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Pricing in the arts is peculiar and opaque. Pricing for works of art is very different from pricing for museum tickets and other interchangeable goods. We consider price elasticity of demand, meaning customer sensitivity to a change in price, especially considering a ticket-pricing change at the Indianapolis Museum of Art. We consider price discrimination, the strategy of charging different prices to different groups of people. We consider other variations on pricing structure including bundling, two-part tariffs, and versioning. For pricing works of art, the method of pricing is, following from Velthuis’s work, largely sociological and best modeled as a set of scripts.
In this chapter we revisit both art and economics as defined categories. The art world itself operates as a system of institutional and commercial value and of complicated interplays of altruism, strategy, financial motivation, and artistic import. This system exists within a larger system. That is, the art world is part of the larger world. We explore the definition of art – the narrowness of the definition of "high art" and the breadth of creative and visual activity. We consider the process by which visual culture is legitimated into the category of art, and then ask whether broad access to art is economic – a chance to buy something – or civic – a chance to participate. In fact, economics itself is a creative discipline. George Akerlof, the Nobel laureate, recently wrote about economics’ "sins of omission" as a discipline. These omissions are in overlooking soft skills and lacking the ability to tackle complex interdisciplinary problems. Thus, we leave the book with an idea of economics as a set of tools to create sustainability in the arts and economics as a creative discipline to build the world as an art project.
Markets are intersections of buyers and sellers brought together to exchange goods and services most efficiently, so the theory goes. In fact, markets are also connected to barter and exchange and to their underlying value: resourcefulness. We look at Nina Katchadourian and her artwork made on airplanes ("Seat Assignment") as an example of resourcefulness, Caroline Woolard’s Work Dress as an example of barter, and Elizabeth Cleland’s exhibition as an example of equivalencies created by markets. We introduce supply and demand, how the graphs are constructed, and how to think about shifts in supply and demand.
If the logic of markets is that price equals value, sometimes there are forms of value that fall outside of what markets are able to recognize. We call this phenomenon market failure. It is not a personal or institutional failure or even a failure of economic theory, just a limitation of markets as a medium. Our core case study is of the opening of Tate Modern. The museum revitalized the Southwark area of London and increased property values sometimes 500%. The museum relied on philanthropy and government support and was not able to capture all of the value it created. We consider two very different methods economists use to evaluate these situations: contingent valuation method and economic development study. We compare and contrast the approaches taken by the Guggenheim and the Tate. We explore concepts of market failure including public goods, externalities, tragedy of the commons, free-rider problems, adverse selection, and moral hazard.
In this chapter we consider supply chains, meaning the sequence of markets in an industry. For example, when the artist Damien Hirst hosted an auction of his own work at Sotheby’s London in 2008, he bypassed his dealers, leapfrogging over a stage of the typical supply chain. Supply chains are also sometimes vertically integrated markets, meaning the same firm owns many stages of these sequential markets. Vertical integration is the process by which a firm enters into the business area of its supplier or its customer, via acquisition, competition, or long-term contract. Vertical market power is often motivated by power or avoidance of different forms of market failure. Here, we are not (as in Chapter 4) talking about failure of the alignment of price and value but failure to transact reliably and without risk or undue cost. We explore related concepts of asset specificity and then business strategy models that take the supply chain as their spine.
If economics focuses on price representing value, we now shift to finance, which focuses on the connection of risk and return. We begin with the story of Wynn Kramarsky, a collector of works on paper (with his wife Sarah-Ann). Kramarsky’s parents had also owned Vincent van Gogh’s Portrait of Dr. Gachet. We go through a market primer including terminology of asset allocation and the logic of discounting cash flows and performing net present value analysis. We then review art market studies that use repeat sales and hedonic regression methods. The questions of this chapter try to connect the ephemeral, risk-taking, deeply uncertain work that happens in artists’ studios and to track the artwork from there to its status as part of an asset class.
We explore themes in Nobel Prize–winning economist James M. Buchanan’s work and apply his Ethics and Economic Progress to problems facing individuals and firms. We focus on Buchanan’s analysis of the individual work ethic, his exhortations to “pay the preacher” of the “institutions of moral-ethical communication,” and his notion of law as “public capital.” We highlight several ways people with other-regarding preferences can contribute to social flourishing and some of the ways those who have “affected to trade for the public good” might want to redirect their efforts. We show how Buchanan’s work has considerable implications for business ethics. Just as his economic analysis of politics changed how we understand government, we think his economic analysis of ethics can (and should) change how we understand business.
We present a rationale for bidder termination provisions that considers their effect on bidders’ and targets’ joint takeover gains. The provision’s inclusion can create value by enabling termination when the target becomes less valuable to the bidder than on its own, but creates a trade-off because termination may also occur when the target is more valuable to the bidder than on its own. This trade-off explains why the provision is included in only some deals, and explains variation in termination fees. Inclusion of the provision is associated with larger combined announcement returns, provided that the termination fee is priced appropriately.
We study trading and risk management decisions of banks in over-the-counter markets, accounting for 2 types of risk: payoff risk from loans and counterparty risk from trading activities. Our model provides empirically supported predictions on the structure of the interbank credit default swap (CDS) market: i) banks with high default probabilities either buy or sell CDS contracts; ii) because of the counterparty risk friction, payoff risk is only partially shared; and iii) safe banks act as intermediaries and help diversify counterparty risk. Banks manage their default probabilities to become creditworthy counterparties, but they do so in a socially inefficient way.