Chapter 11 returns to the beginning by revising the arguments on negativity made by Adorno and Agamben, as well as George Spencer Brown’s language of distinctions and of the nothing to help formulate this sense of renewed strategic need for both in-forming and un-informing. It is not much that we offer by way of a way out, but that is the point; it must remain in an uneasy and slightly impoverished space if it is to survive, it is strategy from the shadow.

Chapter 2 turns to the role of language in the context of strategy, specifically investigating how rhetoric and persuasion can open and close spaces for the airing of opinions freely amongst speakers. It is in creating and expressing opinion (and not truth) in the polis – the space of appearances – that the question of who one is receives its full disclosure. We then turn to the appearance of strategy in ancient Greece, first in the figure of Pericles, then Alcibiades, and in particular the latter’s skilful performances in the polis, and a gifted if contested career blighted, we suggest, by a failure to apprehend the distinction between the polis (rhetoric) and oikos (sophistry and instrumentality). The failure of Alcibiades also hints at some of the difficulties of language as the means of self-disclosure and so also for Arendt’s idealized association of action with talk, for it is in Alcibiades’ struggle as a strategos that opinion becomes twisted into event: Things get done, even if the action is consumed by failure and ruin. The case of Alcibiades takes us from talk to the body, and back to the polis in which the everyday is suspended so that action, freed from instrumentality, can occur and recur, each time alive and enlivening.

Introduction: ‘Strategy and as the basic question of organization?’ provides an overview of ideas, themes and concepts that find fuller exploration in subsequent chapters. We set the scene by considering the grounding importance of strategy as an organizational practice: enacting the struggle to see outside the measured orbits by which sight is habitually and theoretically confined to a representation.

Chapter 7 begins the task of unpacking contemporary information technologies. Taking leave from Soshana Zuboff’s critique of surveillance capitalism, we suggest a further step beyond anthropocentric ideas of control. We discuss how organizational forms such as platforms and systems like Enterprise Resource Planning products, have come to ‘run’ organizations, but in ways that also extend, replace and veil human cognition, in often imperceptibly powerful ways. And yet, these widely connected networks, the computational apparatuses, intelligent algorithms and digital media are fundamentally indifferent to what they ‘replace’. They no longer bring anything near, moreover there is no-one to whom such pictures and things can be brought. Agency, not just human agency, but all agency, is dissipated into brief small blips.

Chapter 8 broaches our understanding of communication systems and their intimacy with strategic practice. Beginning with the general (strategist) Napoleon’s forms of communication–technological warfare and the subsequent reliance on innovation in communication devices, especially those of coding and decoding communications in military conflicts, we consider the workings and implications of electronic, digital computing systems for strategy. Via Alan Turing’s Imitation Game, we introduce the debate on the nature of intelligence, consciousness and conscience (self-awareness), setting the scene for an elaboration on the development from cybernetics to contemporary machine-learning algorithms in the subsequent chapter.

Chapter 4 presents the epoch of technē, which is marked by the play of the fickleness of nature, luck (tuchē) and the fragility of early human stratagems. Technē is both a means of controlling the world, as well as one of violence. Indicated by humble and pre-scientific inventions such as the almanack, they allow little gains to be wrest from an otherwise unforgiving surround by knowing when to sow or harvest in accordance with the almanack’s alignment of experiential, mythical and cosmological clues. The epoch of technē is characterized by an intimacy between humans and their surroundings, the term planning itself finding its roots in the way in which seedlings are pushed into the ground by a farmer’s foot. But there is also violence; both imposed on the human body, whose shape is bent and twisted, ground down and severed by the acts of labour and the growing numbers of devices that extend human reach; as well upon nature, which becomes a place in need of taming and cultivating; cutting, slicing, ploughing, killing and using.

this chapter will discuss the regulation of personal capacity (ahliya) and agency under the civil law of Qatar and will not deal with the issue of competence pertinent to foreign investors or specific competence of state (or administrative) entities, even if said competence concerns contractual freedom. The chapter deals with the most important types of agency and hence several are missing from this discussion. It will become clear from the discussion relating to personal capacity that several (but not all) principles underpinning classical Islamic law have been incorporated in the Qatari CC, despite the fact that they are to a large degree antiquated and out of touch with Qatar’s international obligations.

Chapter 9 entangles strategy and cybernetics, as well as links between military funding and research development culminating in a discussion of the organizational force of neural nets and with this the increasing inability to ask questions of existence. Understanding the workings of these apparatuses has long become a matter for a limited number of experts, and even those are unable to really know how such nets compute themselves, in speeds and complexities that far outstretch human cognition. Glitches and errors, as well as idling, faulty codes, offer, we suggest, openings through which we might glimpse the nature of these new realities, yet rather than welcome, these seem to be subject to the continual attention of interface innovation and ‘good’ design that serve only to further veil access and awareness of the modern human’s captivation in technological environments. With this slipping away of consciousness arises a poverty in world that finally negates the possibility for conscience through self-knowing. The question of existence, and thus the capacity for strategy, have vanished; and there is no possibility of return to a pre-technological life to find a new entry point into the question of existence.

In chapter 2 we discussed contract formation in general, whereas here we shall dive deeper into formality and delivery in particular. Before doing so, we need to lay the foundations by which to evaluate the legal impact of formality and delivery on civil and commercial contracts. It will be recalled that under the civil law tradition, contracts are predicated on three general pillars, namely: (i) consent, consisting of offer, acceptance and intention to be legally bound; (ii) subject-matter; and (iii) cause. In addition, there may, although not necessarily, exist two further requirements (special pillars), namely: (iv) formality; and (v) delivery

Chapter 6 reaches the end of our foray into Heidegger’s analysis of technology. The chapter examines Sloan’s memoirs of General Motors and identifies a cybernetic fantasy of control in the ghost-written account, laid bare by the increasing inability of technological systems to reveal anything; and where humans are not even the ordinary fabricators anymore, the earth merely becomes a globe, that is gridded and dug over. The invention of the radio that for Heidegger heralded an epoch of the nearness of the distant and the gigantic, soon eclipsed any real nearness to being and to the world (and so also the possibility of pluralistic appearances in spaces such as the polis), was itself soon itself eclipsed by technologies no longer need to bring ‘any-thing’ near, where things and pictures and meaning and desires and ends are giving way to patterns and correlations; the cycles of the Gestell become one continual switching (there ‘is’ nothing as such to extract, unlock, store etc.., save for information).

This chapter attempts to build on chapter 2, which dealt with the two building blocks necessary for the formation of contracts, namely offer and acceptance. Here, we examine the remaining two requirements: the intention (nīyya) to be bound and the existence of good cause or causa. Unlike English law where so-called consideration is additionally required, this is not entertained in the CC, even if in places the language seems to suggest consideration. This is in fact not true. The chapter goes on to show how the parties’ intention to be bound may be expressed and how the courts can make sense of such intent when the parties disagree about what it is they had offered or accepted. Intent has been a significant aspect of Islamic law. A significant part of this chapter will deal with the legal nature of promises, as unilateral acts, and whether they are enforceable under any circumstances. As will be demonstrated, Qatari law is generally reluctant to enforce promises.