Chapter 2 of Community Disaster Recovery: Moving from Vulnerability to Resilience examines the case of Colorado’s extreme floods of 2013, describing the event, damages, and the aftermath during the early weeks of disaster recovery.It sets the stage for subsequent chapters that empirically assess the disaster recovery processes and outcomes. The extreme flooding that occurred in Colorado in 2013 began with heavy rain from a stationary front, with the worst coming on September 11 and 12. The rivers along Colorado’s Front Range swelled from the storm beginning September 9. Flash flooding soon occurred in the narrow mountain canyons and communities, overwhelming communities nestled at the mouths of canyons. This floodwater then slowly moved east to the agricultural communities in the plains including Evans. Seventeen Colorado counties across nearly 200 miles (north to south) were affected by the flood event, for a total of 4,500 square miles.

This chapter examines all three levels to present a holistic framework for understanding gender in relation to entrepreneurial ecosystems and policies for supporting inclusive economic development. It builds off the authors’ previous research in this area within the technology startup sector. The chapter provides effective approaches for building inclusive entrepreneurial ecosystems that range from individual approaches to organizational ones and, finally, to approaches by policymakers at local, state, and country levels. The chapter also outlines how gender should be an important dimension of policy efforts aimed at helping cities, states, and nations combat rising economic inequality in the midst of economic development efforts. More urgently, the impact of the ongoing pandemic is also examined given the gendered outcomes it will likely have on entrepreneurial success.

As international arbitration has become increasingly popular over the years as a mechanism for resolving substantial cross-border disputes, stakeholders in the process – parties, counsel, and arbitrators themselves – have devoted significant and increasing attention to how principles of professional ethics should apply in the context of these proceedings.

Dealing in Virtue, which Yves Dezalay and I published in 1996,1 was an effort to understand the origins of international commercial arbitration, its rise to become the default dispute resolution process for transnational disputes, how the arbitrators gained their positions and earned the legitimacy to be selected in high-stakes disputes, and how the rise of international commercial arbitration affected dispute resolution within national States. We interviewed some 400 members of the international commercial arbitration community. One of the most noted findings was that there was a tension between what we termed the “grand old men” of international commercial arbitration and a group of arbitration technocrats who both challenged them and preserved and defended their world. The grand old men were senior arbitrators who had made their careers in academia or practice or in the judiciary, arbitrated part-time (at least until the boom in arbitration in the 1980s), and in Weberian terms told to us in an interview of a technocrat, relied on their charisma for legitimacy.

It is often affirmed that international arbitration does not have a forum. This statement can be seen as one of the manifestations of the doctrine that considers arbitration as a purely international phenomenon, detached from national laws. I have criticised this doctrine in many writings and will not repeat my arguments here.1 What this chapter deals with is one specific aspect, namely the significance for international arbitration of the arbitration law of the country in which the arbitral tribunal has its formal seat, the lex arbitri. The analysis will show that the statement according to which arbitration has no forum cannot de understood to mean that the lex arbitri has no significance for arbitration.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is an international organisation with 122 Contracting Parties, established to facilitate arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution. The PCA is a creation of the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899, and at the same time, a modern centre for the resolution of disputes involving States. It is a pre-cursor to creation of permanently constituted international courts and historically important in the development of international dispute resolution, yet is also more active in its own right today than at any point in its history.

This chapter focuses on the city of Boston and delves into how intersectional differences among women entrepreneurs result in additional and different biasing forces for women of color and immigrant women entrepreneurs compared to White women engaging in entrepreneurship. As such, the chapter provides a holistic consideration of how gender, race, and other relations of difference may play out in experiences of entrepreneurship within entrepreneurial ecosystems. The chapter aims to provide a complex and holistic picture of how entrepreneurial ecosystems essentially provide very different experiences, interactions, and institutional support for actors in ecosystems, thereby supporting our argument that actors, even if in the same category, are indeed heterogeneous and not homogeneous.

The issue of corruption is exemplary for the role of public policy in arbitration. Corruption is a “bilateral” criminal act involving the briber and the taker of the bribe, with varying nuances of solicitation on both sides.1 Both sides have an interest in keeping corrupt activities secret. Yet, regardless of the intentions of the parties, there is a universal consensus that corruption cannot be tolerated in international business relations. When international business transactions tainted by corruption are submitted to international arbitration, the notion of party autonomy finds its limits in the transnational public policy against bribery and corruption. No award can be allowed to take effect if it is seen to condone corruption. International arbitration derives its legitimacy from applying the law, including public policy rules prohibiting corruption.