This paper aims to analyze how governance and management of strategic networks (SNs) composed of small firms differ according to network size and length of existence. We analyzed 20 Brazilian SNs, comparing oldest to youngest and largest to smallest. The results show that large SNs have a more robust management structure, automated process control system, and centralized strategic decision-making power. Only small and younger SNs are not centralized and lack incentive mechanisms for members. Moreover, older SNs have a centralized strategic formulation and implementation process, whereas younger SNs have a more inclusive and participatory one. The results confirm previous studies and offer a fine-grained comprehension of the governance of SNs according to the number of members. The findings contribute to the nascent network governance theory and offer insights to network managers who have to reconfigure the governance as the number of members grows.

Managers’ incentives to round up reported earnings per share (EPS) cause an underrepresentation of the number 4 in the first post-decimal digit of EPS, or “quadrophobia.” We develop a novel measure of aggressive financial reporting practices based on a firm’s history of quadrophobia. Quadrophobia is pervasive, persistent, and successfully predicts future restatements, Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions, and class action litigation. It is more pronounced when executive compensation is more closely tied to the stock price and when the firm anticipates violating debt covenants. Quadrophobia is especially strong when rounding-up EPS allows firms to meet analyst expectations, and investors seem not to see through this behavior.

We hypothesize that corporate takeover markets create significant constraints for short sellers. Both short sellers and corporate bidders often target firms with declining economic prospects. Yet, a target firm’s stock price generally increases upon a takeover announcement, resulting in losses for short sellers. Therefore, short sellers should require higher rates of return when the takeover likelihood is higher. Consistent with this prediction, the return predictability of monthly short interest increases with industry-level takeover probability and decreases as takeover defenses are implemented. Our results suggest that efficient takeover markets create trading frictions for short sellers and can therefore inhibit overall market efficiency.

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing, in which shocks to the value of collateralizable assets generate variation in firms’ debt capacity. We show that the degree of similarity among firms’ financial flexibility forecasts cross-sectional variation in return correlation. We test the implications of the model with firm-level data in two empirical analyses using i) an instrumental variable approach based on shocks to the value of collateralizable corporate assets and ii) the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis as an event study. We find that firms in the same percentile of the cross-sectional distribution of financial flexibility have 62% higher correlation in stock-return residuals than firms 50 percentiles apart.

I examine the impact of the opioid epidemic on subprime auto lending. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that county-level increases in opioid abuse cause an increase in loan defaults. Moreover, I find that traditional credit scoring attributes (e.g., FICO score) fail to predict loan performance deterioration associated with opioid addiction. The weak predictive performance of traditional credit measures and the resulting higher default rates generate a negative externality for borrowers in opioid-afflicted areas, as evidenced by 5.7% higher loan costs for subprime borrowers.

This article provides a survey of China’s initial public offering (IPO) market, focusing on IPO pricing, bids and allocation, and aftermarket trading. We show that strict regulations result in suppressed IPO offer prices and high initial returns, causing a high cost of going public. Investors treat IPOs as lotteries with extremely high short-term returns, with little attention to the long term. The auction selling method, however, works in the way it is supposed to. Mutual funds bid in a more informative way than other investors, and their advantages are unlikely to be due to underwriters’ preferential treatment. We also discuss the latest registration-system reform.

We study how the U.S. government’s anti-counterfeiting enforcement actions through Special 301 Reports influence U.S. businesses. We show that anti-counterfeiting enforcement in foreign countries improves U.S. firms’ sales, profitability, and valuations. Firms significantly reduce capital and research and development investments when their brands and products are protected from counterfeiting activities. Anti-counterfeiting enforcement measures also improve brand asset value, brand profitability, brand inventiveness, market penetration, and customer loyalty.

Economic inequality, in particular vertical inequality in income and wealth within countries,1 has widened considerably with potentially dramatic economic, political and social consequences.2 Reflecting the need for urgent action on inequality, the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10 focuses on the reduction of various forms of inequality within and between countries.3 In that context, a number of recent interventions have sought to highlight how business affects inequality,4 recognizing that businesses have a central function in creating and distributing economic value in society. Significantly, two emerging initiatives, the Task Force on Inequality-Related Financial Disclosure (TIFD)5 and the Business Commission to Tackle Inequality (BCTI) by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development,6 seek to notably identify business impacts on inequality and provide approaches for their alleviation.

The goal of natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) is to compensate the public for losses to natural resources from past or ongoing hazardous releases, including losses that may persist into the future. Compensation is delivered in the form of restoration projects. Resolving NRDA liability requires balancing losses and restoration benefits over multiple decades and converting them into a present value for calculating appropriate damages. For the past two decades, NRDA practitioners have used a real discount rate of 3 % to convert losses and benefits to a present value equivalent. That rate was based, in part, on real historical yields on risk-free debt (e.g., the real rate of return on 3-month Treasury bills). Declining interest rates on risk-free debt in recent years has led to suggestions to reexamine the historical consensus discount rate. This paper reviews two alternative conceptual paradigms for selecting a discount rate in NRDA cases: the social rate of time preference and discount rates for tort cases. We summarize historical data for empirically implementing the two paradigms and discuss the ramifications of the different options. Based on our review, we suggest maintaining the 3 % consensus as a practical solution to a range of empirical candidates within the two conceptual paradigms.

Economists have for decades recommended that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases be taxed – or otherwise priced – to provide incentives for their reduction. The USA does not have a federal carbon tax; however, many state and federal programs to reduce carbon emissions effectively price carbon – for example, through cap-and-trade systems or regulations. There are also programs that subsidize reductions in carbon emissions. At the 2022 meetings of the American Economic Association, the Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis brought together five well-known economists – Joe Aldy, Dallas Burtraw, Carolyn Fischer, Meredith Fowlie, and Rob Williams – to discuss how the USA does, in fact, price carbon and how it could price carbon. Maureen Cropper chaired the panel. This paper summarizes their remarks.

An important literature emphasizes that finance grew rapidly after WWII relative to the full economy and the services sector, but these are poor benchmarks because they mask a broad structural shift from low- to high-skill services. We show that i) finance is among the most skill-intensive service industries, ii) the evolution of the finance income share closely tracks other high-skill service industries, and iii) finance grew much slower than the rest of high-skill services in the post-WWII period. The rise of modern finance is not as remarkable as prior research suggests, providing context for debates about the size of finance.