a firm's income stream under two general cognomens, namely, “business risk” and “financial risk.”1 The degree of business risk associated with a firm's income stream is considered to be a function of all determinants of risk except those that relate to the means by which a firm's operations are financed (i.e., the nature of a firm's capital structure). In general, business risk is determined by a firm's asset structure, the purposes for which a firm's assets are used, and the efficiency and effectiveness with which a firm's assets are utilized. The determinants of business risk include the competitive position of a firm, the nature of a firm's operating expenses, the intensity of demand for a firm's products, and a firm's managerial resources, inter alia. A measurement of the variability of net operating income (i.e., earnings before interest expenses and income taxes) is usually employed as a surrogate of business risk.

The objectives of this paper are to derive the relationship of the geometric mean of a distribution of positive values to the conventional first four moments — arithmetic mean, variance, absolute skewness, and absolute kurtosis — and to empirically evaluate certain approximations involving these four moments for estimating the geometric means of monthly and annual holding period returns for individual stocks and for portfolios. The geometric mean is shown to be positively related to the arithmetic mean and absolute skewness and negatively related to variance and absolute kurtosis. In the case of a normal distribution a very good approximation to the geometric mean is revealed to be a function of just the arithmetic mean and variance. Additionally, empirical evidence indicates that even though a number of the monthly and annual distributions deviate significantly from normality, the approximation involving only the mean and variance produces quite accurate estimates of the geometric means of these distributions.

Until very recently, in most work on normative models for capital investment planning, it has been assumed that availability of capital is unconstrained; i.e., that money may be freely borrowed or lent at a single market rate of interest, and that no other constraints affect the proper choice of available productive investment projects to be undertaken. Since practical situations almost universally do involve such constraints, the traditional theories have, for the most part, been an unsatisfactory guide to achievement of optimal capital investment behavior in the real world.

Professor McClelland reviews two book on land speculation, a traditional historical study by Malcom J. Rohrbough and another which falls in the category of “new economic history” by Robert Swierenga.