The response of both developed and developing countries to global developments has been first, to shift the tax burden from (mobile) capital to (less mobile) labour, and second, when further increased taxation of labour becomes politically and economically difficult, to cut government services. Thus, globalization and tax competition lead to a fiscal crisis for countries that wish to continue to provide those government services to their citizens, at the same time that demographic factors and increased income inequality, job insecurity and income volatility that result from globalization render such services more necessary. This chapter argues that if government service programs are to be maintained in the face of globalization, and if developing countries are to raise the funds needed to achieve the SDGs, it is necessary to cut the intermediate link by limiting tax competition. However, from both practical and normative considerations, any limits set to tax competition should be congruent with maintaining the ability of democratic states to determine the desirable size of their government.

The focus of this chapter is the use of international arbitration for BHR disputes. The first part sets out the theoretical framework. It places arbitration within the context of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“UNGPs”) and the barriers to individuals securing remedies. The merits and limitations of arbitration as an existing mechanism for resolving BHR disputes are discussed. The authors also consider how international arbitration, with appropriate modifications, may be complementary to, and operate in parallel with, both existing state-based judicial mechanisms as well as possible multilateral institutions for resolution of BHR disputes in the future. The second part of the chapter considers the pragmatic angle of arbitration of BHR disputes through: (i) the prism of the experience of the Bangladesh Accord Arbitrations; (ii) the formulation of BHR-specific arbitral procedures in the form of the Hague Rules; and (iii) the potential embrace of BHR arbitration in a range of specific industries, namely fast fashion, mega-sporting events, and commerce at sea.

Debates over fiduciary status gained national prominence with the Department of Labor’s 2016 attempt to define an investment adviser fiduciary under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in 2016. The DOL’s fiduciary rule, however, was vacated by the courts, leaving doubt as to whether and when an investment advisor is considered a fiduciary under ERISA. Moreover, many believe that earlier guidance from the DOL on who is an investment advisor fiduciary is too narrow to protect retirement investors. What is less well known is that many of the debates in ERISA over investment advisor fiduciaries track larger debates in the common law regarding fiduciary status. This chapter explores three parallels between the common law and ERISA in determining fiduciary status. The first is the structure of fiduciary categories and the division between categorical and ad hoc fiduciaries. The second is the tendency to look to whether one person has discretionary authority to determine whether the first person is a fiduciary. The third is the challenge raised by advice giving. Both common law courts and ERISA jurisprudence struggle to determine whether and when advisors, who lack discretionary authority, should be considered fiduciaries. The chapter concludes that trust can serve as a foundation for an advisor’s fiduciary status both in the common law and under ERISA.

This Chapter analyzes two of the most extreme examples of partnerships that have outgrown partnership law: limited liability partnerships (LLPs) and publicly-traded partnerships (PTPs), known in the investment community as master limited partnerships (MLPs). Both of these entities reflect the tension between traditional partnership law and legislatively-granted limited liability and contractual flexibility. Just as corporation statutes apply awkwardly to small, closely-held corporations, partnership and limited partnership acts apply even more awkwardly to extra large partnerships.