Much thought has been accorded to the evolving nature of business history. It is only relatively recently, however, that attempts have been made to articulate methodological issues in a more epistemologically explicit and reflexive fashion. This article contributes to this burgeoning agenda by examining the methodology underpinning an intensive archival study of the British interwar management movement (1918–1939), a major force in British management education between the wars. We explicate the methodology employed and question what this material tells us about the interwar management movement, in terms of its determination to modernize management, encourage openness between firms, and extend a new spirit of partnership. We show that the interwar management movement was characterized by organized cooperation and methodological openness. Our main contribution is to demonstrate that interpretations themselves can become entrenched and prone to inertia, inviting us to revisit these periodically and, if appropriate, recast them.

When faced with Esther Sahle's, Edmond Smith's, and Dane A. Morrison's recent books on English and American merchants, their activities, and their communities, a reader with any level of exposure to the field of early modern and early republic business history might legitimately ask, do we really need more? Historians have so completely associated early modern economic activity with merchant activity that many have deemed the period an era of “merchant capitalism.” The field is full of excellent studies and one might rightfully ask whether historians such as Jacob Price (Capital and Credit in British Overseas Trade [1980]), David Hancock (Oceans of Wine [2009]), Cathy Matson (Merchants and Empire [1998]), and Francesca Trivellato (The Familiarity of Strangers [2009]), among many others, have not plumbed the depths of the subject. Scholars of the Black Atlantic have also increasingly questioned the legitimacy of projects that continue to render the violence of slavery ancillary to discussions of business practice. To some extent, genuine historical engagement with merchants must reproduce the views of colonizers and enslavers to make the people whom it studies legible to modern audiences. This reproduction does damage as it illuminates, and business historians must engage this critique directly to maintain the legitimacy of their projects. In a crowded field with foundations that are seriously challenged by an emergent strain in this historical discipline, it is worth skeptically asking what three additional studies can add.

What effect does political instability in the form of a potential secession from a political union have on business formation? Using newly collected data on business creation, we show that entrepreneurial activity in Ireland in the late nineteenth century was much lower than Scotland, and this divergence fluctuated over time. Several factors may have contributed to this, but we argue that political uncertainty about the prospect of a devolved government in Ireland played a role. The effects were most acute in the North of Ireland, the region that was most concerned by potential changes.

This paper examines whether CEO turnover affects company performance and the optimal time for CEO renewal during a turnaround process. Results, derived from data collected from Italian companies, highlight the necessity of introducing the new CEO before beginning an insolvency procedure. A later appointment can reduce his/her impact, probably due to the difficulty of managing negotiations with the creditors. Moreover, we show a positive and significant relationship between CEO turnover and the likelihood of a bankrupt firm re-emerging from an insolvency procedure. The analysis was based on the traditional logit model and more modern approaches like the random forest and the AdaBoost models, combined with the SHAP technique. Overall, our findings provide valuable insight for all company stakeholders, whose interests are significantly impacted by its default.

In this commentary, I expand on Fey's (2022) perspective on the future development of Chinese business schools. In particular, I explore some of the nuances related to Chinese business schools that were not covered by Fey with the goal of continuing this important dialogue.

Central counterparty (CCP) default waterfalls act as the last lines of defense in over-the-counter markets by managing and allocating resources to cover payment defaults. This article examines the impact of variations in waterfall design on financial system losses in the presence of payment network dependencies and frictions in the cleared and noncleared portion of the system. Through the development of a structural model, we draw several theoretical conclusions about the effectiveness of CCP default waterfalls under severe payment stress. These findings are empirically quantified by testing the model using supervisory data for the U.S. credit default swap market.

We document statistically significant relations between mutual fund betas and past market returns driven by fund feedback trading. Against this backdrop, evidence of “artificial” market timing emerges when standard market timing regressions are estimated across periods that span time variation in fund systematic risk levels, as is typical. Artificial timing significantly explains the inverse relation between timing model estimates of market timing and stock selectivity. A fund’s feedback trading relates to its past performance and remains significant after accounting for trading on momentum. Fund flows suggest that investors value feedback trading, which helps hedge downside risk during bear markets.

Disequilibrating macro shocks affect different firms’ prospects differently, increasing idiosyncratic variation in forward-looking stock returns before affecting economic growth. Consistent with most such shocks from 1947 to 2020 enhancing productivity, increased idiosyncratic stock return variation forecasts next-quarter real GDP growth, industrial production growth, and consumption growth both in-sample and out-of-sample. These effects persist after controlling for other leading economic indicators.