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In this chapter it is argued that a significant part of the reason for private equity’s outperformance is its superior and sophisticated governance structures, as described in this book, with lessons for private equity practitioners, investors and policymakers, as well as academics and others with a general interest in corporate governance and corporate performance.
← He wanted a proper exchange rather than an endless PowerPoint presentation, some real engagement with the content – and he got it. We are talking about the Chairman of a Frankfurt-based bank, who came up with a new way to entice members of the Executive Board to get more involved in their regular meetings.
He had the six most important slides from his presentation printed out in large format and placed them in the meeting room. Up until then, all eight executive board members would sit in comfortable armchairs and passively watch one slide after another – and he wanted to change this. His goal was to activate himself and his colleagues not only physically, but also mentally because all too often, any discussion was superficial at best. As the board members rose from their armchairs and began to walk from one large-format slide to another, something amazing happened. Without a projected slide on the wall and the hum of the beamer, an atmosphere of calm concentration began to fill the room. People really started to get to grips with the details and there was a buzz of animated conversation. One person even took a pen and drew a circle between two existing decision options with a question mark saying, ‘and there could be a third option’.
This chapter considers rules applicable in the UK to shareholders exercising power in their own interests, rather than the interests of the company, and asks whether these create any problems for private equity investors, in theory and in practice.It also looks at other ways in which shareholders and directors can be held liable for the actions of their companies, including Bribery Act rules, health and safety laws, competition law rules and tortious liability.
The Introduction defines and describes private equity-backed companies, explains why they matter and why policymakers are concerned about them. It explains how the book explores corporate governance mechanisms in these companies and why these might be expected to affect outcomes.The Introduction also explains that the book is focused on the UK but has global relevance.
↑ As we there yet? Well, almost. In this chapter, we want to take a brief look back with you and summarise the key findings in such a way that you will be able to apply your new-found knowledge with confidence. We will also take a look at promising developments in the world of meeting management – in terms of both the technology and the psychology of meetings.
← In this book, we have introduced you to the nudging approach as a way to improve the quality of your business meetings. We have assigned a large number of nudges into four different cornerstones, each of which comprises two subareas (see ). This has made the whole spectrum of nudging principles bear more fruit in meetings. For example, we have frequently used pre-structuring, signalling and feedback nudges to encourage meeting participants to work more productively.
‘I. Love. This. Meeting!’ announced Rea’s boss to the assembled group. Rea looked at him in disbelief. Astonished, her colleagues looked at Rea. How had she managed to convert the notorious pessimist Ian Hampton into a dedicated Meet-Up practitioner in a matter of minutes? What had happened?
Just a week ago, Rea Yunen was standing in her new boss’s office being told that he’d had enough of spending more than ten hours each week in unproductive meetings. Without further ado, he appointed her chairperson (he even used the term ‘meeting magician’) of the team to ‘sort out this mess’. She was astonished. She had not envisaged anything like this when she applied for the post. How could she do it? Was she capable of changing a fossilised meeting culture? What difference could she – a small cog in a big wheel – make?
A central question addressed in this book has been how, and for what purposes, private equity firms design governance systems for their portfolio companies and, separately, whether these systems – and the incentives of the decision-makers that populate them – make it more or less likely that private equity investors will be responsible stewards of the companies they own. In these concluding remarks, I address each of these issues in turn.
This chapter explains that a central feature of private equity governance mechanisms is a system designed to improve decision-making. Through an explanation of the typical structures seen in practice, it considers the main ways in which better decision-making is facilitated. These structures – most importantly, the board of directors of the company – differ according to the size, type and stage of development of the company, as well as the skills and expertise of the relevant stakeholders. This chapter also looks at the ways in which private equity firms seek to protect their own interests, as distinct from those of the underlying company. That question is examined from a number of perspectives, including the need for a private equity investor to sell the company within a defined time frame, and its need to protect its own reputation with a wide variety of stakeholders. Building on this analysis, and connecting in particular with the various objectives of private equity firms, this chapter considers how, if at all, private equity firms design governance mechanisms with a view to protecting external stakeholders.
← One of the best meetings we ever attended as moderators enabled a diagnostics company to bring its latest product to market six months earlier than planned, generating significant additional revenue. How was this achieved?
Believe it or not, the breakthrough came about because we were able to create and maintain orientation in a critical discussion despite an incredible amount of detail. Thanks to skilful navigation through the various issues (technical, medical, legal and commercial), the team was able to gain remarkable new insights and remove several go-to-market barriers more quickly than expected.
Practically speaking, this took place in a so-called ‘lessons learned meeting’, when past mistakes, successes and their consequences (findings and measures taken) are jointly considered. The following illustration (Figure 15) shows the poster we used.