In a Schumpeterian economic model, dynamic capabilities (DC) help entrepreneurial firms create competitive advantages. However, advancing the construct of DC in entrepreneurship is hampered by the incompatibility of some key assumptions in entrepreneurial ventures. In this paper, we propose that dynamic managerial capabilities (DMC), which builds upon the DC perspective by drawing attention to the role of managers, is a better alternative in analyzing entrepreneurship research. We find support for our ideas in a systematic analysis of extant research. Our review highlights the evolution of DMC literature in entrepreneurship and traces its dominant intellectual structures. In concurrent analysis, we highlight the limitations of utilizing DC. Additionally, we shed new light on the emergence of organizational capabilities, and present new avenues for future research.

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a significant role in China. Based on recent statistics, about 67% of firms were non-state owned, which contributed 47% of the R&D in 2017 (Report of the Top 500 Firms in China, 2017). The majority of these firms are SMEs, many of which are family businesses. Despite their importance, we lack both theoretical and empirical understanding of how these firms cope with the opportunities and challenges in China's fast-changing transitional market. In light of the mission of Management and Organization Review (MOR), i.e., publishing ground-breaking insights about management and organizations in China, we called for this special issue in order to promote the value of the unique Chinese institutional context for management inquiries.

We study 6,083 European firms that were acquired between 1999 and 2015. Soon after the acquisition, the acquired firms promptly and substantially close the gap between their actual leverage ratios and their target (optimal) ratios. Firms that were over- (under-) leveraged at the start of their acquisition year move their debt-to-assets ratio from 34.1% to 20% (10% to 18.5%) by the end of the following year. Under-leveraged firms expand their assets rapidly following acquisition, as they gain improved access to investable resources. Our results are consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure and with the existence of firm-specific target leverage ratios.

Mandatory disclosure of CEO compensation peers signals potential outside opportunities for the cited CEOs by revealing which companies view them as viable executive candidates. CEOs cited often as compensation peers (especially by larger firms, which represent attractive employment opportunities) are more likely to leave for better positions or receive compensation increases. Equity-based awards following cites by larger firms have shorter vesting periods, suggesting these CEOs gain negotiating power relative to their boards. The disclosure requirement enhanced labor market transparency and led to higher compensation for highly cited CEOs without penalizing less cited CEOs, putting upward pressure on CEO compensation.

Since 2012, a large-scale Party branches building campaign intending to regain political influence in the private sector has been sweepingly promoted. Drawing on the Chinese Private Enterprise Survey conducted in 2008, 2012, and 2018, this study investigates private enterprises’ strategies in response to the intensified political pressure by integrating socioemotional wealth theory and neo-institutional theory. It is found that (1) private enterprises with high family ownership tend not to establish Party branches until political pressure is very high; (2) enterprises with high family ownership are more likely to adopt a decoupling strategy of evading the Party's political and social goals; and (3) the owners’ perceptions of a better market and legal environment weaken the negative effect of family ownership on the establishment of Party branches. These results reveal the key logic of preserving the socioemotional wealth and ‘embedded agency’ of Chinese private enterprises when they confront institutional legitimacy mandates. This study also sheds new light on the causes of the decoupling phenomenon and the dynamic interactions between institutional environment and organizational behaviors.

Using a proprietary data set on international private equity activity, we study the determinants of buyout investments across 61 countries and 19 industries over the period of 1990 to 2017. We find that countries with cyclically strong economies, more active stock and credit markets, and better rule of law experience more buyout activity. Countries also receive more buyout capital following investor protection and contract enforcement reforms. The set of determinants we identify appear somewhat unique to buyout investments, because other forms of investment such as foreign direct investment, gross capital formation, investments in R&D, and M&A activity do not respond similarly to these factors.

We solve a flexible model that captures transactions costs and infrequencies of trading opportunities for illiquid assets to better understand the shadow costs of illiquidity for different origins of asset illiquidity and heterogeneous investor types. We show that illiquidity that results in suboptimal asset allocation carries low shadow costs, whereas these costs are high when illiquidity restricts consumption. As a result, the shadow costs are high for short-term investors, investors who face substantial liquidity shocks, and investors who desire to allocate a large fraction of their wealth to illiquid assets.

Using a large and novel data set over the period of 1976 to 2019 tracking inventors’ career paths following mergers and acquisitions, we show that collaboration between acquirer and target inventors post-merger is associated with more path-breaking patents than those filed by either acquirer or target inventor-only teams. We further show that such collaboration is more important in improving acquirers’ innovation capabilities than hiring target inventors and knowledge spillovers. Finally, we show that recombining tacit knowledge embodied in the human capital of acquirer and target inventors is likely the mechanism. We conclude that inter-firm inventor collaboration is one key means for achieving synergies.