Chapter 4 provides the first empirical assessment of the pathways developed earlier in the book. It focuses on access to judicial remedy mechanisms, defined as any process initiated in the court of law. This chapter asks: how does confrontation shape governance outcomes in terms of access to legal remedy efforts? I draw from political science and legal scholarship on the logic of deterrence to illustrate how Institutional Strength represents an important pathway to judicial remedy mechanisms. The Corporate Characteristics pathway is developed by engaging with political economy and management scholarship to explain the ways in which firm-level characteristics (e.g. foreignness, profitability, and size) explain variation in access to judicial remedy. Finally, the Elevating Voices pathway draws from the human rights scholarship, which illustrates how civil society participation (e.g. NGO or INGO involvement) can shape governance outcomes. Using case studies from the CHRD, this chapter also provides rich illustrations of victims’ access to judicial remedy mechanisms.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to the reconstruction of the case of the Costa Concordia accident, which occurred on January 13, 2012, off the west coast of Italy, near the island of Giglio, and presents an analysis of the scapegoating process that involved the ship’s captain. Sailing very close to the coast, the Costa Concordia foundered on a rock. The impact tore open a gash in the ship, allowing in water which put the engines out of action. After traveling a short distance, the ship ran aground near the island, listing over onto its side. Out of over four thousand people on board, thirty-two died. The dominant view of this case from the judiciary, the media and public opinion, was that the ship’s captain was the main and, in fact, almost the only, figure responsible for the accident and for the inadequate management of the emergency. This book challenges the conventional interpretation of the accident, providing a revised history of the event and at the same time putting forward a different explanation.

This chapter draws a picture of ownership and control change of large Bulgarian companies after the collapse of communism in 1989. Post-communist privatization has fundamentally changed the ownership landscape. First, in 2018–2019 the state was the largest shareholder in only 9% of the top 100 companies (down from 42% in the mid-1990s). The state has virtually disappeared as a direct largest shareholder of listed companies. Nevertheless, the state still remained among the key ultimate owners among the top 20 companies. Second, foreign investors have become the largest shareholders in 46% of the top 100 companies (up from 31% in the mid-1990s) and in 11.7% of listed companies (up from 6.25% in the mid-1990s).Third, there was a remarkable increase in ownership concentration in listed companies and the percentage of listed companies with dispersed ownership has declined. The destruction of large Bulgarian firms, proxied by their exit rate, was not coupled with an entry of newly established private firms into the top 100 companies. There was no sustainable development of the domestic largest shareholders. The chapter discusses potential determinants explaining the observed ownership changes.

Chapter 6 discusses the limits of a purely accusatory approach in dealing with complex events such as the various types of organizational failure (except, of course, in cases of malicious intent and gross negligence) and its contribution, even if involuntary, to scapegoating. The accusatory approach renders organizational and institutional learning processes problematic, putting an end to complex events with the mere sanctioning of “bad apples.”

This chapter examines ownership and control of Swedish companies. Sweden witnessed a significant increase in ownership concentration in the top 20 and top 100 firms in the past few decades. Equity ownership concentration remained virtually the same in listed companies. A few major ownership patterns may be documented. First, the large shareholders remained the dominant corporate governance model in Sweden. Second, the largest domestic shareholders, such as families and holding companies (closed-end investment funds) have persisted in the past few decades. Third, there was an increase in the share of foreign owners as the largest shareholders in both the top 100 and listed companies. Fourth, there was also an emergence of new entrepreneurs as the largest shareholders in the large Swedish companies. The chapter has documented both the persistence of corporate insiders and ownership changes (e.g. an increase in foreign ownership, establishment of new domestic largest individual shareholders) in the past few decades. It also shows the importance of domestic institutional investors. It discusses a few reasons why the ownership structure remains persistent despite the substantial influence of global market forces, liberalization of domestic markets and corporate governance and legal reforms in Sweden.

Chapter 2 offers a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the scapegoat in organizations. In such contexts, it would not be credible for the scapegoats to be extraneous to the event that they are blamed for. It is therefore an individual, or a group of individuals, in some way involved in the event, who are blamed. They are an instrument of organizational rationality, strategically deployed by the organization to avoid any legal consequences and economic damage. Nevertheless, scapegoating also benefits the managers of the organization because their personal reputation can be damaged by their association with a tainted organization. The chapter presents some situations that can favor the creation of scapegoats: accidents, business scandals, organizational failures, crises, and policy fiascos. These events, particularly if amplified by the media, tend to generate scapegoats with the greatest frequency.